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Judicial Independence:
Rebuffing Congressional Attacks
on the Third Branch
BY STEPHAN 0. KLINE*
I. INTRODUCTION
ourts are easy targets for popular anger. This is a burden that
predates the founding of the United States, but ultraconserva-
tives m the 104th and 105th Congresses have launched a
particularly broad array of attacks that pose a threat to judicial mdepend-
ence. The Republican majorities considered constitutional amendments that
would eliminate life tenure for federal judges. They passed bills which
limit the jurisdiction of courts and considered other legislation which
would stip judicial remedies. They convened hearings to study and control
"judicial activism." The Senate has brought gridlock to the judicial
confirmation process, and semor Republicans have even articulated their
desire to impeach and "intimidate"judges because of distaste for particular
judicial decisions.
Some members of Congress are particularly outspoken on this issue.
Representative Bob Barr (R-Ga.) believes that
[i]t is time to begin exploring how and in what way we might take steps
to "re-balance" and restore integrity to our Federal judicial system. This
includes, but is not limited to, exploring the manner in which the
constitutional tenure for judges to hold their office during "good
behavior" can be fully effectuated to take into account the consequences
for misbehavior-a problem plainly presented to the Amencan people by
the assumption of power beyond the scope of the office. There are, as
B.A. 1989, Wesleyan Umversity; J.D. 1992, LL.M. m Law and Government
1998, The American Umversity's Washington College of Law. The author is a
public interest attorney in Washington, D.C., who has specialized m legislative
issues relating to the federal courts. The author wishes to thank Professor Jamie
Raskin of the Washington College of Law for his helpful suggestions on ths
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with other problems confronting our institutions, a number of ways that
the problems of judicial activism or overreaching, can be addressed:
defining "good behavior"; limiting tenure of judges; limitations on the
jurisdiction of judges and impeachment'
Senator John Ashcroft (R-Mo.) claims:
Given the vast power wielded by the judiciary and the Clinton admmis-
tration's pattern of flawed nominees, the Senate must take proper care m
its consideration of candidates for judgeships. Activist, out-of-control
judges pose a clear and present danger to constitutional freedom. It is the
Senate's solemn duty to set a higher standard than we have seen so far
from the Clinton Administration.2
Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.) echoes his colleague, and m one recent
confirmation hearing, he remarked:
As you know, this Senate has been focusing on the question of judicial
activism because we believe that we need to have a commitment and an
understanding and a belief that the nominees we confirm are committed
to the proposition that they would enforce the law as written and not use
redefinition of words or other things to impose a personal agenda.
3
While legislators in previous Congresses have reacted negatively to
certam court decisions,4 the federal courts have rarely been a substantial
and sustamed focus for Congress. This has now changed. According to a
'JudicialMisconduct andDiscipline: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 8
(1997) [hereinafter Judicial Misconduct and Discipline] (statement of Rep. Bob
Barr).
2 John Ashcroft, Symposium, INSIGHT MAG., Mar. 2, 1998, available in 1998
WL 9105346.
' Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments Before the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, Part 3, 105th Cong. 23-24 (1998) (statement of Sen. Jeff
Sessions).
4 For instance, 100 southern Democratic members of the 84th Congress signed
a "Southern Manifesto" condemning Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), and urging the impeachment of its author, Chief Justice Earl Warren. In the
early 1980s, multiple bills were considered in Congress which would have stripped
federal courts ofjurisdiction to hear abortion, bussing, and school prayer cases in
response to Supreme Court decisions. See infra Part II.D.1 for notes 219-23.
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report released by the American Bar Association's Commission on the
Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence,
While there is nothing new about judicial criticism, there are aspects
of the present cycle of political debate that are relatively new and lack
clear precedent. In recent years an unfortunate shrillness has often
marked the tenor of inter-branch discussions. This new skepticism has
caused some to fear that Congress is seeking to over-regulate the courts
in ways that are not keeping with a truly mdependentjudiciary 5
The current attacks onjudicial independence are so severe that Senator
Russell Femgold (D-Wis.) has said: "I think we are close to being able to
say this is an unprecedented series of threats toward the independence of
ourjudiciary " While some may not know how to define it, even those like
Senators Ashcroft and Sessions and Representative Barr, who sternly
criticizejudges, courts, and their decisions and take action reinforcing their
critiques, profess to support the concept of judicial independence while
refusing to acknowledge that they contribute to the erosion of this
important doctnne.7
A number of commentators and legal scholars have placed the efforts
of the congressional majority in historical context by comparing them to
the 1930s. Professor Sheldon Goldman of the Umversity of Massachusetts,
who has studied the federal courts for more than three decades, has called
the current confirmation gridlock "unprecedented in its scope [and] a
Congressional analogue of President Roosevelt's court packing plan of
1937 "1 Both Roosevelt's court packing and the Republican's court
5 ABA COMM'N ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE,
REPORT: AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, opening at ii (1997).
6JudicialActivism: Defining theProblem andlts Impact: Hearings on S.J. Res.
26, a Bill Proposing a Constitutional Amendment to Establish Limited Judicial
Terms of Office Before the Subcomm. on Constitution, Federalism, and Property
Rights ofthe Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 10 (1997) [hereinafter Judicial
Activism] (statement of Sen. Russell Femgold).
7 See infra Part ll.A.
' President Franklin Delano Roosevelt responded to a series of Supreme Court
decisions curtailing the regulatory powers provided by Congress to is
administration by proposing that the Court be expanded one seat for each justice
who was older than 70. While President Roosevelt ultimately suffered a grave
political defeat as Congress failed to adopt his plan, the Supreme Court shifted
ideological direction and never again declaredNew Deal laws unconstitutional. The
court packing plan is considered the twentieth century's boldest and most
1998-991
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blocking plans had their genesis in displeasure with court decisions.9 In
order to explore the current attacks, this paper first defines judicial
independence and the concept of judicial activism. It then discusses the
contemporary threats to judicial independence posed by the Republican
majorities of the 104th and 105th Congresses.
II. THEORY-
SAFEGUARDS AND CRITICISM OF THE THIRD BRANCH
A. Judicial Independence
Jerome Shestack, a past president of the American Bar Association,
correctly assessed that "[w]hat marks our nation from so many unstable or
authoritarian governments is, to a substantial measure, the independence
of our judges as preservers of our constitutional rights."'" Judicial
independence helps insure that litigants will know that decisions made by
judges are based on law and not popular favor. According to the Director
of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, "Judicial independence is a
judge's ability to decide a case free from pressures or inducements.""
Judge Deanell Reece Tacha of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit expands on this concept:
aggressive example of a successful attack on judicial independence. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM F SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
THE NEW LEGALITY, 1932-1968, at 60-70 (1970); see also Barry Cushman,
Rethinlang the New Deal, 80 VA. L. REV 201 (1998); David A. Pepper, Against
Legalism: Rebuffing an Anachronistic Account of 1937, 82 MARQ. L. REV 63
(1998).
Federal case law reflective of the Court's new willingness to accede to
Roosevelt's demands includes the following: United States v. RockRoyal Co-op,
307 U.S. 533 (1939) (upholding authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to control
milk marketing); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939) (upholding provisions of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act); Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118 (1939) (upholding constitutionality of the TVA);
and United States v. Bekns, 304 U.S. 27 (1938) (upholding statute concerning
municipal bankruptcies).
9See Joan Biskupic, HillRepublicans Target "JudicialActivism, " WASH. POST,
Sept. 15, 1997, atA8.
'0Kenneth Jost, The Federal Judiciary, Are theAttacks on U.S. Courts Justified,
CQ RESEARCHER, Mar. 13, 1998, at frontpiece.
" L. Ralph Mecham, Introduction to Mercer Law Review Symposium on
Federal Judicial Independence, 46 MERCER L. REv 637, 638 n.2 (1995).
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[J]udicial independence means simply that a life-tenured Federal judge is
free from all political and other outside pressures to decide cases m a
wholly Impartial manner. She must commit herself to following the
Constitution, the statutes, common law principles, and the precedent that
interprets each of them. Her decision-making is limited to properly
admitted evidence, constrained by appropriate procedural rules, records,
and legal principles. Prevailing political winds have no effect. The codes
of conduct require a judge to adhere not only to the principle of actual
impartiality and absence of outside influence, but also require a judge to
be free from even the appearance of any Improper influence. Thus, a
judge resigns from all other affiliations that would call her impartiality
into question, divests herself of any financial interests which would raise
similar questions, and refrains from all activity that appears to have the
capacity to influence personal decision-making.
12
Sixty years ago, when the Senate Judiciary Committee decided to reject
President Roosevelt's courtpackng plan m 1937, it explamedwhyjudicial
independence is important:
Courts and the judges thereof should be free from a subservient
attitude of mmd, and this must be true whether a question of constitutional
construction or one of popular activity is involved. If the court of last
resort is to be made to respond to a prevalent sentiment of a current hour,
politically Imposed, that Court must ultimately become subservient to the
pressure of public opinion of the hour, which might at the moment
embrace mob passion abhorrent to a more calm, lasting consideration. 13
In 1871, the Supreme Court itself describedthe need forjudicial independ-
ence in a discussion on judicial immunity-
It is essential in all courts thatjudges who are appointed to administer
the law should be permitted to admimster it under the protection of the
law, independently and freely, without favor and without fear. This
provision of the law is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or
corruptjudge, butfor the benefit ofthepublic, whose interest it is that the
judges should be at liberty to exercise theirfinctions without independ-
ence, and withoutfear of consequences. 
14
2 Deanell Reece Tacha, Independence of the Judiciary for the Third Century,
46 MERCER L. REv 645, 646 (1995).
13 REORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, S. REP No. 75-711, at 15 (1937).
14 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 349 n.16 (1871) (emphasis added).
1998-99]
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William Rehnquist, current Chief Justice of the United States, focused
on the separation of powers and the importance of judicial independence
in his 1996 year-end speech on the state of the judiciary-
The federaljudiciary's achievements and disappointments of the past
year illuminate both the basic principle of separation of powers and the
interdependent relationship that exists between Congress and the
judiciary. In the words of Justice Robert Jackson, "While the Constitution
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.
It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy
but reciprocity." To preserve liberty, the Judicial branch of the federal
government is separate, equal, and independent from the Legislative
branch. Yet both must work together if feasible solutions are to be found
to the practical problems that confront today's federal judiciary.
15
Judicial independence is integral to the United States's unique notion
of the separation of powers. The framers of the Constitution based many of
their views of government on the British monarchy Under the British
system, judges were beholden to the monarch for salary protection and
tenure in office. Under the system of government established in this
country, the founders believed that the courts needed protection from the
two political branches, the legislative and executive, which were responsive
both to majoritanan rule and the voters. The courts were established, in
part, to limit excesses of the popular branches and to preserve the rights of
minorities.
16
IS ChiefJustice William Rehnquist, 1996 Annual State of the Judiciary Address
15 (Dec. 31, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
16 Thejudicial branch is not completely isolated from the two political branches.
The president makes appointments to the federal courts. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §
2. Congress has the power to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court,"
id. art. I, § 8; to appropriate money for the courts, see id., and to impeach judges,
see id. art. II, §§ 2, 3. Congress has frequently used its responsibility to set
jurisdictional boundaries on the courts, including establishing sharp limits on the
Supreme Court's acceptance of cases by mandatory appeal in 1925 andpassing the
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1975). Judges have frequently
participated in political branch activities. John Jay, for three months, served
simultaneously as the first Chief Justice of the United States and as Secretary of
State. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson took an 18-month leave of absence
to serve as the chief American prosecutor at the Nuremburg war crimes trials after
World War II. Chief Justice Earl Warren served as Chairman of the President's
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Former president of the American Bar Association N. Lee Cooper
accurately summanzes the two major purposes of judicial independence:
An independent federaljudiciary was created fortwo distinct reasons.
First, making the judiciary a third branch of government independent of
the legislative and executive would enable the judiciary to check over
concentrations of power in the political branches-hence the need for
institutional judicial independence. Second, making the judiciary
independent of outside influences, both within and without government,
Commission on the Assassmation ofPresident Kennedy, and Warren Burger began
his service as Chairman of the Commission on the Bicentenmal of the United States
Constitution prior to his resignation as Cluef Justice. See, e.g., LAURENCEH. TRIBE,
GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY (1985); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESENT JOHN F KENNEDY (1964);
DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME
COURT (1992). Judges and justices have also frequently testified before Congress
on diverse topics including court budgets, the need for additional judgeships,
jurisdiction, and court reorganization plans.
In testifying on behalf ofthe Judicial Conference oftheUnited States before the
ABA's Special Commission on the Separation of Powers and Judicial
Independence, Semor Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez of the District of New Jersey
focused on how mechanical controls can themselves become an attack onjudicial
independence:
[W]hile we as federal justices and judges are as independent as our
counterparts in any democracy, we are very much dependent upon the
Congress for the enactment of laws to enable us to do a better job of
admmistratingjustice. This relationship, it seems tome, results m a"healthy
tension."
Clearly, Congress' role in the affairs of the Third Branch is important
and legitimate. Congress determines the number ofjudgeships, the structure
and function and procedures of the judiciary, the junsdiction of the courts,
the salaries of judges, as well as our annual appropriation. I believe that
Congress, for the most part, does a goodjob in its oversight ofthejudiciary.
If the Legislative branch is sensitive and responsive to our needs, we
shall remain one of the most durable legacies of the founders of this nation.
If it is not, then suspicion, under-funding, minute oversight, and capricious
additions to workload may become the equivalent of a constitutional
amendment effectively repealing Article III.
ABA Public Hearing of the Comm "n on the Separation of Powers and Judicial
Independence [hereinafter ABA Hearings of the Comm'n] (Feb. 21, 1997)
(testimony of Senior Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez).
1998-99]
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would better enable the judiciary to render impartial decisions in
individual cases-hence the need for decisional independence. In both
cases, the operating assumption was that ajudiciary independent of the
electorate and its representatives was needed to preserve the democratic
values the electorate and its representatives held dear 17
Shirley Abrahmson, the Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
agrees with Cooper's assessment of the types ofjudicial independence and
believes that "[t]he general consensus is that judicial independence,
although difficult to define, is valuable to our system, and that threats to
[judicial independence] are ultimately threats to the rule of law "18
First Circuit Semor Judge Frank Coffin, believes that ajudge's "most
elusive mission is that of safeguarding individual rights m a majoritanan
society with due regard to the legitimate interests of that society "19 Bruce
Fern, a legal scholar and former Reagan Department of Justice official who
helped select federal judges, says that
the whole purpose of having the judiciary and conceiving it as a check is
precisely because it's there to resist the passions of the moment; it's there
to resist popular passion, and that's why we want them to decide not
wrongly; we try to hector them and criticize them if they think they're
wrongly approached, but we want them to decide in a more calm
atmosphere that's removed from what politicians and the public may think
is desired at that time.
20
Testifying before the ABA Commission on the Separation of Powers
and Judicial Independence, Drucilla S. Ramey, Executive Director and
General Counsel of the Bar Association of San Francisco, explained how
judicial independence is integral in safeguarding the rights of minorities:
17 Hearng onH.R. 1252, theJudicialReform Act ofl997Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 131 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 1252] (statement of N. Lee
Cooper).
" ABA Hearings of the Comm "n, supra note 16 (Dec. 13, 1996) (statement of
Chief Justice Shirley Abralunson).
"9 Gordon Berman & Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judges and the Judicial
Branch: Their Independence and Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REv 835, 856
n.104 (1995) (quoting FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 249 (1980)).
2 Judicial Misconduct andDiscipline, supra note 1, at 53 (testimony of Bruce
Fem.).
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[W]e as a class have had to depend on brave and independent judges and
in an independent judiciary to measure and, when appropriate, strike
down laws. And while sometimes over the years, especially in the
1800s, judges have failed us as well m failing to find that it was unconsti-
tutional to bar women from juries or from the vote or lucrative jobs,
more often the courts really have served as the last refuge for those
without political or social power whose rights are too often trammeled
upon by the tyranny of the majority. So it has really been the courts to
whom we have turned to weigh statutes andvoter initiatives and fimd them
in appropriate cases wanting.21
Those who created the constitutional system of the United States
addressed these concerns with preserving judicial independence by
guaranteeing in Article I of the Constitution that "[t]he Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices dunng good Behavior,
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."
According to Judge Tacha of the Tenth Circuit, "life tenure symbolizes the
individual judge's ability to resist any temptation to do the popular or
politically correct thing and to conform to the case or controversy
requirement and other judicial constramts."21
L. Ralph Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of United
States Courts, states that judicial independence is dependent on more than
life tenure and salary protection and extends "to encompass those
conditions m which and under which a judge decides the cases. These
ancillary elements of individualjudicial independence, including security,
facilities, support, workload, rules of procedure, and case management,
normally do not impact upon judicial independence but under extreme
circumstances may do so.''24 In engaging in attacks on the courts and the
judiciary, the ultraconservative activists and members of the political
branches often levy charges that jurists are rendering judicial activist
decisions.
Justifying his attacks by claiming the need to weed out judicial
activists, Tom Jipping, Director ofthe Free Congress Foundation's Judicial
21ABA Hearings of the Comm ni, supra note 16 (Feb. 21, 1997) (testimony of
Drucilla S. Ramey).
22 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
3 Tacha, supra note 12, at 646.24Mecham, supra note 11, at 638.
1998-991
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Selection Monitoring Project, suggests thatjudges have only themselves to
blame for any attacks on judicial independence. He notes that
judges cannot make up the very law they must enforce. Judges today
routinely exceed their power, in part because Congress has not used the
checks and balances at its disposal, including impeachment. Judges must
act independently to be independent. The threat to judicial independence
is as much from inside the judiciary as from outside. This is the only
formula that will maintain law as something more than politics, and at the
same time preserve liberty and self-government2
B. Judicial Activism
"Judicial activism" is often defined according to the ideological beliefs
of the beholder. As Alfred Goodwin, a semor judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, notes, "If the court makes a
decision someone likes, it's applauded as 'judicial statesmanship.' If
not, it's called 'judicial activism,' a very bad word these days. Which
label is attached all depends on whose ox is gored." 6 The ABA's Jerome
Shestack shares this belief--"Everytime someone disagrees witha decision,
they call thatjudicial activism. Sometimes legislation is overturned
by the Supreme Court and that isn't called activist, but when a lower court
overturns something, it's called 'activist.' I don't put much faith in those
labels."27 In recent decades, judicial activism has usually become a mantra
for conservative scorn of decisions perceived as liberal.
While there is no precise definition for "judicial activism," there are
some core ideas which are routinely included in the term. In his book
JudicialActivism: Bulwark ofFreedom or Precanous Security, Christopher
Wolfe states that "judges ought to decide cases, not avoid them, and
thereby use their power broadly to further justice-that is to protect human
dignity-especially by expanding equality and personal liberty "= Wolfe
categorizes activist judges as those who are not restrained by constitutional
s Judicial Misconduct and Discipline, supra note 1, at 42 (testimony of Tom
Jippmg).
26 Carol M. Ostrom, Fuming Senators Ready to Carve Up 9th Circuit, SEATTLE
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1997, at Al.
27 Deborah Mathis, Federal Courts Clogged as Judicial Vacancies Mount,
GANNET NEWS SERV., Aug. 22, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8835099.
28 CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: BULWARK OF FREEDOM OR
PRECARIOUS SECURITY 3 (1997).
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interpretation of the framers or by determinate meaning of the words of the
Constitution. Under tls interpretation, activist judges are those who tend
to place less emphasis on adherence to precedent, give less deference to
political decisionmakers, issue broad decisions that extend beyond the
narrow contours of litigation, and are more likely to rely on remedial
powers.29
Accordingto Stephen Halpem and Charles M. Lamb, "the core element
of judicial activism is the notion that judges should decide cases, not avoid
them, andthatjudicial power should be used broadly "30 Activist judges are
result oriented and are willing to decide cases at the "periphery of
justiciability," and "an activist Court is willing to decide tough and/or
novel questions."'
Politicians of all stripes constantly toss around the term "judicial
activism" in an effort to justify their criticisms of the judiciary Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrn Hatch (R-Utah), in a speech to the
Utah Federalist Society said:
Ajudicial activist is, simply put, ajudge who exceeds the proper limits of
his or her authority and usurps the authority delegated to another branch
(or institution) of government. In its most basic sense, activism is when
judges make the law instead of applying it. The limits on judicial
authority are fairly simple in principle, but vitally important m a
constitutional democracy such as ours.
32
He then spoke of Ins disgust of the harm caused by judicial activist
judges:
When judges twist the language of legislation to enact the policies
they prefer, they usurp the role of our popular elected legislators. And,
when they read their own preferences and political agendas into the
Constitution to strike down legislation duly enacted by electedrepresenta-
tives, judges directly thwart the will of the people. What's worse, voters
effectively have no recourse. The public doesn't have the option of voting
these judges out of office, but instead is stuck with the policies these
29 See id. at 4.
30 STEPHEN HALPERN & CHARLES M. LAMB, SUPREME COURT AcTivIsM AND
RESTRAINT 45 (1982).
31 Id. at 45-47
32 Orrin Hatch, Address to Umversity of Utah Federal Society Chapter (Feb. 18,
1997), available in 1997 WL 4429673.
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judges have forced upon them. As a result, entire spheres of policy
making are, in effect, ruled off limits from democratic majorities, and
instead are handed over to self-styled, all-knowing guardians of justice.
This is judicial activism, and it represents a direct attack on the demo-
cratic principles that are central to our constitutional system.
33
Hatch's counterpart, Representative Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), Chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee, has an analogous interpretation ofjudicial
activism:
My own view is that judicial activism is conduct by a judge that egre-
giously trespasses into legislation. When [judges] run school districts,
when they run jail systems and order legislative acts to be initiated that
cannot avoid raising taxes, questions arise whether they are not beyond
their charter. In truth, you look at each case mdividually.
3 4
Representative Howard Coble, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, which has conducted hearings
on judicial activism, believes that
the fundamental job of any jurist is to interpret the law and apply it
impartially to the affected litigants in a given case. The worst thing a
judge can do is to appropriate the role of a legislator by creating law;
that is, by reading personally-held convictions of a social or political
nature into a decision that is otherwise not founded or may not be founded
on legislative intent or case law precedent.3 5
Representative Mel Watt (D-N.C.) has a different interpretation,
conceptualizing judicial activism in terms of respect for the law and
courtroom etiquette:
[T]he ultimate act of judicial activism is standing in a courtroom and
having a judge look down at you and call you "nigger" and tell you that
your client's opinion in a case don't mean anything because your client
happens to be black, or tell the bailiff not to call you and tell you that your
33 Id.
31 Interview with Henry Hyde, Hyde on Judging Judges-And Presidents,
INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, June 16, 1997, at A32.
31 JudicalMisconduct andDiscqiline, supra note 1, at 1 (statement of Howard
Coble).
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case is coming up for trial and start the trial without you being there,
simply because you represent an interest that the judge is out of step with.
That is the ultimate act ofjudicial activism-acts which I have seen m my
practice of law. So one thing I have come to understand is that judicial
activism is much like beauty- it's m the eye of the beholder.
36
C. Scapegoating Jurists
Almost thirty years after Earl Warren retired as Chief Justice of the
United States, conservatives continue to disparage the Warren Court as the
archetype ofjudicial activism. Under this analysis, the liberal maj ority then
on the high court, and for some years thereafter, led this country astray by
creating constitutional rights where none existed. Allegedly these include
the right to privacy,37 welfare rights and expansion of due process," student
rights,39 rights of the accused m criminal cases such as state-paid counsel
in felony trials,4° and protection against coerced confessions.1
For many, the landmark civil rights caseBrown v. BoardofEducation42
was a focal point of anger and divisiveness against judicial activism. Wade
Henderson, Executive Director of the Leadership Conference for Civil
Rights, placed the current attacks on judicial activism in historical context
by referring to the Brown decision. He stated:
Many Americans have short memories when it comes to ourNation's
recent history, and to those ofus m the civil rights community, the attacks
on the courts today that we are hearing remind us all too chillingly of the
deplorable period in our Nation's history some 40 years ago. You may
recall that when Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the unanimous Supreme
Court decision striking down State-mandated school segregation in
Brown, defenders of segregation cried "judicial activism.
' '43
36Heanng on H. 1252, supra note 17, at 32 (statement of Rep. Mel Watt).
37 See Grswoldv. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and its progeny involving
abortion. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
39 See Tinker v Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
4o See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
41 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
42Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
41 JudicialMisconduct andDiscipline, supra note 1, at 65 (testimony of Wade
Henderson).
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One hundred members of Congress signed a Southern Manifesto on March
12, 1956, condemning the Brown decision, and some sought to impeach
Chief Justice Warren. The Manifesto claimed that the Justices,
with no legal basis for such action, undertook to exercise their naked
judicial power and substituted their personal and social ideas for the
established law of the land, a clear abuse of judicial power climaxing a
trend m the Federal judiciary to legislate and encroach upon the reserved
rights of the people.44
While he supports the Court's ruling mBrown, University of Southern
California law professor Erwin Chemernsky argues that it is absurd to
focus on judicial activism:
Perhaps the height of judicial activism was the Supreme Court's
decision rn Brown v. Board of Education m 1954. There the Supreme
Court overturned a precedent that was 58 years old. There the Supreme
Court invalidated laws that existed m every southern state and many of
the border states. And yet I would hope that none among us today would
deny that was a triumph of the judiciary even though it was judicial
activism. My point here is it's meanmgless to talk about judicial
activism.
45
Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) agrees, believing that "[o]ur Re-
publican colleagues in Congress are taking an Alice-m-Wonderland view
of the federal judiciary What was once respected as 'judicial independ-
ence,' they now call 'judicial activism.' What were once hailed as 'land-
mark decisions' are now condemned as 'legislating from the bench. "'
The Warren era ended decades ago, and it has been twelve years since
the Burger Court was succeeded by the Rehnquist Court. Even after the
Reagan and Bush administrations packedthe federal courts withnght-wmg
idealogues, certain ultraconservatives argue that the courts remain stocked
with judicial activists. Gary Bauer, Director of the Family Research
Council and a domestic policy advisor in the Reagan administration, has
said:
4JudicalActivsm, supra note 6, at 161 (statement of Elliot Mincberg, quoting
the Southern Manifesto).
a ABA Hearings of the Comm 'n, supra note 16 (Feb. 21, 1997) (statement of
Prof. Erwin Chemermsky).
46 Senator Edward Kennedy, Alliance for Justice Luncheon Key Note Speech
(Apr. 30, 1997).
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By adopting an understanding of the Constitution as a "living" document,
ourjudges have given themselves a license to twist the Constitution into
any form. The Constitution no longer means what it actually says but
some derivative, based on what judges think it should say. The rejection
of an interpretation of the law as it was written and originally understood
invites arbitrary decisions of a tyrannical nature and is contrary to our
democratic constitutional system.
47
According to conservative commentator and Republican presidential
hopeful Patrick Buchanan,
The Supreme Court-not the majority-decides what is right and what
is wrong. The court may find a quote "constitutional right" and decide
the majority's plan violates that right. End of majority plan. To revise
Lincoln's words: We today have a government of the judiciary, by
the judiciary, and for the judiciary. The court then centralized power
here in Washington and exercised that power without democratic
consensus. Led by the court, the country has set off on a 30-year
experiment with non-democratic government. Now we get one kind of
society when decisions are made by the majority. We get another kind
when decisions are made by judges-what Jefferson called the despotism
of an oligarchy.
4 8
Referring to the Supreme Court, these idealogues look askance at
recent decisions protecting (more or less) the right to have an abortion,4 9
supposedly granting gays "special rights" by overturning Colorado
Initiative 2 (a 1992 referendum which prohibited governmental action
designed to protect homosexuals from discrimination), 0 and at other
'4 Gary Bauer, Displacing Judicial Tyranny, WASH. TIMES, June 7, 1997, at
All.
48 Patrick Buchanan, Speech to the Heritage Foundation (Jan. 29, 1996)
(transcript on file with author).
" See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Webster v
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
50 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In describing Romer, former
Reagan Administration Attorney General Ed Meese stated:
It is hard not to regard the Romer decision as the pinnacle of judicial
arrogance: Six appointed justices struck down a law passed by 54 percent
of a state's voters in a direct election, the most democratic of all procedures.
In one of the most egregious usurpations ofpower in constitutional history,
the Court not only desecrates the principle of self-government, but
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decisions m which the Court's more liberal wing was able to form a
majority
Some politicians like Representative John N. Hostettler (R-Ind.) do not
even acknowledge that the courts have a paramount role in interpreting
constitutional questions. Hostettler observes:
It is interesting to me that there is today such awe-indeed, almost
reverence-for the pronouncements of the judiciary. Their opinions are
held by many to be unchallengeable, almost divine. When a court
declares, for example, that Congress does not have the power to ban
pornography in its military commissaries, it is as if God himself has
spoken. I believe that the present practice of the legislative branch bowing
to judicial supremacy does not square with the U.S. Constitution or its
history 51
Lmo A. Graglia, noted conservative and professor of constitutional law
at the University of Texas at Austin, also attacks the Supreme Court,
noting:
Over the last 40 years, almost every fundamental issue of social
policy-abortion, capital punishment, criminal procedure, prayer in the
schools, government aid to religious schools, public displays of religious
symbols, pornography, libel, vagrancy control, discrimination on the basis
of sex, alienage and illegitimacy, busing for school racial balance, and so
on-every basic issue of social policy has been decided not by elected
legislators, State or Federal, but for the Nation as a whole by a majority
vote of the nme lawyers making up the Supreme Court. And on almost
every issue the Court has worked a social revolution by, for example,
removing prayers from the schools and prohibiting most restrictions on
pornography 
5 2
In decisions where the conservative wing of the Supreme Court struck
down statutes passed by congressional action, ultraconservatives did not
label these actions judicial activism. For example, the Court substantially
limited the applicability of the Commerce Clause, m decisions reminiscent
of the economic conservatism expressed by members of the Court in the
appointed itself the moral arbiter of the nation's values.
JudicialActivism, supra note 6, at 23-24 (statement of Ed Meese).
" Judicial Misconduct and Discipline, supra note 1, at 11 (statement of Rep.
John Hostettler).52Id. at 78-79 (testimony of Prof. Lmo A. Graglia).
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193 0s.53 Representative William D. Delahunt (D-Mass.) commented on this
oddity
What is interesting about the current campaign against "activist" judges
is that today many of those activistjudges are conservatives who take an
extremely narrow view of the scope of congressional authority under the
commerce clause and an equally broad view of the powers reserved to the
States under the 10th Amendment. Those conservatives who recogmze
this have been slow to enlist in the crusade.
54
Umversity of Southern California law professor Erwin Chemermsky
agrees that there is inconsistency m conservative attacks:
[I]t's particularly iromc to hear attacks on judicial activism today from
conservatives because the traditional activism of the 1990s is all m a
conservative direction. I'm not exactly sure what the phrase "judicial
activism" means. My sense is that it's a label that's used to attack
decisions that one does not like. But if I was to formulate some opera-
tional definition of "judicial activism," it would probably include
overruling precedent and overruling the decisions of popular elected
officials. Well, where has the Rehnquist court been activist? For the first
time in 60 years, in Lopez v. United States, the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional a Federal law as exceeding the scope of Congress's
clause on authority.55
53 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (finding provisions of the
Commuications Decency Act unconstitutional as content-based restrictions of
speech); City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (finding the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 unconstitutional because Congress had exceeded
its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (finding the Gun-Free School Zones act unconstitutional for
exceeding Congress's commerce clause authority because possession of a gun on
school premises did not constitute economic activity which substantially affected
interstate commerce). As Washington College of Law professorHerman Schwartz,
in speaking about Lopez and Reno v. ACLU, said: "The conservative rulings thus
represent an extreme case of 'judicial activism,' just the kind of disregard of
democratically elected officials forwhich right-wing states' righters assail 'liberal'
judges. Yet, no criticism has been heard from them about these decisions." Herman
Schwartz, High Court Has a Selective Regard for States' Rights, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 8, 1997, at 27
5" Judicial Misconduct and Discipline, supra note 1, at 15 (statement of Rep.
William D. Delahunt).
55 ABA Hearings of the Comm'in, supra note 16 (Feb. 21, 1997) (statement of
Prof. Erwim Chemermsky).
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Most conservatives have reserved their ire for the lower federal courts
and particularly the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit often rules on the constitutionality of laws
passed by ballot initiative. On November 8, 1994, after a divisive cam-
paign, the California electorate approved Proposition 187 by a margin of
fifty-nine percent to forty-one percent.5 6 This voter referendum required
state officials to verify the immigration status of persons with whom they
come into contact, report those they suspect of illegal immigrant status, and
deny illegal immigrants educational benefits, health care, and social
services.
United States District Court Judge Marianne Pfaelzer enjoined
enforcement of the new law and granted partial summary judgment for the
League of United Latin American Citizens on preemption and equal
protection grounds.5 7 Following litigation involving multiple parties,
multiple attempts to intervene, and multiple decisions, Judge Pfaelzer was
criticized for retammgjunsdiction over the case and waiting several years
before issuing a final ruling on the merits of Proposition 187 In March
1998, she found the law unconstitutional as a violation of the Supremacy
Clause.58
California State Senator Richard L. Mountjoy, one of the authors of
Proposition 187, criticized Judge Pfaelzer's actions prior to the issuance of
the final ruling:
What has happened to proposition 1871 think is a travesty ofjustice. That
proposition has not been released today. We're asking that court just to
make a finding, if she will, just make a finding on the unconstitutionality
of that amendment by the people-that initiative by the people of
California, and let us move on to the next court. But she is denying justice
by delaying justice.
59
Senator John Ashcroft (R-Mo.) also was highly critical of the delay,
stating:
" See Howard Breuer, Outcry Quells Prop. 187, L.A. DAILY NEws, Nov. 28,
1994, at N1.
57 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F Supp. 755 (C.D.
Cal. 1995).
58 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 1998 WL 141325, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1998).
9 Hearing on H.R. 1252, supra note 17, at 95 (testimony of Cal. Sen. Richard
L. Mountjoy).
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The saying, "Justice delayed is justice denied" applies here. Over three
years ago, the people of California voted to end certain public aid to
illegal aliens. Within days of the election, a judge put the will of the
people "on hold." Three years later, nothing has changed. No benefits
have been withdrawn. The will of the people has been totally frus-
trated. Now over three years after the people voted, the federal judge
assigned to the case has finally issued an opinion, holding the law
unconstitutional. The state will appeal, and the legal process will grind on,
but enforcement of the law will remain on hold. This is not democratic
self-government There is nothing democratic about sending alaw into the
void for years on end with enforcement prevented until a judge put the
final touches on the final decision. Even if Judge Pfaelzer had upheld the
law in its entirety, three years with no enforcement and no appealable
decision is a travesty 60
Proposition 209 was adopted by referendum of the California voters
(fifty-four percent to forty-six percent) on November 5, 199 6 .6i It added a
provision to the California state constitution which prohibited race-based
and gender-based affirmative action. United States District Judge Thelton
Henderson issued a preliminary injunction denying enforcement on the
basis that the law appeared unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. 62
Even though the decision was based on a careful analysis of Supreme
Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, it was severely criticized. Tom DeLay
(R-Tex.), the Majority Wip in the United States House of'Representatives,
said:
In a ruling that turned common sense and our Constitution on it's
[sic] head, Judge Henderson ruled that by adopting the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the voters of the State had violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Chairman, we all recognize that a law
which parallels the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, and which forbids discrimiation, is hardly unconstitu-
I Senator John Ashcrot, 'Justice Delayed is Justice Denied;' Calls 3-Year
Court Case an Insult to Voters, Press Release, Nov. 20, 1997, available in 1997
WL 12104976.
61 See Tim Cornwell, American Election, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 7,
1996, available in 1996 WL 13500461.
62See Coalition forEcon. Equityv. Wilson, 946F Supp. 1480, 1492 (N.D. Cal.
1996), vacated, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir.), and amended and superseded on denial
ofreh'g, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
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tional. Only a judge who chooses to willfully ignore the Constitution
could arrive at such a conclusion.
63
Senator Robert Smith (R-N.H.) added:
Federal district judges have repeatedly abused their authority by
blocking the implementation of entirely constitutional measures enacted
through State ballot referenda simply because they disagree with the
policy judgments of the voters.. [A] single Federal district judge, who
had been an activist with the ACLU before going on the bench, blocked
the implementation of the California civil rights initiative. However you
feel about the initiative, for or against, isn't the issue. The Califorma
voters passed it in the State.64
Proponents of Proposition 209 appealed Judge Henderson's decision,
seeking a stay of the injunction. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, stating that
"[a] system which permits one judge to block with the stroke of a pen what
4,736,180 state residents voted to enact as law tests the integrity of our
constitutional democracy "65
63 Judicial Misconduct and Discipline, supra note 1, at 19 (statement of Rep.
Tom DeLay).
64 144 CoNG. REC. S3723 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1997) (statement of Sen. Robert
Smith). Under Senator Smith's view, it appears that the possible unconstitutionality
of Proposition 209 was of no relevance if a majority of voters approved the
measure. As libertarian and Cato Institute Legal Director Roger Pilon has stated,
critics of "judicial activism" have
misstated the issue because they have constantly couched judicial
activism as a matter of the judiciary standing athwart the majority. That is
exactly what the judiciary is charged to do, for the most part, sitting as a
constitutional court. Itsjob is to review the other two branches to make sure
that they're acting within their authority.
JudicialMisconduct andDiscipline, supra note 1, at 69 (testimony ofRogerPilon).
In response to a speech by California Governor Pete Wilson in which the
governor attacked "activist"judges for continuing holdups on Califorma initiatives,
David Oppenheimer, a law professor at Golden Gate Umversity, called the attack
"hype and demagoguery. We have relied on the principle ofjudicial review for
almost 200 years as the cornerstone of constitutional democracy. If we remove
the judiciary from the balance of power, there will be no protection for minority
rights." Dan Smith, Wilson Rips Judicial Activists, Backs Reform, SACRAMENTO
BEE, May 23, 1997, at A4.
65 Coalition for Econ. Equity v Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1437 (9th Cir.),
vacated, 122 F.3d 692, cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997). In fact, the Ninth
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Testifyingbefore the Senate Judiciary Committee, Gail Henot, co-chair
ofthe "Yes on Proposition 209 Campaign," opmedthat "whenU.S. District
Judge Thelton Henderson enjoined [enforcement], he was following his
own political predilections, not any plausible interpretation of the
Constitution. When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed hs ruling
no well-informed court watcher could claim to be surprised."66
The Ninth Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc, although four
judges dissented from this refusal. Judge William Norris said that the panel
neglected its duty
in favor of a path of conservative judicial activism. As a political
manifesto, the panel's opinion could comfortably assume a place on one
side of that debate. As a document that purports to apply the Constitution
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, however, the opinion fails at its
appointed task.67
Proposition 209 went into effect on August 28, 1997, after Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor deied an emergency stay application. California Attorney
General Dan Lundgren said that this final action "signals recognition by
both this court and the 9th Circuit that a state and its people suffer
Circuit panel that heard the appeal in the Proposition 209 case was acting contrary
to Ninth Circuit precedent. Conservativejudges DiarmuldF O'Scannlam, Edward
Leavy, and Andrew J Klemfeld had been assigned motion duty in February 1997,
the month in wich the appellants appealed the preliminary injunction issued by
Judge Thelton Henderson. The panel should have ruled only on whether to issue
a stay on the injunction, wich would have remained in effect until a merits panel
heard the case. However, the motions panel transformed itself into a merits panel
and ultimately ruled on the constitutionality of the underlying law. By failing to
remand the case to the district court for an investigation on the merits, the panel
precluded a full trial on the divisive issues contained within Proposition 209.
According to Professor Chemernsky, "[f]or decades, conservatives have railed
agamstjudicial activism. The 9th Circuit's decisionupholding Proposition 209 only
can be understood as conservative judicial activism of the most aggressive sort."
Erwin Chemernsky, Appellate Decision Went Too Far- Prop. 209" The Three-
Judge Panel Was Not Directed to Rule on the Constitutionality Question, L.A.
TiMEs, Apr. 10, 1997, at B9.
66 Judicial Activism, supra note 6, at 99 (July 15, 1997) (testimony of Gail
Heriot).
67 Larry D. Hatfield & Robert Salladay, ACLUAsks High Court to BlockProp.
209, S.F EXAMINER, Aug. 29, 1997, at Al.
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irreparable harm when the democratic process is thwarted by judicial
activism disguised as constitutional interpretation."
68
Sometimes ultraconservatives direct their comments against de-
cisions addressing specific issues: the constitutional challenges to Cali-
forma voter initiatives, desegregation of the Kansas City schools,69
physician-assisted suicide,70 stays of execution, 71 andpnson system consent
68 Frank J. Murray, Supreme Court Refuses to Block California End to Set-
Asides, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1997, at A3.69 Judge Russell Clark of the Western District of Missouri has overseen a school
desegregation case in Kansas City since 1977. Prior to the Brown decision, Kansas
City and the state of Missouri had established two school systems divided by race
and m the intervening years had failed to eliminate the vestiges of that
discrimination. The Supreme Court expressed disfavor for interdistrict remedies to
achieve desegregation in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), unless all
districts had been involved m the illegal segregation.
Judge Clark decided to create a magnet school system. Under his theory, high
quality schools would help to break down the vestiges of discrimination by
attracting students of all races. Accordingly, he ordered a willing Kansas City
School District to construct hundreds of millions of dollars worth of new facilities,
construction of which was financed in large part by the state of Missouri. At one
point in the lengthy litigation, Judge Clark ordered a recalcitrant Missouri state
government to raise taxes in order to offset construction costs. See Missouri v.
Jenkins, 672 F Supp. 400,411 (W.D. Mo. 1987). This decision was overruled m
part by the Eighth Circuit, which noted that the nposition of a state tax obligation
exceeded the power of the district court. See Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 855
F.2d 1295, 1315 (8th Cir. 1988). Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice White
agreed with the appellate court. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). The
Supreme Court held that Judge Clark had no authority to require Missouri to pay
for the remedy because the thrust of Milliken was the voluntary attraction of
suburban students as a cure for de facto and dejure school segregation. See id. at
35, 50-56.
7 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (holding that a statutory prohibition on aiding another person to commit
suicide violated the Due Process Clause when applied to terminally ill patients who
wished to hasten their own deaths with medication prescribed by their physicians),
rev'd sub nom. Washington v Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
71 Senior Judge John T. Nixon of the Middle District of Tennessee was
described by Charlotte Ann Stout, the mother of a girl whose killer had his death
sentence overturned by Judge Nixon,
[as a] Federal Judge who's appointed for life [and] holding the citizens
[of Tennessee] "hostage" to his conscientious beliefs. He does have the
right to his beliefs. But when these beliefs interfere with the administration
ofjustice and the performance of this duties as an officer of the court, he
should be removed.
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decrees.7 More often, politicians and interest groups expressing these
views refer generically to a judiciary that is "out of control. '73
Judicial Misconduct and Discipline, supra note 1, at 29 (testimony of Charlotte
Ann Stout); see, e.g., Groseclose v. Bell, 895 F Supp. 935 (M.D. Tenn. 1995)
(vacating death sentence conviction because of ineffective assistance of counsel),
affid, 130 F.3d 1161 (6th Cir. 1997); Rickman v. Dutton, 864F Supp. 686 (M.D.
Tenn. 1994) (vacating death sentence conviction because of ineffective assistance
of counsel and other claims), afl'd, 131 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1997).
1 See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992) (denying
motion to modify consent decree requring construction of new jail); Hook v.
Arizona Dep't of Corrections, 107 F.3d 1397 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying motion to
vacate consent decree after new statute prohibited payment of fees incurred by
special masters), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 171 (1997).
73 According to Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-Tex.),
judges have thrown out the Constitution to advance their own political
views. Far too many of our policies-on education, on justice, on
morality-are the result of judicial decree. Congress has given up its
responsibility to be a check on the court system, and we ought to start
exercising it.
Katharine Q. Seelye, House GOP Begins Listing a Few Judges to Impeach, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 1997, at A24. Representative Bob Barr (R-Ga.) stated:
In recent years, many of us-and millions of our constituents-have become
alarmed at the number and brazenness of Federal judges who use the
opportunity of rendering decisions to implement their personal or political
agenda. In many respects, these judges are assuming for themselves the
powers and responsibilities of legislators or executives. This has blurred, if
not eradicated, the separation of powers foundation of our system of
government; it has resulted in a number of blatantly political 'judicial'
decisions; and, literally m some instances, endangered the lives of our
citizens.
Judicial Misconduct and Discipline, supra note 1, at 7 (statement of Rep. Bob
Barr). Senator John Ashcroft (R-Mo.) has said that
here in America today, can it still be said that "the people govern?" Can it
still be said that citizens control that which matters most? Or have people's
lives and fortunes been relinquished to renegade judges, a robed,
contemptuous intellectual elite fulfilling Patrick Henry's prophecy, that of
turning the courts into "nurseries of vice and the bane of liberty9"
John Ashcroft, Courting Disaster: Judicial Despotism in the Age of Russell Clark,
CPAC Annual Meeting, Mar. 6,1997, available in 1997 WL 10024388. According
to James Dobson, the founder of Focus on the Family, "I sense that the judiciary's
day of unchallenged authoritanamsm is coming to a close. The people will
eventually demand relief from the other branches of government." PEOPLE FOR THE
AMERICAN WAY, JUSTICE DELAYED, JUSTICE DENIED: THE RIGHT WING ATTACK
ON THE INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY 2 (1997).
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When decrying judicial activism, these same critics rarely refer to
decisions by the conservative wing of the Supreme Court that favor a more
conservative political agenda. One example is an mjunction issued to
prevent enforcement of a ballot initiative allowing physician-assisted
suicide.74 Another decision struck down as unconstitutional the Violence
Others, like Senator Hatch, promised to do all they could to rem in the
judiciary.
I am serving notice around here that we are not going to continue to sit back
and tolerate these activist judges. Many of these nominees have come
in here and said we are not going to be activist judges; we are not going to
usurp the powers of the executive and legislative branches of Government.
.All of them mouth that kind of language, but when it comes right down
to it, a significant number of them are, on the bench, engaging in patently
activist judging and usurping powers that they do not have. So I am just
serving notice that we are on to the games these nominees are playing, and
do not intend to let this game go on. We are going to do what it takes to
weed out those nominees who pay lip service to judicial restraint, but then
think they can do anything they want to once they don their robes.
143 CONG. REC. S848 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
According to Representative William D. Delahunt,
There is a big difference between reasonable criticism and irresponsible
attacks that distort thejudge's record and focus on the result in a single case
usually without looking at the underlying facts and legal precedents. Most
conscientious judges, regardless of their political views, will eventually be
confronted with a situation in which the law requires that evidence be
thrown out or a death sentence be overturned. Yet ajudge who follows the
law in such cases is labeled "soft on crime" and accused of "letting
murderers go free." This kind of intimidation has its intended effect.
JudicialMisconduct andDiscipline, supra note 1, at 22 (statement of Rep. William
D. Delahunt).
4 In Lee v. Oregon, 891 F Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), Chief Judge Michael
Hogan struck down the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. This ballot initiative,
approved by the Oregon voters in 1994, allowed a terminally ill adult to obtain a
doctor's prescription for a fatal drug dose that would end Ins or her life. Judge
Hogan found the initiative unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because
it "singles out terminally illpersons who want to commit suicide and excludes them
from protection of Oregon laws that apply to others." Id. at 1483. Representative
Barney Frank (D-Mass.) later referred to this decision:
What happens is my friends on the other side have this curious memory
problem. Every time they talk about the judges who invalidated assisted
suicide bans somehow they forgot to mention the judge who invalidated an
assisted suicide referendum wluch allowed it. That is, we have a single
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Against Women Act.75 One judge also added a previously uncontemplated
moral requirement to the Freedom of Access to Clime Entrances Act,76 but
this action provoked little criticism from those who expressed fundamental
disagreement with the underlying legislation.77 Bruce Fern referred to this
judge in the state of Oregon who outlawed a referendum allowing for
this. Somehow that's slipped their minds.
Hearng on HR. 1252, supra note 16, at 18 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank). The
Ninth Circuit reversed Judge Hogan in Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Lee v. Hareleroad, 118 S. Ct. 328 (1997), ruling that the
plaintiffs had not established standing to enjoin the Death with Dying Act. The Act
went into effect late in 1997
1 Chief Judge Jackson Kiser of the Western District of Virginia found the
Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"), 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994),
unconstitutional. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Umv., 935 F
Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996). InBrzonkala, the plamtiffwas raped by two members
of Virginia Tech's football team. One of her attackers later confessed to sexual
assault and admitted that the woman had said "no," but no one was ever prosecuted
by the state of Virginia. The plaintiff sued for civil damages under VAWA, and
Judge Kiser found that she had stated a claim under the Act The Judge denied
relief, however, because he concluded the law was unconstitutional. See idi. at 801.
Under his interpretation, VAWA was beyond congressional authority and did not
have an impact on interstate commerce. The Fourth Circuit reversed, see Brzonkala
v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Umv., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), finding
that in four years ofextensive hearings, Congress had demonstrated the mpact that
violence against women has on interstate commerce. See id. at 964. The Fourth
Circuit then granted an en banc rehearing of the case, and the full court concluded
that the lower court decision should be reinstated. See Bronzkala v. Virgina
Polytechiuc Inst. & State Unv., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane). The en
bane decision agreed with Judge Kiser that the VAWA exceeded Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause and also exceeded Congress's power to compel state
enforcement of federal legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment See id. at 825.
76 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
1 In United States v. Lynch, 952 F Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), Judge John
Spnzzo of the Southern District of New York entered a permanent injunction
against two anti-abortion protesters who had blockaded a women's health clinic in
violation of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 ("FACE"), 18
U.S.C. § 248. Defendants knowingly violated the injunction, and the United States
brought criminal contempt charges. Judge Sprizzo, at Is own initiative, asked "the
parties to brief whether it is a defense to a criminal contempt charge that a person
act with a sincere religious belief that he is acting to save a human life." Lynch, 952
F Supp. at 169. Judge Sprizzo then answered his own question in the affirmative
and concluded that neither defendant could be prosecuted for criminal contempt
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tendency m criticlzmg Republican House Majority Whip Tom DeLay, who
because they both acted out ofa"smcere religious belief."Id at 172. He continued:
The facts presented here both by sworn testimony and a videotape depicting
an elderly bishop and a young monk quietly praying with rosary beads in
the Clinic's driveway clearly call for that exercise of the prerogative of
lenience which a fact-finder has to refuse to convict a defendant, even if the
circumstances would otherwise be sufficient to convict.
Id. at 171. Contrary to Judge Spnzzo's assertion, FACE only required a knowing
and willful violation for criminal penalties to apply, and sincerely held religious
beliefs were not intended to undermine such a finding. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(a).
The decision surprised those on both sides of the abortion debate. A. Lawrence
Washburn, Jr., lawyer for one of the defendants, noted that "he [Sprizzo] surprised
us all. Judge Sprizzo has pointed the way." Jan Hoffman, Judge Acquits
Abortion Protesters on Basis ofReligious Beliefs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1997, at 25.
Randi Fallor, director of the Women's Medical Pavilion in Dobbs Ferry, New
York, which was subjected to the blockade, now wondered where the decision
would lead: "Is it O.K. for them now to block our door? For them to place
bombs in the climc? For them to shoot us, as long as they're sincere in their moral
beliefs." Id. at 30. Reacting to the ruling, Representative Nita Lowey (D-N.Y.)
stated:
It is not a judge's role to weave a moral code for how and when a law
should be applied. Those of us who fought hard for the protection of the
Freedom of Access to Clinics Act fear that Judge Spnzzo's decision will
embolden protesters and lead to more tragedy and violence. And the ruling
shows a callous disregard for the rule of law when lives and liberties are at
stake. Yet, despite my outrage at Judge Spnzzo's decision, I am not calling
for his inpeachment.
Judicial Misconduct and Discipline, supra note 1, at 9 (statement of Rep. Nita
Lowey). Bruce Fern observed that
the two defendant churchmen confessed that they violated the law. They
said "we did it. We wanted to block access to the clinic." And Judge
Sprizzo writes an opinon in which he says "Well, judges don't really have
to enforce positive law if it's morally offensive," indicating that the fugitive
slave law he would have ignored because he would not have wanted to
assist the southern slave owners in recapturing fugitive slaves from Boston
or otherwise. Now you may agree or disagree with his moral sentiment, but
surely that is a prime case, if there ever was one, where a judge simply
states he is above the law, except those that accord with his moral
sentiments-he didn't say only those that accord with the Constitution of the
United States-as positive law.
Id. at 33-34 (statement of Bruce Fern). Because Judge Sprizzo found the defendants
innocent, ins decision in the case was unreviewable.
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had recently announced that he planned to impeach activist judges:
But m [DeLay's] denunciations of Federal judges he cites only rulings he
disagrees with-those that are pro-choice and m favor of affirmative
action. .For all of DeLay's concerns about judicial activism, he has not
uttered a word of criticism about a couple of recent cases that represent
frightening assaults on the rule of law.78
LU. PRACTICE: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER ATTACK
A. The 1996 Presidential Campaign
The selection of federal judges became a central topic m the 1996
presidential election as Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) attempted to use this
issue as a wedge to differentiate hinselffrom incumbent President William
Jefferson Clinton. Dole acknowledged this on the Lehrer News Hour on
April 17, 1996, observing:
You know the judicial branch never gets discussed much, but I find, and
I thnk polls will, will underscore this, there's a lot of concern about
federal judges. We just fimshed a survey. The numbers are way up
there m the 80's and 90's on judges should be accountable.79
Senator Dole stirred up his campaign with a general attack on judicial
activism. He opmed:
Of course, the American people rightfully expect that Federal judges will
respect the text of the Constitution and apply the law as it is written. Some
members of the Federal bench, however, have displayed a disturbing
willingness to sidestep the Constitution and mject their own ideological
agenda into the individual cases that come before them. What the
American people may not realize is the number of other startling ways m
which activist judges reach out to change our daily lives. Through their
rulings, Federal judges not only help determine whether criminals walk
the streets or stay behind bars, but also whether racial quotas or merit
govern hiring decisions; whether businesses can function, prosper and
"8 Bruce Fern, It's Folly to Impeach "Activist" Judges: Just Another Way to
Disagree on Issues, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., May 11, 1997, at 21A.
79 Democratic National Committee, Press Release, DEMOCRATIC NEwS (Apr.
19, 1996).
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create jobs without being subject to baseless litigation; and whether
parents can control the content of their children's education. Today,
Federal judges micro-manage schools, hospitals, even prisons. The
bottom line is that Federal judges wield enormous power, often at great
cost to the American people. Federal judges must be persons of
considerable intellect and unquestioned integrity. But they also must be
faithful to the text of the Constitution and committed to applying the law
as written, not rewriting it by substituting their own policy judgements.80
In particular, Senator Dole hoped that raising the issue of future appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court would galvanize voters, because "[i]fwe give
President Clinton the opportunity to make just one more appointment to the
Supreme Court, we could end up with the most liberal court since the
Warren Court of the sixties."81
Dole soon focused on Clinton's lower court appointments. In a major
speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, he singled out four
Clinton appomtees-"Do we really want the majority of judges on the
Federal bench to think like Judges Barkett, Baer, Brnkema, and Sarokm-
an all-star team of liberal82 lemency-judges who seem intent on disman-
0 Bob Dole, Dole Tells How He Would Pick Judges, INSIGHT, Apr. 29, 1996,
at 10-11 [hereinafter Dole, Dole Tells How].
81 Id. Given that by the time of the 1996 election there were only two
Democratic appointees on the Supreme Court and that neither the Burger nor the
Rehnquist Courts could be viewed as liberal, this issue did not appear to resonate
with voters.
82 While Senator Dole's comments about judges during the campaign were
attributable to political posturing, by most accounts the judges appointed by
President Clinton are quite moderate. Robert Carp, a Umversity of Houston
political scientist who has studied opinions of federal judges for 25 years, found
that based on a study of more than 15,000 opinions written by Clinton's appointees,
"there is no empirical evidence that [Clinton appointees] are inordinately disposed
toward criminal defendants or inordinately liberal. They are kind of moderate to
moderately liberal." Jamie Dettmer & Lisa Leiter, Judicial Choices Raise
Objections, INSIGHT, Apr. 29, 1996, at 12. University of Massachusetts judicial
expert Sheldon Goldman, who for 20 years has published respected biannual
studies of the presidents' judicial appointments in Judicature, agrees:
The large majority of the Clinton nominees are very solid, mainstream
people. None of them have been identified as liberal activists in terms of
public persona or in terms of writings. The Clinton Administration and
Clinton himselfhave been very careful to lower the ideological temperature
of the judicial appointment process. They have nominated mainstream
people.
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MorningEdition: Federal Judge Shortage (Nat'l Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 22,
1997).
William Leuchtenburg, court scholar and historian, observed, "What most
people say is how moderate [President Clinton's judges] have been. [Clinton] has
not taken advantage of his tenure as President to offset the decidedly ideological
appointments that Reagan and Bush made in the 1980s." Katharne Q. Seelye, Dole
Citing Crisis in the Courts Attacks Appointments by Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20,
1996, at A10. In a similar vein, Nan Aron, president of the Alliance for Justice,
said, "One would have hoped that this President would use Ins power to begin to
put some fresh perspectives and voices on these circuit courts. That is something
he has chosen not to do." MorningEdition: Federal Judge Shortage (Nat'l Public
Radio broadcast, Sept. 25, 1997). Molly Ivins, a columnist with the Fort Worth
Star-Telegram, is more caustic rn her description of the typical Clinton judge:
Clinton's nominees don't fit anyone's description of 'liberal activist.' He
has nominated the most bland-vanilla set of appointees imaginable, any
question raised about any of them means that the White House pulls down
the nomination, no fight. Clinton has yet to waste a particle of political
muscle backing ajudicial nominee.
Molly Ivins, Politicians 'Assault on Judiciary Misses Mark, SIOUX FALLS ARGUS
LEADER, Aug. 15, 1997, at 14.
Clint Bolick, the Legal Director for the Institute for Justice, like many
conservative activists, disagrees that President Clinton's judicial appointments are
moderates. He notes:
Clinton judges generally are more likely to favor defendants in criminal
cases and plaintiffs in civil rights and civil liability cases and to view the
power of the federal courts more expansively than judges appointed by
Ronald Reagan or George Bush. Clinton's appointments have made the
federal courts more liberal, moving them perceptibly toward the kind of
judicial activism that characterized the federal courts before the election of
Ronald Reagan.
Clint Bolick, Clinton's Judges: A Preliminary Analysis, 1996 GOLDWATER
INSTITUTE ISSUE ANALYSIS REPORT 3. Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) echoes
Bolick's opinion.
I believe that the current administration has then done a disservice to the
American people by gathering liberal activists from every coffee house and
every street corner in America and nominating them to some of the most
important and influential Federal courts in America. Until the President
came on to the scene, I thought that we had turned a corner on that sort of
Warren Court thinking. I had thought there was a broad consensus that law
enforcement should not have their hands tied by highly technical rules. I
had thought that there was a broad consensus that serving time in prison for
committing crimes should be punishment and not a blissful vacation at
taxpayers' expense. But, Mr. President, I was wrong. President Clinton has
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tling the rule of law from the bench." 3
Senator Dole disparaged Harold Baer, Jr., a Clinton appointee to the
Southern District of New York, for a single evidentiary ruling m which
Baer had suppressed a large quantity of cocaine after he found that the
police had no reason to stop some suspects.8 4 Senator Dole criticized Judge
Leome Bnnkema of the Eastern District of Virgina for departing from the
sentencing guidelines.8 5 He criticized Judge Rosemary Barkett of the
Eleventh Circuit for a death penalty ruling she had made while serving as
Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court. 6 He later commented that "as
a member of the 1 lth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Barkett has had the
opportunity to write opimons in seven crimial cases. And guess what
in all seven cases Judge Barkett has sided with the criminal defendant."87
Referring to Lee Sarokin, then a judge on the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, Senator Dole said:
Tius judge, who twists the constitution to impose his liberal views of
social policy, whose bias m the courtroom is so blatant that he had to be
removed from a case-this judge was hand-picked by President Clinton to
sent up a number of law professors and liberal activists to sit on the Federal
bench and impose their preconceived, unrealistic ideas on the rest of
America
142 CONG. REC. S3699-3700 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996).
83Bob Dole, Verbatim, Dole Strafes Clinton Judges, ABA, LEGAL TIMES, Apr.
22, 1996, at 19 [hereinafter Dole, Verbatim]. George Stephanopoulos, one of
President Clinton's spokespersons, responded, 'We're not going to get into atit for
tat. For every Clinton judge they can pull out, we can pull out a Reagan or Bush
judge who might have made a similar isolated decision." Seelye, supra note 82, at
10.
84 See United States v. Bayless, 913 F Supp. 232, 238 (S.D.N.Y.), opinion
vacatedon reconsideration, 921 F Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Ultraconservatives
like Tom Jippmg of the Free Congress Foundation picked up on the Baer refrain,
commenting, "Baer's appointment says Clinton's nominees are out-of-touch, soft-
on-crinmejudges, andyetthe Senate confirms them. Senatorial courtesy is the single
most perverse factor m the selection process. It has been the reason for the
[Republican] code of silence [on Clinton's judicial nominees]." Dettmer & Leiter,
supra note 82, at 9.
85 See Charles W Hall, Lawyers Defend Virginia Judge Mocked by Dole,
WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 1996, at B3.
86 See Gil Klein, Two State Judges Cited in Dole's Blast at Clinton: Liberal
Judicial Hall of Shame, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH (Richmond, Va.), Apr. 20,
1996, at A-2.87Dole, Dole Tells How, supra note 80, at 10-11.
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sit on the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, the second highest court in the
land-and the very court that had removed him for bias earlier. I voted
against confirming Judge Sarokin. I have profound questions whether
such a man should be sitting on the federal bench, let alone one of the
highest courts m the land. 8
Senate Judiciary Chairman Orrin Hatch had laid the groundwork for these
comments a few weeks earlier when he said, "Judge Sarokm has repeatedly
come down on the side of criminals and prisoners m a series of cases and
he recently voted to overturn the death sentences of two Delaware men
who, in separate cases, killed several elderly people." 9
Senator Dole, of course, was somewhat hypocritical for attacking the
Clinton judges. He had only voted against two: Lee Sarokm for the Third
Circuit and Rosemary Barkett for the Eleventh Circuit.9° According to Fred
Graham, chief anchor of Court TV-
You'll recall that the media very quickly discovered that Senator
Dole had voted for almost all of these judges he was then criticizing; that,
m fact. they went out to Kansas and they found out that Senator Dole's
selections were very much like the Clinton nominees, sort of ud-
dle-of-the-road, smart, well qualified Federal judges. And then they dug
around and, of course, inevitably they found a nutty-looking decision by
one of Senator Dole's judicial appointees, and they pointed out how by
grabbing at one isolated opinion, you could make almost any judge look
a little kooky.91
Kim Wells, who advised Dole on judicial nominees and chaired his 1996
presidential campaign in Kansas, said that "Dole did not use a litmus test
[for nominations]. He never has. I'd characterize his choices as
mainstream."92 Lawrence Berkowitz, a Kansas lawyer and Democrat
18 Dole, Verbatim, supra note 83, at 19.
89 142 CONG. REC. S2790 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1996).
90 See Senate Rollcall Vote 319, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (Oct. 4, 1994) (Sarokm);
Senate Rollcall Vote 92, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (Apr. 4, 1994) (Barkett). Senator
Dole also voted to recommit the nomination of James Denmis to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, sending it back to the Judiciary Committee. See Senate Rollcall
Vote 473, 104th Cong. 1st Sess. (Sept. 28, 1995).
91ABA Hearings of the Comm'n, supra note 16 (Oct. 11, 1996) (statement of
Fred Graham).
92Jonathan Groner, AsJudge-Picker, Dolels No RonaldReagan, LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 1, 1996, at 13.
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agreed. "These judges are very case-oriented, fact-onented. They are
qualified lawyers who are not ideological at all." 93
Judge Baer became the subject of unending criticism andrepeated calls
for his impeachment. Referring to Baer, Senator Dole said the presidential
election was a choice "between a candidate who will appoint conservative
judges to the court and a candidate who appoints liberal judges who bend
the laws to let drug dealers free." President Clinton even entered into this
verbal war, suggesting through his spokesperson that Baer might want to
resign from the bench.95 After months of criticism, including a letter from
150 members of Congress who msisted that President Clinton ask for Judge
Baer's resignation, Baer conducted a second hearing on the suppression
issue and reversed his decision on April 1, 1996.96 According to Senator
Hatch,
[i]t took literally weeks of criticism by the Republican leaders of the
House and Senate to force Judge Baer to reconsider his ill-conceived
ruling. Unfortunately, this sort of attention cannot be brought to bear m
all of the other soft-on-crime decisions issued by the other judicial
activists that President Clinton has appointed to the federal bench.97
During this onslaught, Baer received support from some members of
the Second Circuit, in which the Southern District of New York resides.
Chief Judge Jon 0. Newman and three former chief judges, J. Edward
Lumbard, Wilfred Weinberg, and James Oakes, wrote a public letter to
Senator Dole:
[T]here is an important line between legitimate criticism of a decision and
illegitimate attacks on a judge. Criticism of a decision can illuminate
issues and sometimes point the way toward better decisions. Attacks on
a judge risk inhibition of all judges as they conscientiously endeavor to
discharge their duties. [Judges] have endured attacks, both verbal and
physical, and they have established a tradition ofjudicial independence
and faithful regard for the Constitution that is the envy of the world. We
931d.
" Alison Mitchell, Clinton Pressing Judge to Relent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1996, at B3.
95 See id.
96 See United States v. Bayless, 921 F Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
97 Warren P Strobel, Clinton, Dole Hitfor Judge Bashing, WASH. TIMES, Apr.
3, 1996, atA4.
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are confident that they will remain steadfast to that tradition. Rather, we
argue that attacks on a judge of our Circuit should cease because of the
disservice they do to the Constitution and the danger they create of
seriously misleading the American public as to the proper functioning of
the federal judiciary.
98
Third Circuit Judge Lee Sarokin resigned from the bench on July 31,
1996, after serving in that capacity for only twenty-two months. Following
his resignation, he claimed that the political attacks levied against him
during the 1996 campaign limited his ability to render independent
decisions. In a letter to his Third Circuit colleagues, he said "I see my life's
work and reputation being disparaged on an almost daily basis, and I find
myself unable to ignore it." In his letter of resignation to President
Clinton, he wrote, "In the current political campaign, enforcement of
constitutional rights is equated with being soft on crime and, indeed, even
causing it. [T]o hold judges responsible for crime is like blaming
doctors for disease.""i° Learning of Sarokin's resignation, Yale Law School
legal history professor Robert W Gordon said,
In most cases the attackers think they won't do any damage. . Butwhen
you get a weakjudge who actually changes his mind, it becomes hostage
negotiation. If judges send a signal that this kind of criticism can get to
them, perfectly competent but thm-skinedjudges will be hounded offthe
bench. 101
" Jon 0. Newman, The Judge Baer Controversy: Correspondence from the
WhiteHouse, SenatorDole, Congressmen andJudges, 80 JuDICATURE 156, 158-59
(1997).
99 Neil MacFarquhar, Federal Judge to Resign Citing Political Attacks on
Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,1996, atB 1. Largely because ofpnor rulings during
ns tenure on the district court for the District of New Jersey, which labeled him
soft on crime, Sarokin became the subject of one of President Clinton's most
difficult judicial nomination fights of 1994. Three weeks before his resignation,
Sarokin had sought to transfer his chambers from Newark, New Jersey, to
California to be closer to his family as he prepared to take semor status. His
colleagues rejected that request, and Sarokm soon opted to resign. He demed that
the rejection of his move weighed in ns decision, stating, "my tenure on the court
has become so politicized that I do not feel that I can serve effectively." Id. at B4.
10O Id.
101David E. Rovella, Judge Sarokin Decries Criticism ofBench, Quits, NAT'L
L.J., June 17, 1996, at A10.
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More than a year later, Lee Sarokin wrote that he
thought that by stepping down from the court and making my concerns
public I would convey the gravity of this dangerous course. Now a year
later, I concede that my grand gesture was a complete fizzle, and indeed,
rather than dissuade the practice, seems to have emboldened it since it has
been followed by demands led by Representatives Tom DeLay and Bob
Barr to inpeach judges for unpopular decisions.
102
While many commented on the impropriety ofattacking a sitting judge
for his or her rulings, some also wondered whether the attacks had led to
Judge Baer's reversal of his initial suppression decision. According to
Representative William Delahunt (D-Mass.):
Judge Harold Baer was pilloried by the press and the Presidential
candidates of both parties for a case in which he excluded drug evidence
seized by the police. A few weeks later, the judge reversed his ruling. We
will never know whether he did so because he had genuinely changed his
mind or because of the relentless criticism he endured. But the perception
will remain that a Federal judge was forced to back down under political
pressure. That is hardly the way to increase public confidence in the
courts.
103
Nan Aron, president of the Alliance for Justice, expressed similar
concerns:
I can't say with any certainty that Judge Baer changed [his]
ruling[] because [he] succumbed to political pressure. The problem is we
don't know why [he] changed [his] rulings. The difficulty is that it fuels
the public perception that courts make their decisions because ofpolitical
pressure and not because of the facts and the law presented to them, and
it undermines, it seems to me, the public's faith in the judiciary 104
Abner Mikva, a former White House Counsel and a former judge on
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
102 Lee Sarokin, Public Letter, NATION, Oct. 13, 1997, at 15-16.
103 Judicial Misconduct and Discipline, supra note 1, at 22 (statement of Rep.
William D. Delahunt).
o4 ABA Heanngs of the Comm'in, supra note 16 (Oct. 11, 1996) (statement of
Nan Aron).
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referred to a typicaljudicial aspiration in which judges hope to be elevated
to a higher court. He placed this within the context of the attacks on Judge
Baer:
Most judges do think about promotion. They spend some time
when they're hearing these dull arguments wondering what will happen
if the phone rings and the President of the United States asks, how would
you like to go upstairs?
They think about that, and clearly the Baer mcident, the way it came
out, both with the threats, the political speeches, maybe asking for his
resignation, his impeachment, and then his reversing himself, has to send
a message to every trial judge and everybody else who ever deals with the
exclusionary rule, be careful. If you ever want to go anywhere else than
where you are, don't get on the wrong side of one of these hot-button
cases, and that does chill the independence of the judiciary 105
While many believed that Judge Baer's second Bayless decision
resulted m part from calls for his resignation and was a womsome attack
on judicial independence, others have a different interpretation. For
instance, Fred Graham of Court TV said,
It seemed to me that what we saw there was that Judge Baer had
issued a decision which certainly appeared-most people thought was
foolish and wrong-headed. He apparently came to that conclusion after
some reflection and maybe a little jaw-bonmg from Senator Dole and the
White House because he changed his mmd. He had another hearing, but
he changed his mind, and I think that it was a good thing for probably the
judiciary, the federal judiciary and all of us, that was ventilated and that
we all saw that there were decisions being made by competent, smart
judges that the average person thought were ridiculous and that, on
reflection, in fact, was overturned, and I thought that was pretty
healthy.'16
Judge David F Levi of the Eastern District of Califorma believes that
tis type of criticism poses little threat to judicial independence.
As I define the term, I would say that it takes two to tango on this one.
There is pressure. The threats are only threats if the judges perceive them
10 Id. (statement of Abner Mikva).
'o
6 Id. (statement of Fred Graham).
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that way and respond to them. And I don't see this happening, at least m
the federal system that I know best. I don't believe that any judge would
think that his or her ability to decide cases impartially has been impaired
by anything that has happened recently. 7
B. Impeachment
On March 11, 1997, Tom DeLay, the Majority WhAp of the House of
Representatives, casually announced that he favored impeachment of
"activist" federal judges. He noted:
The articles of impeachment are being written right now. As part of
our conservative efforts against judicial activism, we are going after
judges. Congress has given up its responsibility m [overseeing] judges
and their performances on the bench, and we intend to revive that and go
after them in a big way 108
He did not announce specific judges who might be candidates for
unpeachment, but those names were soon forthcoming. According to
DeLay, "We are receiving nominations from all across the country [for
judges] that could be a prime candidate for impeachment under our
approach."'
0 9
He then explained in the New York Times that
I advocate impeachmgjudges who consistently ignore their constitutional
role, violate their oath of office and breach the separation of powers. The
Framers provided the tool of impeachment to keep the power of the
judiciary in check. It is a tool Congress should explore using.
110
He later defined an "impeachable offense" as "whatever a majority of
the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in
107 ABA Panel, Judicial Independence: Real Threat or Feeling Threatened,
JUDGES J., Winter 1998, at 46.
"'i Ralph Z. Hallow, Republicans Out to Impeach Activist Jurists, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1997, atAl.
"0 Mike Doming, New GOP Target: Liberal Judges' Right-Wing Support
Appears to Be Growing, CHI. TRIB., May 16, 1997, at 3.
"' Tom DeLay, Letter to the Editor, Impeachment Is a Valid Answer to a
Judiciary Run Amok, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1997, at 18.
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history""' DeLay and his allies soon suggested a number of possible
candidates for judicial impeachments, including William Justice," 2 Fred
Biery, 3 HaroldBaer,"n4 Thelton Henderson, 15 andlohn T. Nixon.' 6 Afew
weeks later, DeLay repeated his position on the House floor.
Mr. Speaker, an independent judiciary is the anchor of our democ-
racy A despotic judiciary may very well lead to the downfall of our
democracy. I just urge my colleagues to consider all the tools within our
constitutional authority as we, the Congress, take on a very real problem
of judicial despotism. One of those tools is impeachment. Despite the
barrage of criticism that myself and my colleagues have suffered over the
last few weeks, I think impeachment is a tool that we should consider
using.117
"' Herman Schwartz, The War Against Judicial Independence, L.A. TIMES,
May 11, 1997, atM2.
,i2 Judge William Wayne Justice of the Eastern District of Texas was a
candidate for impeachment because he had asserted control over a Texas prison
system m a 20-year-old inmate lawsuit. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F Supp. 1265
(E.D. Tex. 1980), aff'dinpart, rev'dinpart, 679 F.2d 1115, and amended in part,
vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982).
113 Judge Fred S. Biery of the Western District of Texas was selected because
he had postponed the swearing in of a Republican sheriff and a Republican county
commissioner in Val Verde County, Texas. The two men had won election through
800 absentee ballots mailed in by military personnel who had not lived in the
county for many years but retained Texas addresses because of inexpensive public
universities and the absence of a state income tax. See Casarez v. Val Verde
County, 957 F Supp. 847 (W.D. Texas 1997).
14 Judge Harold Baer prominently made the list for suppressing evidence m a
Washington Heights drug case in 1996, saying police had no reason to stop the
suspects. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y.), opinion
vacated on reconsideration, 921 F Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also supra
notes 84, 94-98 and accompanying text.
"' Judge Thelton Henderson was mentioned for enjoining Proposition 209. See
Coalition for Econ. Equityv. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996), vacated,
122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997); see also supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
116 Judge John T. Nixon of the Middle District of Tennessee was singled out for
blocking executions m capital cases. See, e.g., Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320 (6th Cir.
1998); Groseclose v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct
1826 (1998); see also Viveca Novak, Empty Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26,
1997, at 38. See generally Katharine Q. Seelye, Republicans Identify Federal
Judges for Impeachment, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 14, 1997, at F16.
17 143 CONG. REC. H1587 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1997).
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On May 15, 1997, the House held a hearing to consider judicial
misconduct and discipline. DeLay expanded on his prior remarks,
expounding on his impeachment theory-
When is impeachment a legitimate tool? Can Congress impeach a
public official for noncrimmal acts? I think the answer is yes. The
category of impeachable offenses is much larger than the category of
indictable offenses. Article II of the Constitution states that all Federal
civil officers may be impeached for "treason, bribery or other high crimes
and misdemeanors." The mistaken assumption is that impeachment
requires a statutory crime. That has never been the case.
I am not-and I repeat-I am not suggesting that impeachment be used
for partisan purposes, but when judges exercise power not delegated to
them by the Constitution, I think impeachment is a proper tool. And I
submit to the committee thatjudges who abuse their power, violate their
constitutional oath, and breach our Government's separation of powers
can be impeached as readily as judges who violate statutory law. Anyone
can be impeached that has a majority of the House and removed from
office with two-thirds vote from the Senate. Judges who violate the
separation of powers damage and discredit our system of government as
much as judges guilty of offenses defined mn the statute books.'
18
11 Judicial Misconduct and Discipline, supra note 1, at 16-17 (statement of
Rep. Tom DeLay). In the history of the Republic, the House has voted to impeach
only 13 judges. Eleven were tried, but only seven were convicted and removed
from office by the Senate. The first was the 1803 conviction of New Hampshire
District Judge John Pickering for breaches of statutory duty, alcoholism, and
blasphemy. According to Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge m the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania,
energized by the success with Pickering, the Jeffersonians went ahead to try
to impeach Justice Chase, who was an obvious target. And as we all know,
that effort almost succeeded, but it did not, and the understanding has been
that Justice Chase was being pursued for political reasons, though many
of them related to his conduct on the bench, and the failure to convict was
regarded as a defeat for those who thought that unpeachment could serve
purposes that mEnglish law frequently had been accomplished by measures
of address in parliament to get nd of judges who were simply unpopular
with the prevailing political regime.
ABA Hearngsfor the Comm'n, supra note 16 (Oct. 11, 1996) (statement of Senior
Judge Louis H. Pollak). In the spring of 1996, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to
the Chase proceedings and his subsequent acquittal as providing "assurance to
federaljudges that theirjudicial acts-their rulings from the bench-would not be a
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DeLay's call for impeachment was supportedby is most conservative
colleagues m the House of Representatives. A spokesman for Representa-
tive Ed Bryant (R-Tenn.) said that "[Bryant] considers impeachment of
[Judge John] Nixon a viable possibility and is giving it thought." 1 9
Republican Representative Sam Johnson of Texas contemplated drawing
up articles of inpeachment against Texas District Judge Fred Biery 120
Representative Bob Barr (R-Ga.) believes npeachment is a viable option
when it comes to Federal judges, suggesting
basis for removal from office by impeachment and conviction. And that has been
the guiding principle of the House of Representatives and the Senate from that day
to tis." William H. Rehnquist, The Future of the Federal Courts, 46 AM. U. L.
REv 263, 273 (1996).
After Pickering, the few judicial convictions by the Senate included the 1861
conviction of Tennessee District Judge West H. Humphreys for conduct that
amounted to treason, the 1912 conviction ofAssociate Judge Robert W. Archbald
of the United States Commerce Court for willfully accepting bribes and corrupting
Ins office for illegal personal gain, and the 1936 conviction of Judge Halsted Ritter
of the Southern District of Florida for accepting kickbacks and tax evasion. Fifty
years later, three other impeachment convictions occurred. Nevada District Judge
Harry E. Claiborne was convicted by the Senate m 1986 for tax evasion that had
resulted m a felony criminal conviction. In 1989, Florida District Judge (now
United States Representative) Alcee Hastings was convicted for perjury stemming
from an indictment based on the solicitation of a bribe. Mississippi District Judge
Walter L. Nixon was convicted for lying to a federal grand jury investigating a
bribery scheme. See Steven W Fitschen, Impeaching Federal Judges: A
Covenantal and Constitutional Response to Judicial yranny, 10 REGENT U. L.
REV 111, 123-25 &thl. 1 (1998).
Bruce Fern insists that "[lt speaks volumes that Congress answered the
flagrantly erroneous opinion in Dred Scott with a constitutional amendment,
not impeachment of justices voting with the majority." Harvey Berkman, Some
Republicans Declare Open Season, NAT'L L.J., June 30, 1997, at All. While
politicians have raised the possibility of impeachment against jursts with whom
they disagreed, these rare instances have not led to Senate convictions. For
example, Southern segregationists considered impeachment of Chief Justice Earl
Warren m the wake of the Brown decision. See Fitschen, supra, at 122. Justice
Douglas was the target of an impeachment campaign by Representative W M.
Wheeler (D-Ga.) in 1953, for granting a brief stay of execution to Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg. See id. at 137 Douglas was targeted again in 1970, attacked by House
Minority Leader Gerald Ford (R-Mich.) for reasons of "character." See id. at 142.
119 Jeff Amy, Nixon Foes Hail Efforts to Impeach Texas Judge, NASHVILLE
BANNER, Mar. 13, 1997, atAl.
"2' See Laurie Kellman, Republicans Rally 'Round Judge-Impeachment Idea,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1997, at Al.
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[t]hat doesn't mean we should do it, but it certainly means that it is
something that is on the minds of our constituents and we ought to sit up
and take notice of it. [T]he possibility of looking at some of the
terminology that is used in our constitutions such as "good behavior" and
looking at perhaps defining that, trying to come to grips with, What does
that mean? We know it doesn't mean "bad behavior," but beyond that,
what does it mean? And I don't think we should be at all afraid to start
thinking about these things.i12
Ultraconservative activists also appreciated the Whip's comments."
Tom Pendleton of the Free Congress Foundation said, "We support
impeachment for those judges who violate their oath of office. They've
violated it because they are sworn to admmster the law, not their law they
make up as they please, but the law " Tom Jipping, director of the
Judicial Selection Monitoring Project, discounts the idea that threatening
judges with inpeachment is an attack on judicial independence. He states
that inpeachment is merely another tool m the congressional arsenal of
appropriate controls on the judiciary
The judiciary does not have any claim to be able to operate in
isolation while operation of the governmental structure of which it is a
part is somehow put on hold. This category would include Congress'
authority to make appropriations, and even to establish, abolish, or
reallocate judgeships and judicial resources. It would also include
Congress' authority to determine the appellate jurisdiction of the courts.
It would even include, I would argue, impeachment of judges. Impeach-
ment ofjudges has occurred about two dozen times in American history.
Each of these may be pursued for excessively partisan or ideological
reasons, something that should actively be part of those debates. But it
cannot be said that Congress doing what the Constitution empowers it to
do necessarily threatens judicial independence. That would ascribe to the
" Judicial Misconduct and Discipline, supra note 1, at 7 (statement of Rep.
Bob Barr). Barr, in fact, was the first House member to introduce a bill to impeach
President Clinton. See H.R. Res. 304, 105th Cong. (1997).
2 David Barton, a conservative activist, provided some of the underpinnings
for DeLay's ideas. In 1996, he publishedlmpeachment!Restrainingan Overactive
Judiciary, a fifty-page pamphlet explaining why conservatives should push for the
impeachment of federal judges with whose decisions they disagree. He noted that
even ifjudges are not impeached, the threat "serves as a deterrent," causmgjudges
to "become much more restrained." DAVID BARTON, IMPEACHMENT! RESTRAINING
AN OVERACTIVE JUDICIARY 53 (1996) (text on file with author).
" Amy, supra note 119, at Al.
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judiciary a degree or a kind of independence that, at least in tlus country
under the governmental structure createdby its founders, does not exist. 124
While not embracing the calls for impeachment, Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) would not rule out its use to censure "activist"
judges:
I don't think there is going to be a plan to look at [impeachment] as a way
to express our opinion on their rulings. [Impeachment] should be
based on improper conduct. I think we should look at judges very
carefully if they're nominated or if their nominations come to the floor of
the Senate. Once they are on the bench, if they act nproperly and the
judiciary does not act on its own, then Congress does have the impeach-
ment velcle.
2 5
Most observers were outraged at this series of comments favoring
impeachment. They noted that the only examples cited of "impeachable"
judges happened to be those who had written opimons with which DeLay
and ins allies disagreed. On May 13, 1997, the deans of 110 law schools
wrote to Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.):
Comments by various members of Congress suggest that
inpeachment is an appropriate mechanism to restrain an "overactive"
judiciary and that, even though it is unlikely that impeachment will result
in conviction, bringing impeachment proceedings against certain federal
judges will have a deterrent effect on the substance of their subsequent
ruling from the bench. These rationales mis-charactenze the purpose of
impeachment and only encourage Congress to abuse its extraordinary
power to remove a federal judge from office.
Impeachment was never intended to be used-and never should be
used-against a judge who issues an opimon with which members of the
other branches disagree. We urge you to adhere to the long-standing
precedent established by your congressional colleagues over the years to
use the extraordinary unpeachment remedy only in extraordinary
circumstances ofjudicial misconduct.
26
'24 ABA Hearngs of the Comm'n, supra note 16 (Oct. 11, 1996) (statement of
Tom Jipping).
1'2 Brian Blomquist, Lott Won't Use Rulings to Topple Federal Judges, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1997, atA4.
1 Letter from Dean Richard L. Aynes et al. to Speaker Newt Gingrich,
reprnted in Judicial Misconduct and Discipline, supra note 1, at 57-58.
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According to Laura Murphy of the American Civil Liberties Union, "[t]his
is a coordinated and sophisticated strategy of intimidation. You are not
talking about someone accepting bribes or personally being convicted of
a crime. This is a very dangerous trend that should be taken into account
along with the slowdown in the confirmation of federal judges by the
Senate."'27 Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the ranking member on the
Senate Judiciary Committee, said,
The Founders of this country did not consider disagreement with a
Member of the House of Representatives as an impeachable offense. In
fact, the Founders of this country would have laughed that one right out.
Can you imagine? I suggested some read the Constitution and, I must
admit, in a moment of exasperation, I suggested perhaps some who were
making these claims had never read a book at all. But of course, they
have. There is one by Lewis Carroll. It is calledAlice in Wonderland. The
queen had a couple of different points she made. One, of course, if all else
failed was "Offwith their heads." The other is, "The law is what I say the
law is.
' ' 128
The Clinton administration expressed outrage, and Attorney General
Janet Reno noted:
We must all work to ensure that these judges' and all federal judges'
independence is not chilled by threats of impeachment. Respect for our
system of government is critical to its continued legitimacy. Ongoing
challenges to the judiciary's independence has the potential not only to
undermine citizens' respect for the judicial branch but, even more
broadly, to undermine their respect for our government as a whole. 129
N. Lee Cooper, then president of the American Bar Association,
suggested that "[i]f impeachment just becomes another avenue ofjudicial
review, sort of a legislative referendum on the quality ofjudicial decision-
making, then we have really turned our back on the Constitution and in
effect have made three branches of government two by ripping up our
Constitution.""13
127 Hallow, supra note 108, at Al.
'2 143 CONG. REC. S2525 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997).
129 Janet Reno, Speech to the ABA House of Delegates, ABA 1997 Summer
Meeting (Aug. 5, 1997) (transcript on file with author).
130 Michelle Mittelstadt, DeLay Seeks Impeachment of U.S. Judge, CORPUS
CHRISTI CALLET TIMES, Mar. 13, 1997, at B4.
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Even many conservatives were appalled that this subject arose, and
they were concerned about the impact that it might have on judicial
independence. Justice Antonm Scalia, in a May 19, 1997, speech to the
Anti-Defamation League, criticized the calls for impeachment, saying, "I
think it shouldn't go anywhere. I think we have enough respect for our
courts, enough understanding in the country that if you let the legislature
intrude too much on the judiciary we'll be in trouble.' 3 1 House Judiciary
Committee Chairman Henry Hyde (R-In.) agreed:
I do not believe that impeachment can or should be based upon ajudge's
decision on the merits of any particular case or upon the judge's political
philosophy. There is no precedence for such an approach, and for
good reason. Instances of systematic abuse of power and aggressive
legislating from the bench must be addressed, possibly by impeachment.
However, the remedy for an incorrect decision, no matter how wrong, is
not impeachment, 132 but an appeal to a higher court or the enactment of
legislation.1
33
131 Richard Carelli, Scalia Speaks Out Against Impeaching Activist Judges,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 21, 1997, at 4.
'1 In response to the complaint that the impeachment process was too difficult
to use to pumsh an errant judge, the Senate Judiciary Committee, m considerng
President Roosevelt's court packing plan in 1937, stated that
[w]hen members of the Court usurp legislative powers or attempt to
exercise political power, they lay themselves open to the charge of having
lapsed from that "good behavior" which determines the period of their
official life. But, if you say, the process of impeachment is difficult and
uncertain, the answer is, the people made it so when they framed the
Constitution. It is not for us, the servants of the people, the instruments of
the Constitution, to find a more easy way to do that which our masters made
difficult.
But, if the fault of the judges is not so grievous as to warrant
impeachment, if their offense is merely that they have grown old, and we
feel, therefore, that there should be a "constant infusion of new blood," then
obviously the way to achieve that result is by constitutional amendment
fixing definite terms for the members ofthejudiciary or making mandatory
their retirement at a given age. Such a provision would indeed provide for
the constant infusion of new blood, not only now but at all times in the
future.
REORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, S. REP No. 75-711, at 10
(1937).
33 Berkman, supra note 118, at Al.
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Chairman Hyde also recognized that "[a]n impeachment under these
circumstances [for decisions rendered] would gravely threaten the
independence of the judiciary "I 4 In response, Bruce Fern suggested that
the mdependentjudgment of the judges that we secure by preventing their
opinions from forming a foundation as an impeachable offense is the price
that we pay for having a genuine, rather than a phony or bogus, check on
other branches of government. Can it be abused? Of course it can. All
authority can be abused. But I think it's clear the Founding Fathers
thought that independent judges would be more safe custodians of this
power of interpretation than alternate branches. And it's hard for me to
see how this Congress could exercise impeachment power for allegedly
wrongful decisions, how that process could unfold without the Congress
themselves then sitting and having hearings and saying "Well, was this
opinion supported by the language, the legislative history," and acting
basically as a 435-member supreme court itself. I don't think that is a
forum that was designed to yield reason and deliberation, as opposed to
more passionate and impulsive responses.
135
Analogizing DeLay's calls for impeachment to President Roosevelt's
claim that the aged Supreme Court in 1937 was unable to keep abreast of
its work, Fern posits:
Now today it seems to me that we're confronting a similar situation. I
know that those who are encouraging the use of the impeachment power
to sanction a judge or a Justice for an allegedly wayward opinion insist
that this has nothing to do with politics, nothing to do with the results-that
all they're trying to do is constrain the courts to acting within their oath
of office. But I think that is no more sincere than Roosevelt's insistence
that he was womed about the geriatric stress of the Justices when he
proposed his Court-packing scheme. 136
After the media had lost interest in his comments on impeachment,
DeLay again made news by telling the Washington Post that "[tlhe judges
need to be intimidated. They need to uphold the Constitution. If they
l Doming, supra note 109, at 3.
s JudicialMisconduct andDiscipline, supra note 1, at 34 (statement of Bruce
Fein).
116 Id. at 33 (statement of Bruce Fern).
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don't behave we're going to go after them in a big way "37 When asked
about DeLay's statement, Senate Majority Leader Lott said he agreed with
its underlying sentiment. He explained,
it sounds like a good idea to me. I mean, you know who some of the
most unpopular people m America are, I think they've got, you know,
they maybe are at the top of the list. When I go home, nobody says, oh,
please, give us some more federaljudges. A lot of them say, these people
are out of control and they are gom' beyond what the Constitution
intended. 3
His counterpart, Senate Democratic Leader Tom Dasehle (D-S.D.),
rebuked Lott-
That kind of statement is as strong a challenge to our form of government
as anything I've heard in the United States Senate. So we now know, as
this becomes more clear to all of us, the Republicans are holding up
judgeships, causing extraordinary delays of justice in many parts of our
country because we don't have judges, in order to intimidate the
judiciary.
139
Patrick Leahy agreed with his leader:
I have never known a time when the leadership of the Senate would
tolerate partisan and ideological politics so diverting flus institution from
its constitutional responsibilities with respect to the third constitutionally
coequal branch of Government [T]he American people must know
that not only is the Senate leadership allowing these efforts, it is condon-
ing them.140
Leahy then told a reporter, "I defy anybody to find any time in our history
where a concentrated effort like this has been done to intimidate judges.
If it continues, it becomes a real constitutional crisis of damaging the
independence and the integrity of the federal judiciary 141
'37Biskupic, supra note 9, at Al.
'38MorningEdition: JudicialIntimidation (Nat'l Public Radio broadcast, Sept.
26, 1997).
1
39 Id.
140 143 CONG. REC. S9723 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1997).
14 John Aloysius Farrell, Republicans Take Aim at the Federal Judiciary,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 24, 1997, at Al.
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The attacks onjudges were an effective way for conservative members
of Congress to wm allegiance from their followers without affirmatively
passing legislation. According to People for the American Way Legal
Director Elliot Mincberg, "[i]t's one way they can please their most rabid
supporters by literally doing nothing."' 42 Tom DeLay acknowledged that
the right-wingers "love[ ] it: they think I'm a god on this one."'4 Clint
Bolick, Director of the Institute for Justice, admitted that there is no
downside to attacking thejudicary" "Some of these rulings have inflamed
mainstream America. So when the G.O.P elevates this issue, it is seen as
a winner."
144
C. Hearings on Judicial Activism
Senator John Ashcroft (R-Mo.) is chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism and Property
Rights. In that context, he has an on-going interest in the federal courts. 45
142 Dan Carney, More Challenges to Clinton Nominees Cause Judicial Stale-
mate, CQ, Nov. 22, 1997, at 2912, 2912.
"43 Molly Ivms, Politicians Assault on Judges Continues, SIOUX FALLS ARGUS
LEADER, Oct. 15, 1997, at 1.
' Novak, supra note 116, at 38.
14' Ashcroft states thatMissouri v. Jenlans, 672 F Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo. 1987),
afid in part, rev'd in part, 495 U.S. 33 (1990), was his major motivation for
attacking "judicial activists."
I know what the character ofjudicial activism is and the threat that it poses.
I know this firsthand after what happened in my home state of Jenkins with
the Kansas City school district A lawsuit was filed in the court of Federal
Judge Russell Clark in 1977, and since that time the school district has been
run by the Federal courts rather than the local school board.
As Judge Clark candidly admitted, he "allowed the district planners to
dream" and "provided the mechanism for those dreams to be realized."
Because these extravagant orders were not funded through the normal
political process, Judge Clark took the extraordinary step of ordering tax
increases to fund his plans.
Now if the power of the judiciary includes the umquely legislative
power to tax, one wonders if there is anything that it does not include. Judge
Clark certainly showed me and the whole State of Missouri the dangers of
judicial activism: the powers of all three branches combined in a single
Federal judge, the power to tax, the power to run the school system, and the
power to consider legal challenges concerning the school system.
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He had hoped to use this interest as one launching pad in his quest for the
Republican presidential nomination in 2000.11 During the first session of
the 105th Congress, Ashcroft's subcommittee held a series of hearings on
judicial activism.147 Ashcroft claimed that the purpose of the hearings was
"to find out the extent of the problem, look at situations where statutes and
referendums of the people, from Washington State to Arkansas, from
Hawaii to the East Coast, where the people's will has been set aside by the
courts.'
4 8
Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, supported
these hearings and denied that they would exacerbate the threats to judicial
independence. He noted:
There are some who have, and will, denounce any effort, including
these hearings, to discuss and examine the problem ofjudicial activism,
and who will raise the shield of judicial independence to suggest that
judicial decisions, and the judiciary generally, should somehow be
insulated from any criticism. While in candor I would concede that there
have recently been occasional statements or complaints that might be
construed as "court-bashing" or as threats tojudicial independence, let me
emphasize that reasoned discourse and examination regarding judicial
decision making and the proper role of courts is anything but a threat to
judicial independence. Indeed, I would suggest that it is not only
appropriate for Congress to examine these issues, but that we have an
obligation, established by Article IlI of the Constitution itself, to do so.
And I would hope that the participants in, and observers of this examina-
tion, are able to distinguish between reasoned mquny regarding constitu-
tional principle, as opposed to an attack on judicial independence or
hostility to the courts generally. 
1
49
Judicial Activism, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft); see supra
note 69.
146 See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Political Briefing; Early and Often Is 2000
Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1998, at A16.
147 See Judicial Activism: Defining the Problem and Its Impact: Hearings on
S.J Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism and Property
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). The
hearings were split into three phases. The first, held on June 11, 1997, was entitled
"Judicial Activism: Defining the Problem and its Impact." The second phase, held
on July 15, 1997, was entitled "Judicial Activism: Assessing the Impact." The final
stage, held on July 29, 1997, was entitled "Judicial Activism: Potential Responses."
148 Dana Fields, Senator Blasts Judicial "Activism, 'Plans Hearings, ASSOC.
PRESS POL. SERV., Mar. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2506353.
149 JudicialActivism, supra note 6, at 8 (June 11, 1997) (statement of Sen. Orrm
Hatch).
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The hearings were hardly fora for "reasoned inquiry" At the first
hearing, Philadelphia Police Detective Patrick Boyle was summoned to
testify about his son, a fellow police officer, who was killed. Detective
Boyle blamed a federal judge.
Gentlemen, Danny's killer was arrested, tried, and convicted of first
degree murder. At the end of the trial the presiding judge informed us
m open court that this murder should never have happened that Danny
should be with us today; that this killer who was arrested and convicted
of killing my son Danny, was released time and time again because of this
prison cap in Philadelphia. This federal court order was not necessary
and failed to protect the public. Other types of federal court cases can
have similar harmful effects. Congress should establish controls to
prevent unnecessary court orders that can harm the public.1
50
Unsurprisingly, Senator Ashcroft used Boyle's grief to comment:
At our first hearing, we also heard testimony from individuals who
have experienced the impact of judicial activism firsthand. I don't think
any of us who were here could forget the testimony of Detective Pat
Boyle, who told us how his son was killed by a dangerous criminal who
was out on the street because of a Federal court order issued by ajudge
who, I believe was inappropriately judicially active. Detective Boyle's
testimony demonstrates that the problem ofjudicial activism is not some
theoretical concern about the separation of powers alone, but a problem
with sometimes tragic, real-world consequences. Today's hearings will
help to demonstrate other ways in which activist judges and their
decisions have affected all of us.
15'
On May 15, 1997, the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property in the House also conducted a hearing on judicial activism. The
hearing, entitled "Judicial Misconduct and Discipline," considered various
remedies, including impeaching federal judges and stripping away their life
tenure. The very title of this hearing suggested that judges had done
something wrong and that Congress was going to fix the problems caused
by judges.
I01d. at 46-47 (statement of Patrick Boyle).
Ild. at 63 (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft).
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According to Elliot Mincberg, "[b]y using such emotionally laden
phrases as 'judicialmisconduct' and'judicial activism' to attackthe federal
courts, conservatives are working to erode the great American restitu-
tion of an independent judiciary The fact is, judicial independence works
to protect our rights-and some conservatives in Congress can't stand
that., 52
Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.) also commented on the name
of the hearing:
[B]egmnmg m 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court has invalidated a large
number of statutes-12, since 1990. Now, the fact is that if you look at the
appointees there, overwhelmingly these 12 statutes have been invalidated
by the appointees of Republican Presidents. And I do not think that
anybody ought to imply that there's any misconduct when the Supreme
Court Justices strike down a statute. I think that's their job. It is some-
times the fault of the Congress that has legislated sloppily or in the face
of some short-term public pressure, ignoring the constraints.
153
During this hearing, John Conyers (D-Mich.), the ranking member of
the Committee, agreed. He stated:
Now if you were to examine this hearing not in the totality of other
things that the American legislature is doing, this could be a perfectly
reasonable proceeding. If, however, you examine what is going on in a
slightly larger context, I'm afrad you may get a different picture. You see
this unbridled attack on the judiciary is part of a larger, conservative,
Republican plan engineered by the leader of the Republican Congress.
We can isolate these pieces of legislation and criticize them construc-
tively or we can see it as part of a colossal, arrogant, unprecedented attack
on the Constitution of the United States of America."M
152 People for the American Way, Assault on Justice, Conservatives Launch
Attack on Independent Judiciary, M2 PRESS WIRE, May 16, 1997, available in
1997 WL 10369002.
153 Judicial Misconduct and Discipline, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Rep.
Barney Frank).
"5 Hearing on H.R. 1252, supra note 17, at 70 (statement of Rep. John
Conyers).
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Henry Hyde disagreed, stating this hearing was "a discussion of ways
to discipline judges whose conduct needs some corrective measure. This
gives an opportunity for people to vent their concerns."' 55 Afterwards, he
continued,
I think there is a recognition that [federal judges] have unlimited power
and it is unaccountable. I don't think judges should just be able to do
anything they want to do and not be criticized. What we are doing is
criticizing-we have a right to do it, and we have a duty to do it 
156
On January 29, 1998, Charles T. Canady, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, hosted a hearing entitled
"Congress, the Court and the Constitution." Canady opened the hearing by
stating
that the framers of our Constitution expected the Congress to play an
important role in debating and legislating on constitutional issues. It is
important for the Congress to ask itself if deference to the Supreme Court
is always the order of the day. We have a responsibility to consider the
circumstances under which the Congress should or should not defer to the
Supreme Court in making constitutional interpretations. And we have a
duty to ensure that the requirements of the Constitution are consistently
recogmzed and honored in the legislative process. 15 7
Representative John Hostettler (R-Ind.) was the first witness at the
hearing. In contrast to the chairman's view, he directly challenged the
prerogative of the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of
legislation approved by the Congress. He claimed that the present practice
"of the elected branches bowing to judicial supremacy in interpreting the
Constitution squares neither with the Constitution nor with American
history "'58 He went on to state that
the Court makes a valuable contribution to the understanding of our
nation's laws, and, of course, it is essential in the resolution of disputes
155 Penny Bender, Judges Futures in Jeopardy, DES MOINES REG., May 16,
1997, at 5.
116 Kirk Victor, Bashing the Bench, NAT'L L.J., May 31, 1997, at 17
157 Congress, the Court and the Constitution: Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (visited
Feb. 27, 1999) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/22361.htm> (statement of Rep.
Charles T. Canady).
15 8 Id. at <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/223 63.htm> (statement ofRep. John
Hostettler).
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between litigants. But a mere opinion on constitutionality by one branch
is not, and only recently has been, considered supreme and binding on the
others. It can be politically expedient to place the great policy
decisions of our times in the hands of an unelected elite rather than to be
held accountable to the voters back home. Nevertheless, it is time to put
the doctrine of judicial supremacy to rest. We all take oaths to uphold the
Constitution. Where the legislative branch disagrees with a statutory
construction of the Supreme Court, we must make haste to correct the
wrong. If it be a Constitutional error by the Court, we must first do what
we can to negate the impact Where the Court's opinon is truly an
egregious constitutional error, we must refuse to allow the Executive
branch to carry out the Court's orders. In such cases, the People will
ultimately decide the issue in the next election when they face the
opposing views. This, my colleagues, is the paramount issue. Is it the
People's Constitution? Is it the People's government? No Mr.
Chairman, we must never resign our government-that government of the
People, by the People and for the People-m the hands of the Supreme
Court or any lower court. 159
This truly revolutionary statement, while contrary to constitutional
principles going back to the seminal case ofMarbury v. Madison,16 is not
atypical of the variety of vindictive attacks onjudicial independence made
by legislators in the past two Congresses. According to retired Judge
Charles B. Renfrew,
in the last year we have had an extraordinary number of what I term
inappropriate and unfair criticisms. The Constitution and our society
contemplate vigorous criticism as an important part in the daily life in the
republic. Inappropriate criticism may be difficult to define as Justice
Stewart said of pornography, and yet its consequences are apparent. Such
criticism erodes the public confidence in the judiciary and without such
confidence, the functioning of the courts is severely affected and
impaired. Where governmental officials, the President and a Senator
involved in a Presidential campaign, refer to a specific decision as the
basis for either forcing resignation or commencement of impeachment
proceedings, tlus goes beyond the appropriate bounds. This brings the
judicial process into disrepute.1
61
159 Id. (statement of Rep. John Hostettler).
'oMarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
' ABA Hearngs of the Comm'n, supra note 16 (Oct 11, 1996) (statement of
retired Judge Charles B. Renfrew).
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D. Grabbing Procedure and Substance
As part of their efforts to attack "judicial activists" and m response to
particular types of "outrageous decisions," the Republican congressional
majorities have attempted to strip substantive jurisdiction, judicial
procedure, and judicial remedies from federal judges. In part, they have
been successful, and their attacks have certainly had an impact on judicial
independence. In the months leading up to the 1996 election, Congress
curtailed federal court jurisdiction in the areas of habeas corpus relief and
immigration proceedings." Congress also seriously considered additional
legislation in these areas in 1997 and 1998.
1. Court-Stripping Legislation
In the spring of 1996, Congress passed four pieces of legislation that
significantly limited the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The court-
stripping bills include the Prison Reform Litigation Act,"63 restrictions on
the Legal Services Corporation," the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, 6 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996.11 A major threat to the independence of the
federal judiciary, this group of bills diminished the power of the courts to
curtail legislative and executive actions that violate the Constitution.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") was a cynical response to
"activist" judges who supposedly stretched the applicability of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and hamstrung
the jobs of prison officials and state officers. It was enacted as part of a
supplemental appropriations bill and was adopted by a conference
committee without receiving the benefit of public debate, hearings, or even
a separate vote. The PLRA limits the remedies that a judge can provide in
civil litigation relating to prison conditions. Judges are told to give
"substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety orthe operation
162 See nfra notes 163-275 and accompanying text (discussing legislative
reforms).
163 Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Title
VIII, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66.
'" Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 § 504,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-53.
'65 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214.
" Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Division C, 1997, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
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of a criminal justice system caused by the relief."' 67 Under the legislation,
preliminary mjunctions are effective for only 90 days, courts are limited m
their use of special masters to oversee prison litigation, attorney fee awards
are constricted, and most prisoners will have to pay court costs because the
PLRA limits the applicability of the informapaupens statute.'68 Circuit
courts addressing challenges to the PLRA have upheld its constitutional-
ity 169
Prior to passage, many suits brought by prisoners alleging unconstitu-
tional conditions were settled through pre-tnal consent decrees where,
without admitting liability, officials agreed to change the conditions at
issue. The PLRA now requires officials to admit they violated constitu-
tional rights of prisoners before agreeing to a consent decree, and these
admissions expose the officials to personal liability 170 Because of the
PLRA, more cases will go to trial, and regardless ofwhether ajudgment is
issued at trial or through a consent decree, it will only be effective for two
years. Most prison consent decrees entered into before the adoption of the
PLRA are now of questionable validity, and two years is little time to both
clean up prison conditions and maintain court oversight to determine
whether all parties are complying with a consent decree.
Restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC") were included
as part of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act
of 1996 ("OCRAA") and in continuing restrictions under subsequent
appropriations bills. Even if private funds are used to pay for legal
representation, LSC attorneys are now barred from handling abortion
cases 7' and from participating "in any litigation on behalf of a person
67 Prison Litigation Reform Act [hereinafter PLRA] § 802(a)(1)(a).
168 See id. §§ 803(d), 804.
1
69 See, e.g., Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir.) (holding that PLRA
termination provisions of consent decree does not violate separation of powers),
cert. denzedsub nom. Hadix v. McGinnis, 118 S. Ct. 2368 (1998); Zehnerv Trigg,
133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding provision limiting recovery for emotional
injury if there was no physical harm did not violate equal protection or separation
of powers); Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that
requirement that prisoners pay court fees did not violate equal protection), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 1812 (1998); Roller v Gunn, 107 F.3d 227 (4th Cir.) (finding
PLRA did not unconstitutionally bar access to courts), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 192
(1997); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that PLRA's
provision ending consent decrees did not violate due process, equal protection, or
the separation of powers).
'"' See PLRA § 802(b)(2), (3).
171 See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996
[hereinafter OCRAA] § 504(a)(14).
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incarcerated m a federal, state, or local prison."'"2 LSC attorneys are also
unable to litigate class action lawsuits, 113 arguably the most effective means
by which an attorney can seek to remedy systemic problems. The LSC is
banned from lobbying and political advocacy 174 Finally, LSC attorneys are
prohibited from participating in any "effort to reform a Federal or State
welfare system [or] challenge existing law " 75
One court in Hawaii granted a preliminary injunction on February 14,
1997, prohibiting the LSC from enforcing its restrictions on the use ofnon-
LSC funds.76 The court found this to be an unconstitutional constraint
whereby plaintiffs would relinquish First Amendment rights in exchange
for federal funding.1" Ultimately, the same court granted summary
judgment for LSC on the basis that the regulations did not impermissibly
burden due process or equal protection rights of indigent clients and that
there was no significant burden on their First Amendment nghts. 78 A
second suit, in New York, challenged the restrictions on the use of federal
funds, and the court held that the LSC restrictions on the use of its
nonfederal funds do not impermissibly intrude on the lawyer-client
relationship. 79 An appeal in the case is now pending before the Second
Circuit.
Passed in the wake of heightened public concerns posed by the 1995
Oklahoma City bombing and prompted by disgust for death penalty cases
that lasted for years, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
172 Id. § 504(a)(15).
See id. § 504(a)(7).
'74 The Act notes:
None of the funds appropriated m this Act to the Legal Services
Corporation may be used to provide financial assistance to any person or
entity that. attempts to influence the passage or defeat of any legislation,
constitutional amendment, referendum, initiative or any similar procedure
of the Congress or State or local legislative body.
Id. § 504(a)(4).
1751d. § 504(a)(16).
176 See Legal Aid Soc'y v. Legal Servs. Corp., 961 F Supp. 1402, 1408 (D.
Haw. 1997).
177 See id. at 1405.
178 See Legal Aid Soc'y v Legal Servs. Corp., 981 F Supp. 1288, 1294 (D.
Haw. 1997), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 145 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 539 (1998).
179 See Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 985 F Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1997),
aff'd in part and vacated inpart, No. 98-6006, 1999 WL 5300 (2d Cir. Jan. 7,
1999).
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1996 ("AEDPA")I 80 diminishes much of the effectiveness of the writ of
habeas corpus.' Under this law, the federal judiciary cannot grant the
Great Writ unless the state court decision upon which the prisoner's
conviction was based was "unreasonably" wrong or directly violates
established Supreme Court precedent.1 82
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the AEDPA in
Felker v. Turpn,18' a death penalty case that challenged the restrictions on
habeas corpus contained within the Act. Felker's lawyers had argued m
their brief that
[w]hatever the ultimate scope of congressional power to regulate flus
court's appellate jurisdiction, we submit that when an individual
suffers a severe deprivation of liberty and asserts a claim that he is being
confined pursuant to rulings and practices that violate the Constitution of
the United States, such a claim cannot be wholly withdrawn from the
cognmzance of this Court.
18 4
Despite this assertion, the Supreme Court held that "the provisions of the
[Act] do not violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, Article I, §
9 "185 The habeas corpus restriction provisions included in the statute limit
federal court review of death penalty cases to one year after the conviction
becomes final."86
The statute also restricts rights provided to immigrants, resident aliens,
and those seeking access to this country It provides that "any final order
of deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of [specific
180 18 U.S.C. § 1 Note (1996).
18 According to Carol Wolchok, staff liaison for the ABA's Coordinating
Committee on Immigration Law, "only a handful of people knew these provisions
were slipped m there, and were changing a law that's been around for decades."
Richard C. Reuben, McDeportation: The New Anti-Terrorism Law Allows Border
Guards to Summarily Exclude Aliens Without Documents, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996,
at 6, 34. "The legislation was quickly approved 'so that it could be announced on
the anmversary of the Oklahoma City bombing.' "Id.
'
82 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(1)-(3) (1996).
'8 Felker v. Turpm, 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
184 Rhonda Cook, Death-Row Inmate the Focus of High-Court Turf War,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 2, 1996, at Cl.
'85Felker, 518 U.S. at 654.
'
8 6 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
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criminal grounds] shall not be subject to review by any court. 187 Iroically,
according to one innmgration attorney,
"[s]uspected terrorists under the act have the right to appointed counsel,
the right to bond proceedings, the right to a court hearing and the right to
judicial review m removal proceedings while the same law takes away all
of those rights for long-term permanent residents who have had even a
minor criminal violation, with no possibility for relief from depor-
tation."'
88
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
("IIRA")'8 9 substantially eliminates class action suits for illegal
immigrants and limits the role of federal courts m reviewmg decisions
involving deportation and political asylum. Support for this legislation
arose because of the perception that "' [t]here has been too much legislating
from the judicial bench m which advocates for immgrants go around
shopping for a judge and finding some pretext to overturn the will of
Congress."' 1 0 IIRIRA prevents courts from hearing cases brought by
illegal aliens who have failed to comply with amnesty deadlines m earlier
legislation.' 91
As IIRIRA was being debated m 1996, Representative Bill McCollum
(R-Fla.), one of its chief sponsors, said, "Well the intent is to try to make
sure that when we deport somebody, they're not able to hang around
forever, looking at procedural devices to stay m this country'" As
Congress considered the legislation, ninety law professors argued that
"[t]hese proposals grant agency authority to take constitutionally question-
able action and raise issues of constitutional dimensions wholly apart from
the immigration context and the rights of immigrants. The most basic
87 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [heremafterAEDPA]
§ 440(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(10) (1996).
188 Reuben, supra note 181, at 34 (quoting Brian K. Bates, an immigration
lawyer with the law firm of Quan, Burdette & Perez m Houston).
189 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act [hereinafter
IIRIRA], 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1259 (1996).
190 Patrick J. McDonnell, Panel Upholds Deadline for Amnesty Seekers, L.A.
TIMES, May 1, 1997, at A3 [hereinafter McDonnell, Panel Upholds Deadline]
(quoting Ira Mehlman of the Federation for American Immigration Reform).
"' See IIRIRA, § 440(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(c).
192 Weekend Edition Saturday (Nat'l Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 28, 1996).
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safeguards of due process are threatened."'9 According to Dick Day,
chief counsel to the Immigration Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee which helped write these provisions, a major motivation for
the legislation was that "[w]e're tired of these suits every time you
don't give out benefits to as many people as some lawyers think you
should."' 94
Asked why "Congress want[ed] to sharply cut back on judicial review
of immigration cases," Lucas Guttentag, Director of the ACLU Immigra-
tion Rights Project, responded:
I think there was anusperception among some Members of Congress
that the courts were playing too large a role in reviewing the govern-
ment's immigration policies and orders. Butmore fundamentally, the new
restrictions on the courts are part of a larger hostility to the independence
of the judiciary.
Congress has the power to change the jurisdiction of the federal
courts and to decide which court will hear which types of claims. But
there are constitutional limits to how far Congress can go, and it cannot
barjudicial review altogether when the liberty of an individual is at stake.
Deportation orders necessarily involve the rights and liberties of
individuals. Therefore judicial review of those orders is constitutionally
required.
195
Under IURIRA, decisions made by Immigration and Naturalization
Service employees are effectively shielded from admnistrative orjudicial
review For instance, when immigrants flee their countries without
sufficient paperwork, upon arrival at a point of entry into the United States
they must convince an INS official that they have a legitimate fear of
persecution. 196 Under JIRIRA, they will no longer have a right to a hearing
193 Letter from Anna William Shavers, Associate Professor of Law, Umversity
of Nebraska et al., to members of the House/Senate Conference Committee on the
IIRIRA (July 29, 1996) (copy on file with author).
1'4 Patrick J. McDonnell, New Law Could End Immigrants' Amnesty Hopes,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1996, at A16 [hereinafter McDonnell, New Law Could End
Immigrants' Amnesty Hopes].
95 New Immigration Law Threatens People and Principles, an Interview with
Lucas Guttentag, TEx. LAw., Jan. 12, 1998, at 24 [hereinafter New Immigration
Law].
96 See IIRIRA, § 440(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42) (1996).
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before an immigration judge or review by the federal courts.197 Under this
law, federal courts other than the Supreme Court are prohibited from
issuing broad injunctions against the INS, effectively stripping a remedy
from the courts in handling class actions.198 Judicial review of discretionary
decisions made by the Attorney General, who can waive deportation for
aliens demonstrating they should be permitted to stay for reasons of equity,
is also elimmated.19
Georgetown law professor David Cole, counsel for ten Palestimans
who the government is seeking to deport under the new law, said:
Perhaps the most basic principle of our government is that we are
governed by a rule of law and that no one is above the law. What this
provision would do is essentially put the INS above the law because they
would not be subject to judicial review for any decisions to commence
deportation proceedings.
200
According to Cole, IIRIRA "is a remarkable act of chutzpa on behalf of an
agency, the INS, that has probably been found by the courts to have
violated the law more than any other Federal agency " 0' Referring to broad
new powers granted to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Jeanne
Butterfield, executive director of the American Immigration Lawyers
Association, said, "[W]hen you have an agency with unbridled discretion,
197 See id. § 440(c).
9' See id.
'19 The Ninth Circuit has held that while IRIRA applies retroactively, it does
not remove federal court jurisdiction from a case in which aliens have filed suit
challenging deportation proceedings on constitutional grounds before a final order
of deportation has been issued. See Amencan-Arab Anti-Discrimmation Comm.
v Reno, 119 F.3d 1367 (9th Cir. 1997),j. vacated, 119 S. Ct. 936 (1999). See also
Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1139
(1999) (holding that exclusive jurisdiction provision of IIRIRA depriving courts
of jurisdiction over clamis arising from removal orders was constitutional where
habeas corpus review remained available). But see Auguste v Attorney General,
118 F.3d 723 (1997), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh'g, 152 F.3d 1325
(1 lth Cir. 1998) (holding that statute restricting judicial review of removal orders
did not deny aliens due process).
200 Weekend Edition Saturday (Nat'l Public Radio Broadcast, Sept. 28,
1996).
201 McDonnell, New Law Could End Immigrants'Amnesty Hopes, supra note
194, at Al6.
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there is no way to prevent abuse. It's making the tolltaker on the freeway
both the judge and jury 2 02
While opponents claim tns court-stripping law violates the separation
of powers, the Ninth Circuit upheld the provision in Alviedo v. 1NS,2 °3
dismissmg a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of hundreds of thousands
of illegal immigrants who had missed the amnesty deadline.211 According
to Lucas Guttentag, this decision was "very narrow, but very significant.
It's a question of whether these are essentially back-door amendments to
the Constitution.""2 5
In the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison,206 the Supreme Court
concluded that the federal courts and not Congress determine the constitu-
tionality of particular legislation because the Constitution "is a superior
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means,"0 7 and when the
Constitution conflicts with legislation, "it is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."2 8 In contrast,
Congress controls most federal court jurisdiction. Article I, section 1 of
the Constitution states that "the judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordam and establish."2° The Constitution provides
the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, public ministers and counsels, and cases in which one of the
states is a party 210 In all other cases, the Supreme Court "shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."211
Based on these provisions, the Supreme Court in the mid-nmeteenth
century first held that "having a right to prescribe, Congress may withhold
from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated
controversies. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such
as the statute confers.21 Congressional power in thls area is not absolute,
however, because courts must be able to hear core constitutional claims.
202 McDonnell, Panel Upholds Deadline, supra note 190, at A23.
203 Alviedo v. INS, No. 96-70161, 1997 WL 222306 (9th Cir. Apr. 30, 1997).
204 See id. at *2.
205 Illegal-Immigrants Who Missed Amnesty Period Lose Suit Again, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 1997, at 25.
20 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
207 Id. at 177
208 Id.
29 U.S. CONST. aft III, § 1.
210 Id. art. I, § 2.
211 Id.
212 Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850).
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Before 1996, Congress had adopted only two provisions which stripped
jurisdiction from the courts m response to judicial decisions it disfavored.
One provision involved an 1867 law m which Congress revoked the
Supreme Court's appellate review of habeas corpus decisions in cases
involving Civil War Reconstruction statutes. Based on this legislation, the
Supreme Court dismissed apending case on procedural grounds mExparte
MCCardle.213 In the late 1930s, after the Supreme Court had shifted its
jurisprudential philosophy in the wake of President Roosevelt's court
packing scheme, the Court upheld a provision of the Noms-LaGuardia
Act" that restricted the power of inferior federal courts to issue injunctions
in any case involving a labor dispute.215
Similar legislation was introduced in response to decisions by the
Supreme Court in the 1950s and 1960s. One example was aimed at limiting
federal court jurisdiction in proceedings against those charged with
contempt of Congress or under federal anti-subversion statutes. 16 Another
example concerned apportionment ofrepresentation in state legislatures. '
A final target was the warning requirement placed by Miranda v.
Arizona.21 8 All of these measures failed to pass Congress.
In the early 1980s, numerous bills were introduced that would have
removed federal court jurisdiction in the areas of abortion,2 19 prayer in
213 xparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 506, 512 (1868).
214 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1932).
2 5 See Laufv E.G. Shiner & Co., 303 U.S. 323,327 (1938) (holding that an
injunction could not be issued absent requisite findings of fact).
216 The proposed bill was S. 2646, 85th Cong. (1957). For its effects, see
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957) (holding employee discharge proper and
court without power to review) and Watlans v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957)
(holding valid charge of contempt of Congress).217 H.R. 11926, 88th Cong. (1964), was introduced by William Tuck (D-Va.)
and sought to remove federal jurisdiction from apportionment cases m the wake of
the decisions m Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964). The bill was passed by the House in 1964 but was not considered
by the Senate. See 110 CONG. REC. 20,300 (1964). One hundred thirty similar bills
were introduced m the wake of these cases but never made it out of committee. See
ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTiTUTION: ITS
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 948 (5th ed. 1976).
218 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In response to Miranda, an
amendment was included in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 107 The amendment sought to reverse the
Miranda decision, but it was not adopted. See id.
219 See S. 1741, 97th Cong. (1981) (eliminating federal court jurisdiction to
issue orders in any case involving a state or local law regulating abortion or
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school,' ° school bussing for racial integration,"2 and issues relating to the
composition of the armed services.' N on e of these controversial measures
prevailed, due m part to support from Republicans such as former Senator
Barry Goldwater (R-Anz.), who called them a "frontal assault on the
providing funding or other assistance for abortions); S. 583, 97th Cong. (1981)
(prohibiting any federal court (excluding the Supreme Court) from issuing
injunctive relief in any case arising out of federal, state, or local law prohibiting or
regulating abortion); S. 158, 97th Cong. (1981) (prohibiting inferior federal courts
from issuing injunctive relief in any case arising out of state or local law
prohibiting or regulating abortion); H.R. 900, 97th Cong. (1981) (prohibiting
inferior federal courts from issuing injunctive relief in any case arising out of state
or local law prohibiting or regulating abortion); H.R. 73, 97th Cong. (1981)
(prohibiting any federal court (excluding the Supreme Court) from issuing
ijunctive relief in any case arising out of federal, state, or local law prohibiting or
regulating abortion).
"o See S. 481, 97th Cong. (1981) (eliminating all federal court jurisdiction to
review and hear any case arising out of state law relating to voluntary prayer in
public buildings and schools); H.R. 2347, 97th Cong. (1981) (same); H.R. 1335,
97th Cong. (1981) (same); H.R. 989, 97th Cong. (1981) (same); H.R. 865, 97th
Cong. (1981) (same); H.R. 408, 97th Cong. (1981) (removing federal court
jurisdiction to hear cases arising out of federal or state law interpreting or enforcing
a state law relating to voluntary prayer in public buildings and schools); H.R. 72,
97th Cong. (1981) (eliminating all federal court jurisdiction to review and hear any
case arising out of state law relating to voluntary prayer in public buildings and
schools); H.R. 466, 96th Cong. (1979) (same).
22 See S. 1147, 97th Cong. (1981) (declaring that students shall have school
assignment determined in a racially neutral manner); S. 1005, 97th Cong. (1981)
(amending Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prevent federal government from using
federal funds to alter composition of student body in public schools); H.R. 1180,
97th Cong. (1981) (eliminating federal court jurisdiction to issue orders requiring
individuals to attend particular schools); H.R. 1079, 97th Cong. (1981) (same);
H.R. 761, 97th Cong. (1981) (same); H.R. 340, 97th Cong. (1981) (eliminating
federal court jurisdiction regarding assignment of pupils to school based on
membership in a protected class); H.R. 327,97th Cong. (1981) (amending Title IV
of Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit federal government from assigning teachers
or students to school based on membership in a protected class).
222See H.R. 2791, 97th Cong. (1981) (removing federal court jurisdiction
regarding constitutionality of federal statutes providing "different treatment on the
basis of sex in the Armed Forces or in criteria for induction, for training or for
service in the Armed Forces"); H.R. 2365, 97th Cong. (1981) (eliminating federal
courtjurisdiction regarding validity of federal statutes providing for registration or
induction into the armed services of males but not females).
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independence of the federal courts [which] is a dangerous blow to the
foundations of a free society "
Senator John Ashcroft sees stripping jurisdiction from the federal
courts as "a threat to the scope of judicial activity, but not to the mdepend-
ence ofjudicial activity "I Lucas Guttentag disagrees:
In the recent past other proposals to strip the courts of their jurisdiction
over controversial issues were defeated. In each instance, they were
recognized for what they are: a back door amendment to the Constitution.
Congress was trying to eliminate basic rights by prohibiting the courts'
ability to enforce those nghts.22
Boston Umversity law professor Lawrence Yackle recognizes the
overarching historical importance of what has happened in recent years,
noting that
[t]his is the first time court-stripping laws have actually gone into effect.
It's not something to ignore. People may not see the importance of an
independent judiciary in the abstract, especially when it comes to
unpopular groups like crimials. But the fact is, we have these courts to
hold other branches of the system in check.?2
6
Given their treatment to date by the federal courts, it seems unlikely that
any of these four measures will be found unconstitutional. This raises the
question of why they passed congressional muster and were able to limit
access to the courts where so many of these predecessors had failed.
Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that they are directed against three of
America's most despised and least politically powerful constituencies:
prisoners, immigrants, and the poor.
2. H.R. 1252, the Judicial Reform Act
In January of 1997, Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) asked Judiciary
Committee Chairman Henry Hyde to "look at the issue of judicial
2 132 CONG. REC. S15140 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1986).224 JudicialActivism, supra note 6, at 123 (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft).
s New Immigration Law, supra note 195, at 24.
16 Robert Marquand, Justified or Pernicious Limits? New Judicial Curbs Draw
Fire, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 15, 1996, at 1, 1.
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activism" and produce a bill that would respond to Republican concerns. 227
The result was H.R. 1252, the so-called Judicial Reform Act of 1997 228
Tins omnibus procedural bill was designed to combat specific instances of
judicial activism by modifying certain judicial procedures. One key
provision would have required a three-judge district court panel to enjoin
constitutional challenges of state referenda instead of a single judge. 9
Another would have prohibited a judge from issuing any order to require
a tax increase." One section would have allowed either party in litigation
to obtain a new presiding judge as a matter of right,"sl and a provision
adopted on the floor of the House would have prevented judges from
releasing prisoners to comply with a prison cap.
As he introduced the bill in committee, Chairman Hyde described it as
"a modest proposal limited in scope. It reforms the procedures of
the federal courts to ensure fairness in the hearing of cases, without
stripping jurisdiction or reclaiming any powers granted by Congress to the
lower courts." 3 As H.R. 1252 was being considered by the full House,
floor manager Howard Coble (R-N.C.) claimed that it
is a restrained but purposeful effort to combat specific areas of abuse that
exist within the Federal judiciary. This bill perhaps goes too far for
some Members, not far enough for others. But that is not unlike much
legislation that we consider m this hall. Before describing what the bill
does, however, let me emphasize what it does not do; namely, it will not
compromise the independence of the Federal judiciary, which is an
indispensable attribute for that branch of the Federal Government, nor is
H.R. 1252 an attempt to influence or overturn legal disputes. Above all,
we most certainly are not creating a novel, more lenient standard of
impeachment to remove particular judges from the Federal bench without
cause or to intimidate them with a threat of doing so. That said, the
Judiciary Reform Act of 1998 is largely an amalgam of ideas developed
7 Louis Fisher, Have US. Courts Overreached?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997, at
Mi.
H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1997).
n9 See id. § 2 ("3 Judge Court for Certain Injunctions").
20 See id. § 5 ("Limitation on Court Imposed Taxes").
231 See id. § 6 ("Reassignment of Case as of Right").
2 See id. § 12 ("Limitation on Prisoner Release Orders"); see also 144 CONG.
REC. H2272-73 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1998).
" Robert Schmidt, GOP Measure Chips Away at Judicial Power, Discretion,
LEGAL TIMES, May 26, 1997, at 19.
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by various Members of Congress that will curtail certain abusive practices
within our Federal court system
3 4
Representative Howard Berman (D-Cal.) argued that "[i]t is simply wrong
to manipulate court jurisdiction and procedure as tins bill would do, to try
to make it more or less likely that the federal courts will reach particular
results."' 5
Elliot Mincberg, legal director of People for the American Way,
explained why the bill constituted court-stripping:
Congress can define the court's jurisdiction, but there may yet be
constitutional limits to that because, for example, there have been
proposals to eliminate the courts' jurisdiction over the issue of school
desegregation, and that, it was argued by many legal scholars, conserva-
tives among them, it would violate the due process clause by essentially
providing for a constitutional right with absolutely no remedy. So while,
as a general matter, Congress does set thejunsdiction of the courts, there
may well be constitutional limits if Congress were to try to do that
3 6
The late Representative Sonny Bono (R-Cal.) became the chief
proponent to require three-judge panels for suits seeking to enjoin
challenges of state initiatives. Bono was reacting to the failure of
California's federal judges to enforce three highly publicized referenda
enjoined by federal judges: Proposition 140, requiring term limits for
legislatures; Proposition 187, stopping benefits for immigrants; and
Proposition 209, ending affirmative action m state programs. During the
104th Congress, Bono sponsored a free-standing three-judge court panel
bill, which passed the House 266 to 159 but did not progress through the
Senate. 7 When Chairman Hyde introduced H.R. 1252, he proclaimed that
the three-judge provision"8 would ensure that "where the entire populace
234 144 CONG. REC. H2243-44 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1998).
"35 House Passes "Judicial Activism " Bill, THIRD BRANCH, May 1998, at 1, 1.
1 6 JudicialActivism, supra note 6, at 174 (July 29, 1997) (statement of Elliot
Mincberg).
237 See H.R. 1170, 104th Cong. (1995). For legislative history andvote, see 141
CONG. REC. H9627 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1995).
238 Any application for anticipatory relief against the enforcement, opera-
tion or execution of a State law adopted by referendum shall not be granted
by a United States district court or judge thereof upon the ground that the
State law is repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United
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of a state exercises a direct vote on an issue, a single federal judge will not
be able to [issue an injunction] obstruct[ing] the will of the people of that
State., , 39
Section 2 of H.R. 1252 sought to change the normal procedure whereby
a claimant who opposes a state referendum attempts to obtain a federal
injunction from a single judge. It substituted a three-judge panel with direct
appeal to the Supreme Court.24 This would have led to a two-tier system
of state law that decades of experience have shown to be cumbersome,
mefficient, and confusing. At the beginning of the twentieth century,
federal procedure permitted a judge to issue an ex parte injunction that
could paralyze an important state statute without the possibility of a
hearing on the merits.24 The orders were deemed unappealable because
they were interlocutory 242 As one commentator noted:
It was the boast of representatives of the railroads that m 13 minutes after
the governor had signed at Pierre [South Dakota m 1908] the act fixing
passenger shares at 2 cents per mile [far lower than the customary rate],
the Federal judge at Sioux Falls had signed his sweeping order restraining
the Attorney General and all State attorneys from attempting to enforce
it 2
43
In response to the increased use of federal injunctions and procedural
infirmities, Congress passed the Three-Judge Court Act of 1910,21 which
provided that any lawsuit attempting to enjoin a state official from
States unless the application for anticipatory relief is heard and determined
by a court of 3 judges Any appeal of a determination on such
application shall be to the Supreme Court.
H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. § 2(a) (1997).
39Hearng on H.R. 1252, supra note 17, at 24 (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).240 See H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. § 2(a).
241 See, e.g., Elliott S. Marks & Alan H. Schoem, The Applicability of Three-
Judge Courts in Contemporary Law: A Viable Legal Procedure or a Legal
Horsecart in a Jet Age?, 21 AMER. U. L. REv 417, 419-20 (1972); see also Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that federal courts have the power to
enjoin state officials from enforcing state laws thatviolate the federal Constitution).
242 See, e.g., Harrs S. Ammerman, Three Judge Courts: See How They Run!,
52 F.R.D. 293, 293 (1971); David P Curne, The Three Judge District Court in
Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REv 1, 16 (1964).
243 Comment, The Three-Judge Court Act of 1910: Purpose, Procedure and
Alternatives, 62 J. CalM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & PENAL So. 205, 206 n.7 (1971).2 Three-Judge Court Act of 1910, ch. 309, § 17,36 Stat. 557 (1910).
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enforcing a state statute on the ground that the law violated the Constitution
must be decided by a district court composed of three judges, with the
panel's decision subject to direct review by the Supreme Court.245
Tins rule remained m effect from 1910 through 1976. It was subjected
to years of criticism and has been largely abolishedbythe Congress.2" The
same reasons that led to its abolition militate against its revival: ineffi-
ciency of using a three-judge panel as a factfinder (the most labor mtensive
part of litigation); the awkward and unwieldy nature of conducting a trial
with three judges; the increase in workload for the Supreme Court
engendered by direct appeals, with resultant increase in summary
affirmance or demal of panel decisions rather than meaningful appellate
review; and the potential harm posed to Supreme Court decisionmaking by
the lack of intermediate review Under H.R. 1252, three-judge court cases
would have come to the Supreme Court without the filtering of facts and
allegations normally applied by the courts of appeals. Moreover, referenda
lack the legislative history materials that federal and state assemblies
develop in the process of making laws. The lack oftlns material would give
the Supreme Court even less information upon which to base an appellate
opinion.
Drucilla S. Ramey, Executive Director of the Bar Association of San
Francisco, is concerned about California's experience with direct democ-
racy She notes:
We, m California, have a particularly troublesome history with
respect to majoritanan excess, whether it is m the context of some of what
I think to be real tragedies m the area ofjudicial elections in the Supreme
Court area where Justices Bird, Riorden and Renfrew were voted out as
a result of the unpopularity of some of their opinions, but most often m
California the problem has been presented by judicial initiatives, voter
initiatives which so often take sort of a meat axe approach to extremely
complex issues and they often constitute sort of the crassest of bids to the
lowest common denominator and to the human psyche, and the basic fears
and insecurities of the citizenry and the electorate. And it really has been
the courts over the course of the last many, many years wich have
continually sort of pulled us in California back from the abyss.
247
245 See id.
246 See Warren Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A. J.
1049, 1053 (1972).
1
7 ABA Hearings of the Comm'n, supra note 16 (Feb. 21, 1997) (statement of
Drucilla S. Ramey).
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Wade Henderson, Executive Director of the Leadership Conference for
Civil Rights, agrees:
[F]ederally-protected constitutional rights cannot be determined by voter
referendum. If the voters of a particular State, for example, elected to pass
an initiative winch sought to reinstate slavery as directed against selected
members of society, surely no one would suggest that that voter mitiative
would carry or should carry constitutional weight.248
Representative Bono, however, contended that referenda deserved special
protections.
The idea is not that threejudges will give a better answer. I think the idea
is that it would kind of enforce more of a fairness on referendums than
having one judge that might be totally biased on an issue, winch has
occurred in our state. The point is not strictly that three judges will give
the perfect answer where one judge can't. That wasn't the idea.
249
Section 5 of H.R. 1252 would have prohibited a district court from
entering an order or approving a settlement that "requires" a state or
political subdivision to impose, increase, levy, or assess any tax for the
purpose of enforcing any federal or state common law, statutory, or
constitutional right or law unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that a number of enumerated conditions were met.21° At various
4S JudicialMisconduct andDiscipline, supra note 1, at 65 (statement of Wade
Henderson).
249Hearing on H.R. 1252, supra note 17, at79 (statement ofRep. SonnyBono).
250 See H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. § 5 (as introduced Apr. 9, 1997). Section 5
states:
(1)(a) LIMITATION ON COURT-IMPOSED TAXES.-(1) No district court may
enter to approve any order or approve any settlement that requires any
State, orpolitical subdivision of a State, to Impose, increase, levy, or assess
any tax for the purpose of enforcing any Federal or State common law,
statutory, or constitutional right or law, unless the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that-
(A)(i) there are no other means available to remedy the deprivation of
rights or laws; and
(ii) theproposed imposition, increase, levying orassessment is narrowly
tailored to remedy the specific deprivation at issue;
(B) the tax will not contribute to or exacerbate the deprivation intended
to be remedied;
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times m the committee and floor debates, the language was amended to
restrict a judge from either "requiring" or "expressly directing" a tax
increase.25 The notion that federal judges routinely "expressly direct" a
state or political subdivision to mpose taxes is chimerical, but Representa-
tive Donald Manzullo (R-Ill.), the chief sponsor of this section of the bill,
testified about a case in his district.
Here, a Federal judge issued an order having the effect of raising property
taxes to pay for past desegregation injustices. Federal judges have
ordered tax increases to build public housmgs and expand jails. Any state
or local government is subject to such rulings from the Federal courts.
2 2
In fact, beyond the context of nineteenth century municipal bond
cases,253 the federal courts have imposed a direct tax only m Jenlans v.
(C) the proposed tax will not result in a loss of revenue for the political
subdivision in which it is assessed, levied, or collected;
(D) the proposed tax will not result in the loss or depreciation of property
values of the taxpayers who are affected;
(E) the proposed tax wil not conflict with the applicable laws with
respect to the maximum rate of taxation as determined by the
appropriate State or political subdivision thereof; and
(F) plans submitted to the court by the State and local authorities will
not effectively redress the deprivation at issue.
(2) A finding under paragraph (1) shall be subject to immediate
interlocutory de novo review.
(3)(b) TERMINATION OF ORDERS-Notwithstanding any law or rule of
procedure, any order of a district court requiring the imposition, increase,
levy, or assessment of a tax imposed pursuant to subsection (a)(1) shall
automatically terminate or expire on the date that is-
(1) 1 year after the date of imposition of the tax
H.R. 1252, 97th Cong. §§ 5(1)(a)-(3)(b) (1995) (as introduced Apr. 9, 1997).
The original language considered by the House Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property used the term "require." Tlus was amended to "expressly
directs" at the subcommittee markup and back to "require" at the full committee
markup. Finally, the full House voted 230 to 181 to change the language back to
"expressly directs." See 144 CONG. REC. H2262 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1998). A
subsequent amendment to change the relevant language again back to "require"
failed by a vote of 174 to 236. See id. at H2284.
252 Hearng on H.R. 1252, supra note 17, at 35 (statement of Rep. Donald
Manzullo).
" See, e.g., Heine v. Levee Comm'rs, 86 U.S. (19 Wall) 655 (1873) (holding
that once a tax is levied, mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel payment
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Missoun?. 4 In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court unanimously
prohibited the direct imposition of taxes by the federal courts.2S5 A majority
of the Court upheld the power of courts to direct local government bodies
to fund constitutional remedies for educational segregation, leaving it up
to the community to determine how to pay 11 The "expressly direct"
version of H.R. 1252 would have had no effect on this power given the
Supreme Court's ruling in Missouri v. Jenlans.
If language prohibiting a district court from "requirng" taxes had been
adopted, a key judicial remedial power would have been eliminated.
Representative Manzullo objected not simply to the direct remedial power
of the federal courts to impose taxes but also to all of the costs of comply-
ing with judicial orders. Chairman Hyde made equally clear that his
intention was to restrict not only explicit judicial taxation but also any
judicial remedy that was expensive and could require an elected govern-
ment to raise taxes. According to Hyde, when a judge issues an order, "[i]n
many cases, the locality has no choice but to raise taxes, so in practical
effect, that judge has raised taxes." 7 The prohibition against a judge
"requiring" taxes would have vitiated a wide variety of federal court
remedies. State or local authorities would have been able to argue that
virtually any order or settlement requiring substantial expenditures to
conform institutions to constitutional or federal statutory requirements
would "require," if not explicitly impose, tax increases, thus triggering fis
provision.
Section 6 of the legislation would have allowed litigants to employ a
peremptory strike not against ajuror but against ajudge, permitting either
party in a lawsuit to remove a judge.258 In exercising this strike, the party
would not have been required to make a showing, or even allege bias or
prejudice, for which judges are already removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § §
144 and 455.59 Due process guarantees an impartial and competent judge,
not a specific judge whom a party favors. Because the strike would be
exercised at the outset of a case in most instances, the decision was more
of bonds).
5 Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F Supp. 400,413 (W.D. Mo. 1987), aJd inpart,
rev'd inpart, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
's5 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50-56 (1990).
216 See id. at 80.
57Heanng on H.R. 1252, supra note 17, at 25 (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
2" See H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. § 6 (1997).
'9 See id., see also 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1994) (allowing removal for bias or
prejudice); Id. § 455 (other bases for disqualification).
1998-991
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
likely to be based on ajudge's race, gender, or experience before taking the
bench than on a demonstrated bias for or against a particular party 260
As the provisionwas consideredbythe full House, Representative Mel
Watt (D-N.C.) commented:
I cannot start changing every rule that sometimes cuts in my favor
and sometimes cuts against me. There has to be a set of rules that governs
any kind of organized system, and our court system has a set of rules that
govern it.
So while I have experienced that frustration that some of my
colleagues have talked about, what I have said to myself over and over
and over again is that our system has to be protected. Otherwise, there is
no rule of law; there can be no justice. We substantially undercut it when
we start selectively trying to take some result and change it by changing
the whole process under which we operate.
That is what this bill does in substantial measure. It gives every
citizen the opportunity to come in and say, I don't like this judge because
I don't like what color he is or what gender she is or what political
perspective they have, and therefore I am going to exercise a peremptory
challenge, just like we do in a jury pool.
That is an unprecedented change in our system. One, which I would
have loved to have had on many occasions, but I have understood would
undermine the system of justice that we have substantially in our
country 
261
The prospects of judge-shopping allowed by the peremptory strike
provision would have chilledjudicial decisions m difficult or controversial
260 Under tis proposal, parties joined m the case after the initial filings would
have a right to seek reassignment within 20 days after service of the complaint or
other pleading. See id. § 6(b). As drafted, the section contained broad loopholes
that would have allowed challenges to be made at many stages of the proceedings,
even after the court had made substantive rulings. See id. § 6(b)(2)(A)-(C). Because
of the liberal rules for joinder of parties within the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the right of reassignment under this proposal would have been
applicable at all stages of the case, leading to gamesmanship where litigants would
be encouraged to add new parties or withhold an initial joinder of parties for the
purpose of creating a new right of reassignment later in a case. This procedure
would wastejudicial resources and allow parties dissatisfied with thejudge's ruling
to select a new judge. To the extent that the reassignment statute is designed to
increase public confidence in the judicial process, a provision that allows parties
to change judges after receiving adverse rulings undermines such a goal.
261 144 CONG. REC. 112251 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1998).
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cases. California Attorney General Daniel Lundgren, a supporter, argued
that the mere existence of a peremptory challenge procedure "is perhaps
most significant in its effect on judicial conduct." '262 Thus, the peremptory
challenge is intended, or is at least acknowledged, to be an attempt to
influence future judicial behavior, including rulings on particular issues.
According to Frederick B. Lacey, a former U.S. Attorney and district
judge in New Jersey who testified on parts of the legislation, "[e]very trial
lawyer will 'judge-shop' if you permit it, and the strike promotes the
practice, and I think it discredits the judicial system. It [also] poses a
threat to the proper and fair case management. 263
Majority Whip Tom DeLay introduced an amendment to H.R. 1252 on
the House floor which would have limited the authority of federal judges
to remedy inhumane prison conditions.2" It would prohibit any federal
court from entering "any prisoner release order that would result in the
release from or nonadmission to a prison, on the basis of prison conditions,
of any person subject to incarceration, detention, or admission to a facility
because of a conviction of a felony under the laws of the relevant
jurisdiction.'2 65 This would have also terminated any consent decree in
effect before passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act "that provides for"" -66
remedies relating to prison conditions.
DeLay pushed for this provision purportedly because
some Federal judges have even made themselves the sovereigns of the cell
blocks, micro-managing our State prisons, and forcing changes in prison
operations that have resulted in the early release each year of literally
hundreds of thousands of violent and/or repeat criminals out on our streets
and the streets to plague our families.
267
In particular, he pointed to Judge Norma Shapiro of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, who
262Heanng on H.R. 1252, supra note 17, at 89 (statement ofDaniel Lundgren).
263 Id. at 62 (statement of Frederick B. Lacey). Malcolm M. Lucas, the former
Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, notes that "the peremptory
challenge in Califorma is perceived by most Judges as a constant disruption of the
efficient management of a court and is believed to be used often for frivolous
reasons, such as a delaying or disrupting tactic." Id. at 41 (quoting letter from
Malcolm M. Lucas to Ann C. Williams (May 11, 1997)).
264 See H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. § 14(a) (1998).
265 Id. § 14(c)(1).
266 Id.
267 144 CONG. REC. H2248 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1998).
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has used complaints filed by individual inmates, criminals, convicted
criminals, to gain control over the prison system and establish a cap on the
number of prisoners.
Federal Judge Shapiro put a cap on the number of prisoners m
Pennsylvania. To meet that cap she ordered the release of 500 prisoners
a week. In a 18-month period alone, 9,732 arrestees were out on the
streets of Philadelphia on pretrial release because of her prison cap. They
were arrested on second charges, including 79 murders, 90 rapes, 701
burglaries, 959 robberies, 1,113 assaults, 2,215 drug offenses and 2,748
thefts.
How does Judge Shapiro sleep at nght? Each one of these crimes was
committed against aperson with afamily, dreaming ofasafe andpeaceful
future, a future that was snuffed out by ajudge who has a perverted view
of the Constitution.
268
268 Id. at H2273. Judge Shapiro was assigned a habeas corpus petition in 1982
m which the petitioner complained of overcrowding in the Philadelphiajails. Judge
Shapiro originally dismissed the petition on abstention grounds for lack of
jurisdiction, Hams v. Pernsley (E.D. Pa., Dec. 30, 1983) (unpublished opinion).
Her ruling was then reversed by the Third Circuit, see Hams v. Pemsley, 755 F.2d
338 (3d Cir. 1985), and she was told to accept jurisdiction. Judge Shapiro now
believes that the Third Circuit "felt the state courts were inadequate to deal with
this and it required Federal intervention to bring the jails into compliance with the
Constitution." ABA Heanngs of the Comm'n, supra note 16 (Dec. 13, 1996)
(statement of Judge Norma Shapiro). In 1986, she was presented with a consent
decree signed by the City of Philadelphia which included a cap on the prison
population, and she has enforced that decree m the face of extensive criticism by
politicians and the press. See Hams v. Reeves, 761 F Supp. 382 (E.D. Pa. 1991);
Hams v Pernsley, 654 F Supp. 1042 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
The Philadelphia District Attorney's office publicly decried Judge Shapiro's
efforts to comply with the prison cap and spoke out against her to the press. She
noted, "I became a public enemy, ahead of all the murderers and rapists that
everyone was worried about. And, indeed, some of those murders and rapes were
attributed to me." ABA Heanngs of the Comm'n, supra note 16 (Dec. 13, 1996)
(statement of Judge Norma Shapiro). She continued:
I did allow pre-trial detainees to be released by signing their own bail
instead of posting $100 or $200, which they could not afford. The city
responded by never trying to apprehend the people who didn't show, and
the number ofbench warrants increased and the local newspaper had apage
devoted to me every day with my picture and all the criminals who had
committed offenses in the city of Philadelphia for which I was responsible.
Id. (statement of Judge Norma Shapiro).
According to Judge Shapiro, her prison litigation case,
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DeLay went on to state that
[t]he courts have undone almost every major anticrimne mitiative passed
by the legislative branch. In the 1980s, as many States passed mandatory
mimmuum sentencing laws that the American people wanted to see happen
around the country to keep these crnmmals m jail, judges checkmated the
public by imposing prison caps on the amount of population that we can
hold in prisons. When this Congress mandated the end of consent decrees
regarding prison overcrowding in 1995, some courts just ignored our
mandate. There is an activist judge behind each of most of the perverse
failures of today's justice system.269
Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.), m opposing DeLay's
provision, emphasized that even if a judge found an unconstitutional
condition, the judge could not remedy it because
[i]t says prison conditions means conditions of confinement are the effect
of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in
prison. If in fact there are situations where particular prison officials have
behaved in a outrageous fashion abusive of people's rights, may even
have put these people in danger, and we are talking about nonviolent
felons, I am not prepared to say that no judge ever ought to let them
out.
2 70
Exhibiting his general disdain for federal judges, Representative
Donald Manzullo opined that
[t]he legislation takes a look at Congress, the elected branch, the
representative branch of government, and says we are overseeing the
court system to bring about a change when something has happened in the
court system that violates the public good.
by luck of the draw, did affect my career. When at one time I thought I
might be eligible for advancement to the court of appeals, it was made quite
clear to me that that was not feasible, and I accepted that because I still
believe that I am able to serve my country. But I do worry, as Judge Sarokin
did, about whether the publicity affected my decisions. I did speak to other
judges about whether this affects them and my colleagues have been free to
say that they worry about being in a judicial hall of shame.
Id. (statement of Judge Norma Shapiro).
269 144 CONG REC. H2273 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1998).
2701d. at H2273-74.
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The public good to which the gentleman from Texas addresses
himself is the fact that courts have overstepped their boundaries by
releasing dangerous felons, who go out to kill, and to maim, and to peddle
drugs to our little children, who ingest these drugs, and the little innocent
ones, my children and children of all Americans, thus become susceptible
to more people who the law enforcement people have m good faith put
away, but which a Federal judge says they should be out.
So we are here today because the Constitution compels us to do so.
It would do no good for me to reiterate the various travesties that have
taken place m America because of what the Federal courts have done. But
let us look upon tis day m this Congress as being a responsible Congress
and telling the American people that the courts have gone too far, and that
Congress is exercising thejurisdiction and the authority envisioned by the
founders of tlus republic in saying we are going to correct what is wrong
with the court system.27i
To Representative Mel Watt, this was
an amendment which basically says we are going to go back retroactively
and undo existing consent orders that have been entered into, that
retroactively says we are going to undo orders that courts have entered in
these cases, or even an amendment which, looking forward, says that even
though the Constitution might, and we as a body of people in our country
believe that nobody, no individual, ought to be put into conditions where
they are subjected to rape or disease or whatever by overcrowding or
failure of supervision, we cannot enforce that order to protect those
people, is an amendment which, in my opinon, goes too far.27
Perceived as an amendment that would demonstrate a harsh stance
against crnme, the DeLay Amendment passed overwhelmingly by a vote
of 367 to 5 2 27
3 Ultimately, the House adopted H.R. 1252 by voice
271 1d. at H2273.
272 Id. at H2276.
273 See id. at H2277 On the same day that H.R. 1252 passed the House, DeLay
introduced a free-standing bill identical to his amendment to H.. 1252. See H.R.
3718, 105th Cong. (1998). Without holding any hearings on the issue and
bypassing the Judiciary Committee, the House majority leadership placed the bill
on the suspension calendar, which limited debate but required a two-thirds vote to
pass. OnMay 19, 1998, the House held a30-mmute debate onH.R. 3718 andvoted
to approve itby a 352-53 margin. See 144 CONG. REC. H3461 (daily ed. May 19,
1998). Compamon legislation was not considered by the Senate and the bill died
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vote.274 While companion legislation was introduced inthe Senate,275 it was
not acted upon by the Judiciary Committee or the full Senate during the
105th Congress.
E. Constitutional Amendments
Between the 104th and 105th Congresses, more than 100 proposed
constitutional amendments were introduced. These proposals ranged from
old war horses which are perennially introduced but never acted upon276 to
those issues currently in vogue, several of which received majority votes
in one or both houses of Congress but failed to pass both chambers by the
required two-thirds margin.277 As John Conyers (D-Mich.), ranking
member of the House Judiciary Committee, noted:
We've had about every constitutional amendment that is totally
useless offered up m great seriousness m both bodies of the Congress: tax
limitation, term limits, balance the budget, you name it-let's put it in the
Constitution, folks.
We have more constitutional amendments before this subcommittee
than at any time m our history. Give the same judges that we are now
going to allow every lawyer worth is salt to challenge coming m to send
at the end of the 105th Congress.274 See 144 CONG. REC. H2286 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1998).
275 See S. 2163, 105th Cong. (1998).
276 See, e.g., S.J. Res. 24, 105th Cong. (1997) (equal rights amendment); H.R.
Res. 13, 105th Cong. (1997) (right to life amendment).
277 See, e.g., H.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. (1995) (balanced budget amendment).
The balanced budget amendmentpassed the House on January 26, 1995, by a vote
of 300 to 132, see 141 CONG. REC. H772 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1995), but failed in the
Senate on June 6, 1996, by a vote of 64 to 35, see 142 CONG. REC. H5903 (daily
ed. June 6, 1996). This same legislation, cast as S.J. Res. 1, 105th Cong. (1997),
failed m the Senate by avote of 66 to 34 on March 4, 1997 See 143 CoNG. REC.
S1921 (Mar. 4, 1997).
Another example isH.J. Res. 159, 104th Cong. (1996), aproposed amendment
to regulate tax increases by requirmg their approval by a two-thirds majority of
both houses. The measure failed by avote of 243 to 177 on April 15, 1996. See 142
CONG. REC. H3304 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1995). The measure was reintroduced as
H.J. Res. 61, 105th Cong. (1997); it failed by a vote of 233 to 190 on April 14,
1997 See 143 CoNG. REC. H1506 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1997).
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this case to another judge-give the judges the role of deciding how to
appropriate the tax money in this country, because we are not able to do
it. So says this new leadership in Congress. 278
In the 105th Congress, there were also five proposed constitutional
amendments that directly related to the appointment, tenure, and duties of
federaljudges; four of these called for term limits forjudges. 279 None of the
Term limits are a popular topic. A constitutional amendment was proposed m
the form of S.J. Res. 21, 104th Cong. (1995). The measure died after a failed
cloture vote of 58 to 42 on April 23, 1996. See 142 CONG. REC. S3879 (daily ed.
Apr. 23, 1996). The measure saw light again as H.J. Res. 2, 105th Cong. (1997),
but failed in the House by a vote of 217 to 211. See 143 CONG. REC. H511 (daily
ed. Feb. 12, 1997).
Congress sought to eliminate flag burnings by introducing S.J. Res. 31, 104th
Cong. (1994), wnch prohibitedphysical desecration ofthe flag. The measure failed
in the Senate by avote of 63 to 36. See 141 CONG. REC. S 18395 (daily ed. Dec. 12,
1995). The House then introduced H.J. Res. 54, 105th Cong. (1997), on the same
subject. The measure passed by avote of 310 to 114 on June 12, 1997, but was not
adopted by the Senate. See 143 CONG. REC. H3755 (daily ed. June 12, 1997).
278 Hearing on H.R. 1252, supra note 17, at 19, 71 (statement of Rep. John
Conyers).
279 Senator Bob Smith (R-N.H.) introduced Senate Joint Resolution 26, wich
would have limited the term of office of all federal judges to ten years with judges
then eligible for reappointment. See S.J. Res. 26, 105th Cong. (1997).
Representative Bill Paxon (R-N.Y.) introduced H.J. Res. 63, which would have
required federal judges to be reconfirmed by the Senate every 12 years. See H.J.
Res. 63, 105th Cong. (1997). This resolution only affected "ajudge of an inferior
court," presumably including all Article I and I judges except the Justices of the
Supreme Court. See id. Judges "shall not continue in office, exceptwith the consent
of the Senate, given within the first 365 days at the beginning of each successive
12-year period after the judge first takes office." Id. Representative Joel Hefley (R-
Colo.) introduced H.J. Res. 77, which would have limited all federal judges to ten
years in office, unless the Senate consented to the continuance of that judge in
office. See H.J. Res. 77, 105th Cong. (1997). FrankRiggs (R-Cal.) introduced H.J.
Res. 74, which would have limited federal judges to eight year terms in office and
did not provide for any subsequent extension. See H.J. Res. 74, 105th Cong.
(1997). Finally, Representative Donald Manzullo (R-Ill.) introducedH.J. Res. 110,
which would have forbidden any federal or state court in the United States from
having "the power to instruct or order a State or political subdivision thereof, or an
official of such State or political subdivision, to levy or increase taxes." H.J. Res.
110, 105th Cong. (1997).
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proposals advanced through the legislative process, except that Senator
Smith's Senate Joint Resolution 26 was discussed m the Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Constitution, Federalism and Property
Rights hearing onjudicial activism. Four other constitutional amendments
were introduced in the 104th Congress that also related to the tenure and
powers of federal judges.280 None ofthesejoint resolutions was acted upon
by the House Judiciary Committee and they all died at the end of the 104th
Congress.
This plethora of proposed amendments to end life tenure for
federal judges is unsurpnsmg, because life tenure is unpopular and is
viewed as undemocratic. As William W Schwarzer, Semor Judge on the
Northern District of California and Director of the Federal Judicial Center,
notes:
we ought in all humility acknowledge that were life tenure to come to a
popular vote today, the chances of it passing are slim. So the exalted
status we occupy today owes less to the continuing vitality of the
historical argument than to the inertia of the political process-the hurdle
that stands m the way of adoption of a constitutional amendment. And as
a result, it is burdened by considerable public skepticism. The existence
of that skepticism makes it imperative that life tenure be defended, that
the case for itbe made clear and convincing. But the defense of life tenure
Another proposal would have directly applied to judges. Senator Strom
Thurmond (R-S.C.) introduced S.J. Res. 4, which would have required that any
"officer oftheUnited States appointed by the Presidentwith the advice and consent
of the Senate, upon conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude, shall forfeit
office and all prerogatives, benefits, or compensation thereof." S.J. Res. 4, 105th
Cong. (1997). This would have conflictedwith the Constitution's Article I, winch
states thatjudges serve during good behavior, interpreted to mean for life, unless
they are convicted of an impeachable crime. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
o Representative Jack Fields (R-Tex.) introduced H.J. Res. 63, which would
have limited federal judges to ten-year terms, subject to reappointment with the
consent of the Senate. See H.J. Res. 63, 104th Cong. (1995). Representative James
Hayes (R-La.) introduced H.J. Res. 160, winch would have limited federal judges
to six-year terms. See H.J. Res. 160, 104th Cong. (1995). Representative Frank
Riggs (R-Cal.) introduced H.J. Res. 164, which would have limited federal judges
to eight-year terms. See H.J. Res. 164, 104th Cong. (1995). Finally, Representative
James Talent (R-Mo.) introduced H.J. Res. 167, prohibiting "the judicial power of
the United States from including the power to require States to levy or increase
any tax." H.J. Res. 167, 104th Cong. (1995).
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and judicial independence should not appear to be a self-serving exercise
devoted more to the welfare of the judges than to the institution.28'
Political opponents of life tenure have astutely picked up on public
disapproval for this undemocratic component of the judicial office. Idaho
Republican Representative Helen Chenoweth spoke approvingly of
proposals to end life tenure, but Umversity of Idaho law professor Jim
MacDonald, one critic who has followed Chenoweth's career, argued that
"[t]he idea of the founding fathers was exactly to prevent what Representa-
tive Chenoweth is trying to do. She is trying to get at the independence
of the judiciary and bend it towards her will. It's the same old nght-wing
blather."
282
As he introduced his term limit proposal m a press conference on April
23, 1997, Senator Bob Smith said:
In recent years activist Federal judges have repeatedly abused their
authority by blocking the implementation of constitutional measures-
enacted through state ballot referenda-simply because they disagree with
the policy judgements of the voters. Term limits for judges would
establish a responsible and appropriate constitutional check on activist
judges.
283
Two days later, when he presented the proposed amendment on the Senate
floor, he explained that
the modern-day judiciary is too independent and too unaccountable to the
taxpayers and to the people who pay their salaries and pay for their
courthouses all over America. They are insulated by life tenure and free,
for all intents and purposes, from any threat of impeachment. You have
to commit a high crime to be removed from office as a Federaljudge; we
all know that Very few judges in history have had that happen. These
activist judges, because of almost impunity, feel free to impose their
political will on all of us, without having to answer to anybody. I believe
thatjudges appointed for 10-year terms would be far more likely to follow
that law rather than imposing their political will.
284
2i ABA Hearings of the Comm'n, supra note 16 (Feb. 21, 1997) (statement of
Senior Judge William W Schwarzer).282 Frederika Schouten, Chenoweth May Try to Limit Terms ofFederalJudges,
GANNET NEWS SERV., Apr. 24, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 8826425.
" Bob Smith, Smith Introduces Bill Callingfor Term Limitsfor Judges, Gov't
Press Release, Apr. 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4431941.
284 144 CONG. REC. S3724 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1997).
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Senator Smith, tried to place a moderate spin on his introduction ofthe
constitutional amendment by contrasting it with other proposals:
Judicial activism has become such a severe problem that one of the
leaders of the House, Representative Tom DeLay of Texas, has even
suggested that we ought to consider using the constitutional power of
impeachment to remove activist Federal judges from office. Now, I
understand Congressman DeLay's concern. It is a justifiable con-
cem, but I think there is a better way to do this, which is to limit their
terms 285
Serious consideration of these proposals to end life tenure by definition
would unquestionably jeopardize judicial independence. According to
Elliot Mincberg:
If you say to ajudge, you have got a 20-year term, but after that you
are going to have to go out and find yourself anotherjob, the judge might
very well be concerned about, particularly m the 18th year, rendering a
decision that law firms might find unpopular. One of the reasons for
lifetime tenure is to say to a Federal judge, you are removed from the
political and other fray, assuming, of course, that you do what you are
supposed to do, and you are there to be an arbiter of our most precious
constitutional rights and to protect them, and not for other purposes.
2 6
N. Lee Cooper, then president of the American Bar Association, testified
on the ABA's position on terms for judges, stating "[w]e are inalterably
opposedto all proposals to amend Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution
by limiting the lifetime tenure of Article I judges dunring good behavior
and establishing a term of years, subject to reappointment. Such action
would eviscerate the concept and reality of judicial independence."287
Senator Russell Femgold (D-Wis.) summarized why a switch to
judicial terms would be harmful to judicial independence.
I do think if we had term limits for Federal judges, we would have a
very different system, a far less independent judiciary The fact is that if
you are a judge and you want to continue to be a judge and your term is
285 Id. at S3723.
" 6JudicialActivism, supra note 6, at 174 (statement of Elliot Mincberg).
27 Hearng on H.P, 1252, supra note 17, at 131 (statement of N. Lee Cooper).
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up, there are only two ways you can go. Either you have to run for
reelection
[or] you have to be reappointed by the President. Now, what does
one do if you are a Federal judge and you want to stay connected and you
want to make sure you are in good with whoever is going to be the new
President so you can continue to be a judge? Now, maybe that President
is going to do the right thing and just reappoint every good judge, but
recent history suggests to me that other considerations could possibly
play into the mind of the President and the judge. I think that can
compromise judicial independence as well.2 8
While Article I judges m the federal system are appointed for life, m
many states judges are selected through partisan elections or are appointed
by an executive and then face the voters m retention elections. When he ran
for president in 1996, Patrick Buchanan talked about the distinction
between elected and appointed judges:
[R]ow do we reign in an out-of-control court? Not hard to do; here are
several ideas we could appoint federal judges for a term of years
rather than for life. A term could be renewed if the president and Senate
think they have done a good job. We should not delude ourselves that life
terms keep judges above the political fray. They have joined the fray and
they must have some accountability [F]ederal judges at both the
appellate and district court levels could be made subject to voter recall
and removal as supreme court judges are in California, where Rose Bird
and two colleagues overturned something like 39 straight death sentences
and refused to allow the state to impose them. The voters put their names
on the ballot, recalled them and fired them. I think that would be a way,
a recourse, that individual middle-class citizens would have against
federal judges.
289
2.JudicialActivism, supra note 6, at 124 (statement of Sen. Russell Femgold).
' 9 Buchanan, supra note 48. In 38 states, judges are directly elected or need to
face the public in some sort of retention procedure to stay in office. In a number of
instances,judges andjustices have lostreelections because ofhlghlypublicized and
damaging campaigns which focus on a particular ruling, often a death penalty case.
The 1985 retention elections m California that ousted Supreme Court Chief
Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird and two of her colleagues because of animus to their
death penalty decisions was the modem invocation of the ballot box doctrine to
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remove judges on the basis of their decision making. See Samuel Latham Grimes,
Without Favor, Denial or Delay: Will North Carolina Finally Adopt Merit
Selection ofJudges?, 76 N.C. L. REV 2266,2320 (1998).
InNovember of 1996, Justice Penny J. White of the Tennessee Supreme Court
was defeated m a retention election after conservatives targeted her for her decision
in one death penalty case. The Tennessee Conservative Umon paid for
advertisements to publicize a case involving Richard Odom, a man who stabbed
and raped a 78-year-old woman. According to TCU, the murderer "won't be
getting the punishment he deserves. Thanks to Penny White. [She] felt the crime
wasn't heinous enough for the death penalty, so she struck it down." Colman
McCarthy, Injustice Claims a Tennessee Judge, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1996, at
C11. All five justices on the Tennessee Supreme Court found procedural errors
during the trial that required reversal and a new sentencing hearing. See State v.
Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996). Tis was the only death penalty case ruled
upon by Justice White, and she did not write the majority, concurring, or dissenting
opinions in the case. After White's defeat, Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist
asked, "[S]hould a judge look over his shoulder [when deciding cases] about
whether they're going to be thrown out of office? I hope so." Anthony Lewis,
Politicians Play Politics to Intimidate Judges, Nominees, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale, Fla.), Apr. 1, 1997, at 1 1A.
A Texas judge also lost reelection in November of 1996 after her opponent
advertised that the incumbent had oncebeen a defense attorney in capital cases. See
Colman McCarthy, Injustice Claims a Tennessee Judge, WASH. POST, Nov 26,
1996, at C11. In Maryland, a judge was defeated by a candidate who pledged to
push for the death penalty as a sitting judge. See id. In Alabama, an incumbent
judge won reelection after advertising the number of defendants he had sentenced
to death. See id. In Washington State, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court won
her reelection, partially because she publicized the fact that her opponent had
represented a defendant in a capital case, a case which the opponent had served in
a pro bono capacity at the request of the appellate court. See ALLIANCE FOR
JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE NOMINATION OF BARBARA DuRHAM TO THE NINTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS (1999) (text on file with author). In the election of
November 1998, incumbent Texas Criminal Court of Appeals Judge Charles Baird
was defeated in large part because of Ins dissent from a death penalty case on
ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. See McFarland v. Texas, 928 S.W.2d
482,525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (Baird, J., dissenting).
Andrew M. Coats, Dean of Umversity of Oklahoma College of Law, relayed
an odd twist to this pattern:
In my state judges at the trial level do not want to be mistaken for an
incumbent In fact, you don't see signs anymore that say "Keep Judge
Smith" or "Re-elect Judge Jones." Always before in the history of our state,
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Other politicians have proposed a constitutional restructuring with
ideas that were first raised during the court packing fight of 1937
Testifying before Senator Ashcroft's Judiciary Subcommittee, Nebraska
Attorney General Don Steinberg claimed that
mcumbentjudges were elected 90,95 percent of the time, unless something
really untoward happened. These days, if they discover that you're an
incumbent, your chances of success are quite limited, and we've had two
very fine judges recently who most would have thought were very strong
law-and-order judges defeated by people who were mentally disturbed, but
who happened to get on the ballot and were the outsider running against the
incumbent. So, that is a circumstance out there that is quite remarkable.
ABA Hearngs ofthe Comm 'n, supranote 16 (Oct. 11, 1996) (statement of Andrew
M. Coats).
Umversity of Southern California law professor Erwin Chemermsky believes
that these examples show that
the standard for re-call of ajudge [in states with re-call proceedings] should
be the same as the standard for unpeachment of ajudge at the Federal level.
If a state court judge has violated the law, abused the office in the sense of
taking bribes as the San Diego judges were accused of, obviously re-call is
appropriate. But I don't believe that a re-call is appropriate because people
disagree with a particular decision of the judge. To me then there is a real
threat to judicial independence because I worry then judges will decide
cases to please the voters to stay in the prestigious office that they hold.
Id. (Feb. 21, 1997) (statement of Prof. Erwin Chemennsky).
Judicial elections which can cost hundreds of thousands and sometimes millions
of dollars can compromise acandidate's independence. Supreme Court Justice John
Paul Stevens decries this recent trend:
Persons who undertake the task of admmisterng justice impartially should
not be required-mdeed, they should not be permitted-to finance campaigns
orto curry the favor of voters by making predictions or promises about how
they will decide cases before they have heard any evidence or argument. A
campaign promise to "be tough on crime," or to "enforce the death
penalty," is evidence of bias that should disqualify a candidate from sitting
in criminal cases. Moreover, making the retention of judicial office
dependent on the popularity of the judge inevitably affects the decisional
process in high visibility cases, no matter how competent and how
conscientious the judge may be. 'My conviction that the practice of
electing judges is profoundly unwise is one that I have held throughout my
period of service as a Federal judge. I must confess, however, that my
review of capital cases has reinforced that conviction because the emotional
impact of those cases gives rise to a special risk of error.
John P Stevens, Opening Assembly Address at the ABA Annual Meeting (Aug.
3, 1996).
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Congress has the constitutional power to restore the intended balance
of power between the people's elected representatives and the Federal
judiciary. It would be my recommendation that the Congress act through
its powers granted m Article Ell, sections 1 and 2 of the U.S. Constitution,
first, to eliminate the authority of the lower Federal courts to declare State
and Federal laws unconstitutional, leaving that power solely in the hands
of the U.S. Supreme Court and the State courts; and second, further
provide that no State or Federal law may be declared unconstitutional by
the U.S. Supreme Court except by a vote of three-fourths of the Justices
of that courL
290
RobertBork, President Reagan'sunsuccessfulnommeeto the Supreme
Court, has recently proposed a constitutional amendment to allow federal
and state court decisions to be overruled by a simple majority of one house
of Congress.291 Bork's former District of Columbia Circuit colleague
Justice Antonin Scalia disagreed with this proposal, saying "Bork
essentially has given up. I'm not so pessinmstic. I'm not ready to throw in
the towel. We can get back." 2
F Gridlock in the Judicial Confirmation Process
During President Clinton's first two years in office, the Democratic-
controlled Senate confirmed 129 Article ImI judges to the 843 member
federal bench.293 Following change in control of the Senate, the confirma-
tion rate for judges slowed dramatically to fifty-five in 1995, twenty m
1996, and thirty-sx in 1997, 94 while the acrimony and bitterness in the
Senate process escalated. During the second session of the 104th Congress
m 1996, the Senate confirmed only seventeen judges295 and none to the
court of appeals, which was unprecedented in the post-World War II era.
No one was confirmed after August 22, 1996. By the end of the 104th
Congress, the Senate had failed to confirm a record twenty-eight of
290 Judicial Activism, supra note 6, at 54-54 (statement of Don Sternberg).
291 See Herman Schwartz, GOP's Ideologic Court Cleansing Bloclang New
Judges Threatens Entire System, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 19, 1997, at B5.
292 Richard Carelli, Scalia: Don 'tImpeach Liberal Judges, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4866960.
293 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, VACANCY SUMMARY,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL VACANCY REPORT (1996).
294 See id.
295 Three judges, A. Wallace Tashima, Sidney Thomas, and John Martin, were
confirmed on January 2, 1996, the last day of the first session of the 104th
Congress. See 141 CONG. REC. S 19344 (daffy ed. Jan. 2, 1996).
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President Clinton's nominees. While this might be dismissed as election
year politics, in 1992 the Democratic Senate confirmed sixty-six judges,
the most in any year of the Bush presidency, and many of them were in the
final weeks of the Congress when President Bush was far behind in the
polls.2 96 By August of 1997, there were more than 100 vacancies on the
federal courts, more than ten percent of the total seats.297 According to
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the ranking member of the Judiciary
Committee, his Republican colleagues "tried to shut down the executive
branch [at the end of 1995], and that didn't work. So they are aiming at
judges, who are an easier target, and at the same time throwing red meat to
"1298their right wing.
The Republican majority has tried to alter the traditional judicial
appointment process wherein the semor senator from the president's party
makes recommendations for district court nominees by attempting to wrest
control from the president and his Democratic advisors. The Republicans
have ended the Senate's arrangement in which the American Bar Associa-
tion assisted in screeningjudicial nominees andmade formal presentations
to the Senate Judiciary Committee. 211 Lower court nominees have been
subjected to lengthy delays3" and have had to participate in multiple
hearings by the Judiciary Committee.3"' Nominees have had holds placed
on them, even after they have been voted on to the Senate floor, and are
now routinely approved through rollcall votes instead of by unanimous
consent. They have faced unprecedented and intrusive questioning, which
296 See, e.g., SENATE DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMrITEE, SHUTDOWN ONJUDGES:
THEREPUBLICANS' DISMALRECORD THREATENSTHEJUDICIARYPUB.NO. SR-40-
JUDICIARY (1996).
297 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, VACANCY SUMMARY,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL VACANCY REPORT (1997).
29' David A. Price, So Many Cases, So Few Judges, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY,
Jan. 15, 1998, atAl.
299 See Letter from Senator Omn Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, to other members of the Committee (Feb. 24, 1997) (copy on file with
author).
3 Nommees William Fletcher, Susan Oki Mollway, and Hilda Gloria Tagle all
were forced to wait more than 30 months from the time they were nominated until
they were finally confirmed respectively for the Ninth Circuit, the District of
Hawaii, and the Southern District of Texas. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL
SELECTION PROJECT: ANNUAL REPORT 1998, at 21-22 (1998).
3 Nominees William Fletcher, Susan Old Mollway, Margaret Morrow, Richard
Paez, and Clarence Sundram all had to undergo two hearings by the Judiciary
Committee in connection with theirrespective nominations to the Ninth Circuit, the
District of Hawaii, the Central District of California, the Ninth Circuit, and the
Northern District of New York. Paez and Sundram were not confirmed. See id.
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is designed to weed out "judicial activists." Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.),
one of the more aggressive members of the Judiciary Committee, probes
nominees, looking for examples ofjudicial activism. In a remarkable (but
for him typical) line of questioning, he collected multiple views of the
American Civil Liberties Unon to ask whether a particular nominee agreed
with the beliefs of the ACLU:
[I]t does adhere to a number of positions such as they oppose the death
penalty, they oppose the "three strikes" sentencing laws, they are in
opposition to school vouchers for sectarian schools, they oppose V-chips
for television sets to limit what is shown, opposition to voluntary labeling
of albums, and support of partial-brth abortion, support of the constitu-
tionality on the issue of racial preferences and the decriminalization of
drugs. [D]o you agree with all of those views?
30 2
Court watchers like Sheldon Goldman, who has studied judicial
confirmations since the 1960s, believe that the current gridlock has been
umque-"[W]hat's unparalleled is to start so early with delay We've never
had this done in a president's first year of a new term. Sure, people
have played hardball in the past, but not on such a sustained level as they
are doing now '303 President Clinton finally reacted to the threats to his
appointment power by stating in a weekly radio address that "the Senate's
failure to act on my nominations, or even to give many of my nominees a
hearing, represents the worst of partisan politics. Under the pretense of
preventing so-called judicial activism, they've taken aim at the very
independence our founders sought to protect." 3°4
In hIs annual State of the Judiciary speech, presented on December 31,
1997, Chief Justice William Rehnquist also rebuked the Senate for the
lengthy delays in the confirmation process. He observed that "[t]he Senate
is surely under no obligation to confirm any particular nominee, but after
the necessary time for inquiry it should vote him up or vote him down." 305
The Senate finally appeared to heed this advice by confirming sixty-
3
1 Confirmation Heanngs on Federal Appozntments Before the Committee on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 79 (1998) (confirmation proceedings of Susan Graber).
303 Marcia Coyle, Confirmations at Last? The Stalemate Over Appointing
Federal Judges May Finally Be Over, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 2, 1998, at Al.
3o1 President William J. Clinton, Saturday Radio Address, 33 WEEKLY COMP
PRES. DoC. 1442-43 (Sept. 27, 1997).
31 William Rehnquist, 1997 Year-endReport on the Federal Judiciary (visited
Feb. 21, 1999) <http://www.uscourts.gov/cj97.htm>
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five judges in 1998 and bringing the number of vacant seats down to
fifty 306
G. Court Unpacking Plans
While they have majorities m Congress but do not have control of the
White House and its power to nominate right-thinking jurists, certain
Republican members of Congress believe it appropriate not only to slow
down the confirmationprocedures for individualjudicial nominees but also
to decrease the total number of federal judges and change the structure of
the federal courts to affect the outcome of cases. These members have
engaged m "what we call court unpacking proposals," 3°7 referring by
comparison to President Roosevelt's court packing plan.
1. Grassley Hearings
Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), Chairman of the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Admimstrative Oversight and the Courts, has held a
series of hearings m which he questioned whether every federaljudgeship
is needed. In 1996, Senator Grassley distributed a questionnaire to all
Article III judges, the first of its kind, in which he sought information
covering everything from the need for new judicial seats to more intrusive
questions on howjudges use their law clerks and the amount of travel time
they take.0 ' According to Senator Grassley, "nearly 70 percent of the
circuit and around 60 percent of the districtjudges responded, which I think
is an impressive response rate."3' This questionnaire was distributed to 249
active and senior circuit court judges, 170 of whom responded, a 68.3%
306 See 144 CONG. REC. S12963 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Omn Hatch).
307 Rex Bossert, The Call for Dividing the 9th Circuit Grows, NAT'L L.J., May
5, 1997, at Al (quoting Deborah Lewis).
308 See Report on the January 1996 Judicial Survey, Part 1. U.S. Courts of
Appeal, U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the
Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. at app. A (1996) [hereinafter
Report on the January 1996 Judicial Survey, Part 1].
3 9 Considering the Appropriate Allocation ofJudgeships in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 3 (1997) [hereinafter Considering theApproprateAllocation ofJudgeshps]
(statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
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response rate,310 and to 902 semor and active district court judges, 529 of
whom responded, a 58.6% response rate. Responses were also received
from 68 out of 90 chiefjudges, a 75.6% response.311 According to Senator
Grassley,
[m]any issues were explored in this survey, including the need for
judgeships. Partly as aresult of the lines ofcommunications opened up by
this survey, I have received additional letters and comments from judges
around the country who believe judgeships in their circuits or districts
should be unfilled or eliminated.
3 12
Senator Grassley apparently believed that judges faced no coercion to
answer the questions m any particular manner, because his letter attached
to the survey, read:
[A]s Chanrman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over legislation
affecting the courts, I have responsibility to communicate with, and elicit
input from, the members of the Federal judiciary. Of course, as a
member of a co-equal branch of government, you certainly are not
required to respond to any of the enclosed questions. However, it is my
hope that you will be eager to participate in this effort.
313
At least one judge was concerned about the effect of issuing this
survey Judge Norma Shapiro of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
commented on Grassley's questionnaires, stating that while
no one resents Congress, m its proper role in supervising or in worrying
about how much money we spend, making inquiry I don't know if any
of you have read that questionnaire, but you couldn't read that question-
naire and think that it was other than designed to achieve a particular
310 See Report on the January 1996 Judicial Survey, Part 1, supra note 308, at
I.
311 See Report on the January 1996 Judicial Survey, Part 2: U.S. District
Courts, U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the
Courts ofthe Comm. on theJudiciary, 104th Cong. atI (1996) [heremafter Report
on the January 1996 Judiciary Survey, Part 2].
312 Considering the Appropriate Allocation ofJudgeships, supra note 309, at 3
(statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
313 Charles E. Grassley, Memorandum to Article III Federal Judges on Judicial
Survey (Jan. 26, 1996) (copy on file with author).
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result.314 Now, I've looked at the responses, those from the trial judges
and the appellate judges, and I think the result achieved was not what was
expected. And there was great consternation about whether it should be
answered, but by and large it was answered and I don't think any harm
was done. But it's just this sort of ripple effect of [sic] you don't want
your judges to be paranoid that everyone is out to get them; at least I don't
think you do.315
Senator Grassley's articulated motivation for reviewing court staffing
issues is fiscal conservativism. On several occasions he stated:
The taxpayers deserve to have their money spent judiciously. But when
it comes to judicial seats, all that we have heard in the past from the
Judicial Conference is that we should have more seats, that more is better.
I want to make a revolutionary change in that mind set.
It is interesting to note that the Congress hasn't eliminated a
judgeship since the Civil War era. So I want to resurrect a whole new way
of thinking that I hope will become commonplace; that is, ifwe do end up
creating seats m certain needy jurisdictions, we also need to be terminat-
ing, or at least not filling, open seats.3i6
Since 1996, Senator Grassley has held oversight hearings on the
District of Columbia, First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh,
and Federal Circuits. The results do not necessarily comport with Senator
Grassley's theory that the number of judicial seats can be reduced and
some vacancies should remain unfilled. The chief judges of the First,
314 Besides focusing on the judge's opinion of the optimum size for courts, the
questionnaire asks: "What is the typical recess period for your court," id. at A2a;
"Do you believe that the location of circuit conferences should be restricted to the
geographic boundaries of the circuit," id. at Bld; and, "Are you involved in
extracurricular activities, such as teaching, lecturing, writing law review articles,
and making public appearances? If so, how much time do you spend on these
activities, including preparation and travel," id. at Cla, b.
... ABA Hearngs for the Comm "n, supra note 16 (Dec. 13, 1996) (statement of
Judge Norma Shapiro).
316 Considerng the Appropnate Allocation ofJudgeshps, supra note 309, at 2.
Before his hearings began, Grassley emphasized to reporters that "since the Civil
War the Federal judiciary has only expanded and has not contracted by a single
seat." Id. He further noted that, "it all comes down to whether we are making wise
use of taxpayers' dollars." Jamie Dettmer & Susan Crabtree, A Judge Too Far,
INSIGHT, Apr. 29, 1996, at 6.
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Second, Third, Eighth, Eleventh, District ofColumbia, andFederal Circuits
all testified, after polling their colleagues, that it was nperative to fill the
vacancies on their courts and m some cases that it was necessary to expand
the number of seats to fill growing backlogs. 17 While Fourth Circuit Chief
Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson18 and Judges Patrick E. Higginbotham and
Edith H. Jones of the Fifth Circuit testified that their courts did not need to
expand or even fill existing vacancies, other judges on those courts, like
Samuel J. Ervin, the former Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit, disagreed.
Senator Grassley uses no standard methodology to determine how
many judges are needed. Instead, he appears to examine a particular court
from which he highlights random factors relevant to his determination,
despite the fact that those factors may be unique to that court. In the
introduction to his summary of survey responses from court of appeals
judges, he acknowledges that "the questionnaire was never intended to
result in a mere statistical compilation of data, as many of the questions in
the survey did not lend themselves to such an analysis. '319 Nonetheless, he
ignores much of the information compiled m his own survey and through-
out the hearings to conclude that fewer judges are needed for the federal
bench.
31 CluefJudge Harry Edwards of the District of Columbia Circuit testified that
most of his colleagues favored the filling of the then twelfth seat on the court, but
his colleague, Circuit Judge Lawrence Silberman, testified that filling the twelfth
seat was unnecessary. See 143 CONG. REC. S2515 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Orrmn Hatch).
318 Senator Sessions referred to Chief Judge Wilkinson's testimony before the
Grassley subcommittee:
Even Judge Harvey Wilkinson said even though they have 378 filings per
judge in the fourth circuit, they do not need another judge. He also noted,
and the records will bear it out, that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has
the fastest disposition rate, the shortest time between filing and decision, of
any circuit in America, and they are the third busiest circuit in America.
That is good judging. That is good admimstration. That is fidelity to the
taxpayers' money, and they ought to be commended for that.
143 CONG. REC. S2521 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997). Chief Judge Wilkinson,
however, has also articulated grave doubts about any judicial expansions: "We've
charted a course of unexamined growth over the past 25 years. We have
ignored basic questions like what is the optimal size of a federal circuit and what
kind of questions the Federal judiciary should be involved with." Carney, supra
note 142, at 2914.
319 Report on the January 1996 Judicial Survey, Part 1, supra note 308, at I.
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Senator Grassley's statistical computations are disingenuous. For
instance, in his summary for the U.S. Court of Appeals survey describing
the "Need for More Judges," he begins:
Even though a large majority of the responding judges (70%) believed
their caseload was increasing, the majority of these judges (53%)
indicated either that the current number of judges in their court was
sufficient or that less judges were needed. On the other hand 30.6% of
responding judges answered it was their perception that their court
necessitated more judges.
3 20
However, in his section actually compiling the survey results, out of 170
responses to the question, "Given the overall workload and backlog of your
court, is it your perception that the workload and backlog necessitate
additional judges, or fewer judges?" Fifty-two (30.6%) answered "more
judges," four (2.4%) answered "fewer judges," eighty-six (50.6%)
answered "the current number of judges is sufficient," and twenty-eight
(16.5%) answered they were unsure or did not answer.321 In contrast to
Senator Grassley's formulation, more than 80% of all judges who
responded to the survey said the courts should not shrink or should actually
grow 3 More than 97% of the judges who actually answered this question
said the same thug.
311
Addressing the same issue in his summary of the district court surveys,
Senator Grassley said:
Even though a near majority (44%) of the responding judges believed
their caseload was increasing, a solid majority (63.5%) indicated either
that the current number ofludges in their court was sufficient or that less
judges were needed. While only 18.9% of responding judges
answered that it was their perception their court needed more judges, a
mere 3.8% perceived their caseload to be unmanageable.
324
Again, Grassley's emphasis appears misplaced, because 79.2% believe the
current number ofjudges needs to be expanded or is adequate. Out of 529
responses, 100 (18.9%) said more judges were needed, 17 (3.2%) said
320 Id. at5.
321 Id. at survey results section, no page number.
322 See id.
323 See id.
324Report on the January 1996 Judicial Survey, Part 2, supra note 311, at 5.
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fewer judges were needed, and 319 (60.3%) said the number of current
judges is sufficient. In the remaining 93 responses (17.6%), the respondent
was not sure, did not answer, or the answer was unclear.325
The theme expressed by Senator Grassley has surfaced in the confirma-
tions battles of certain circuit court nominees. James Beaty, a United States
District Court judge from the Middle District of North Carolina, was
nominated for a Fourth Circuit seat on December 22, 1995, at which point
there were two vacancies on the fifteen-seat circuit. Beaty, an African-
American, would have become the first non-white judge on the circuit.
North Carolina, the state with the largest population m the Fourth Circuit,
has only one active North Carolinian judge, as opposed to South Carolina,
which has four, and Virginia, three.
Beaty, awell-respected former general practice attorney, was perceived
as too liberal by North Carolina's two Republican senators, Jesse Helms
and Lauch Farcloth.326 The two senators have sharply criticized Beaty on
the basis of one case, Sherman v. Smith.32' Sitting by designation as part of
a Fourth Circuit appellate panel, Judge Beatyjomed a per cunam opinion
overturning a criminal conviction and remanding the case for new trial.
32
The basis for tis ruling was that a trial juror, on Ins own initiative, had
gone to the crime scene to inspect a tree where the murder weapon was
found and then reported his findings to the other members of the jury 
329
The trial judge concluded this was harmless error and did not declare a
mistrial, but the appellate panel disagreed.33' The Fourth Circuit, sitting en
banc, reversed the panel decision.33' However, given the facts in evidence,
the panel's decision was not unreasonable. 32
3 1 See id. at survey results section, no page number.
326 Senator Faircloth was defeated in his reelection bid in November 1998. See
John Edwards Wins with a Message ofHope, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Nov.
5, 1998, at A14.
327 Sherman v. Smith, No. 94-6831, 1995 WL 709751 (4th Cir. Dec. 4, 1995)
(un-published opimon), opinion vacated (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 1996), and on reh'g en
bane, 89 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1996).
328 See id. at * 1.
329 See id.
330 See id.
331 See Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).332After President Clinton nominated Beaty, Senator Orrin Hatch accused him
of being "soft on crime," and asked, "Will the President chastise Judge Beaty, or
does he agree with his decision to release a convicted double murderer on a
technicality"" 142 CoNG. REC. S2790 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1996). Andrew Frey, the
defendant's lawyer and a formerDeputy Solicitor General and Reagan nominee to
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As partial justification for not pushing their home state nommee, the
North Carolina senators also stated that based on the Grassley hearings,
additional active Fourth Circuit judges were not necessary 333 The situation
remained static until February of 1998, when one of the remaining active
South Carolina Fourth Circuit judges died suddenly and a Fourth Circuit
judge from West Virgnia took semor status.334 Receiving recommendations
from the South Carolina and West Virginia senators, President Clinton
named two moderate nominees for the Fourth Circuit, United States
District Court Judge William Traxler of the District of South Carolina and
former United States Attorney Robert King from West Virginia. The
Senate quickly confirmed both nominees at the end of its session.335 Judge
Beaty's nomination was not acted upon and died at the close of the
Congress.
More publicly, Senator Grassley's argument for fewer judges came to
light during the confirmation of Merrick Garland, a 1995 nominee to the
District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit") who was not confirmed until
March 19, 1997 There are twelve seats on the D.C. Circuit. Garland was
nominated for the twelfth seat which became vacant when Judge Abner
Mikva was appointed White House Counsel on September 19, 1994. The
Republican controlled Senate would not advance Garland's nomination
the District of Columbia Circuit, wrote to Senator Hatch:
[F]ar more disturbing to proponents of judicial restraint (as I believe we
both are) should be the action of the Fourth Circuit in granting rehearing of
Tim Sherman's case en banc. As you may know, the panel decision in
Tim's favor was an unpublished, non-precedential opinion that did not
purport to create any new law or modify any existing legal principles.
The lack of any principled justification for an en banc rehearing suggests
that the result-oriented judicial activism may be its cause.
Letter from Andrew Frey, defense counsel in Sherman v. Smith, to Senator Orrm
Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Feb. 19, 1996) (copy on file
with author).
333 See, e.g., Helms Should Unblock Circuit Court Appointees, GREENSBORO
NEWS & REC., Feb. 19, 1997, at A10; N.C. May Lose Posts on Federal Court,
GREENSBORO NEWS &REC., Feb. 18, 1997, atA3.
3
1 SeeAdmimstrative Office ofU.S. Courts, Vacancies in the FederalJudiciary
(visited Mar. 17, 1998) <http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/udgevacancy.htm>
331 See United States Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Alphabetical List of
Judicial Nominees (visited Mar. 17, 1998) <http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/
105alpha.htm>. Judge Traxler was nominated on July 13, 1998, and confirmed on
September 28, 1998. See id. Judge King was nominated on June 24, 1998, and
confirmed on October 8, 1998. See id.
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until D.C. Circuit Judge James Buckley took semor status on August 31,
1996.336 Even then, led by Senator Grassley, opponents argued that based
solely on an analysis of the number of filings and terminations, the D.C.
Circuit did not need an eleventh, let alone twelfth seat. A number of
Republican senators articulated this rationale. Senator Grassley stated
that
[a]s chairman of the Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the
Courts, I have closely studied the D.C. circuit for over a year now. And
I can confidently conclude that the D.C. circuit does not need 12 judges
or even 11 judges. Filling either of these two seats would just be a waste
of taxpayer money-to the tune of about $1 million per year for each seat.
Abolishmgjudicial seats is completely nonpartisan. If ajudicial seat
is abolished, no President-Democrat or Republican-could fill it. As long
as any judgeship exists, the temptation to nominate someone to fill the
seatwill be overwhelming-even with the outrageous cost to the American
taxpayer.
337
According to Senator John Ashcroft:
[E]nding the era of big Government includes all three branches of
government But if we cannot end big government where we have had
declining demand for services, and where we are already over staffed,
where can we end big government? To believe that the judicial branch
should be excluded from the exercise of responsibility or should be over
staffed or should ignore the trends in terms of case filings and should be
overpopulated with individuals because there are slots available, in spite
of the fact that the work or the caseload is not there to justify those slots,
would be for us to deny a responsible position in this matter.338
Case filings from court to court are not identical, and the D.C. Circuit
has the largest number of the most complicated cases and the smallest
number of relatively simple cases of any of the regional circuit courts. As
Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.) stated in the floor debate on the Garland
nomination,
336 SeeAdmimstrative Office ofU.S. Courts, Vacancies in theFederal Judiczary
(visited Mar. 17, 1998) <http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/judgevacancy.htm>
337 143 CONG. REC. S2522 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997).
3381 d. at S2535.
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[the] mere case filing numbers do not tell the whole story with respect to
the burdens that the court faces. The D.C. circuit receives, in complexity
and importance, cases that do not come as a general rule before the other
circuits across the country. It has had major, major cases that it has had to
deal with as a routine matter, cases of great weight and importance to the
nation.
The D.C. circuit also handles numerous appeals from admnstrative
agency decisions that are characterized by voluminous records and
complex fact patterns. In fact, almost half of the D.C. circuit's cases are
these kind of administrative appeals-46 percent. The next highest circuit
in this respect is the Ninth circuit with 9.6 percent of their cases being of
this kind. The D.C. circuit also handles fewer of the least complex and
time-consuming cases, criminal and diversity cases, than any of its sister
circuits. Only 11 percent of its cases are diversity cases. No other circuit
has less than 24 percent.
339
By the end of the Merick Garland proceedings, Senator Hatch, who
led the floor debate on behalf of Garland, was angered by some of the
language employed by his Republican colleagues:
As I suspected, nobody in this body is willing to challenge the merit
of Merrick Garland's nomination. I have not heard one challenge to him
yet. In fact, they openly concede that Mr. Garland is highly qualified to
be an appellate judge. Rather, they use arguments that the D.C. circuit
does not need 12 judges in order to oppose the confirmation of Mr.
Garland for the 1 1th seat on this court.
My colleague from Alabama [Senator Sessions] circulated a letter
saying confirming Merrck Garland would be a "npoff' of the tax-
payers. Having just led the fight for the balanced budget amendment, I
do not think that is quite fair. I am never going to rip off the taxpayers.
But I will tell you one thing, playing politics with judges is unfair, and
I am sick of it, and, frankly, we are going to see what happens around
here. A "npoff"" Let's be serious about this, folks. Tins is a serious
matter.
3 40
Garland was confirmed by a vote of 76 to 23, the largest number of
votes received by any Clinton judicial appointee to that point in the 105th
339 Id. at S2527
340 Id. at S2536.
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Congress.34' The twelfth seat on the D.C. Circuit has remained vacant for
almost three years with the Clinton Administration taking no efforts to fill
it.
2. Judicial Expansion
Senator Grassley's contention that the authorized size of the federal
courts has only expanded since the Civil War is accurate, except for the
natural elimination of temporary judges.342 However, the size and
complexity of the federal docket, in both its civil and criminal components
and at the trial and appellate levels, have increased significantly in recent
years.
Congress has created newjudgeshlps in every presidential administra-
tion since World War II, except for Gerald Ford's. The last two expansions
were in 1984 and 1990 when the size of the judiciary was expanded by
eighty-five positions at each instance.34 3 The eight years since the last
expansion is the longest time that the size of the judiciary has remained
fixed in at least fifty years. Since 1992, civil and criminal filings in the
district courts have increased by 16.9%, from 265,612 to 310,504,314 and
appeals have increased by 11.3%, from 47,013 to 52,319 during this
period.345 While a substantial part of the backlog can be attributed to the
confirmation gridlock caused by the Senate, many parts of the country
desperately need new judicial positions, quite apart from any unfilled
judicial vacancies.
341 See id.
342 Temporaryjudges are appointed in districts that have an emergency backlog
of cases or an unexpectedly high new number of filings after legislation is
approved m both houses of Congress and signed by the president. Temporary
judges are appointed as full-fledged Article III judges with life tenure and salary
protection, but at the end of five years, the next vacant judicial seat in that district
is automatically extinguished, unless Congress votes to extend the duration of the
temporaryjudgeship orto convert it into a permanent judicial seat. See Pub. L. No.
105-53, 111 Stat. 1174 (1997) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1997)).
343 See Judicial Improvements Actof 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 151 Note (1990)); Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1984)).
3" See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGE-
MENT STATISTICS 167 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT
STATISTICS].
34
' See id. at 31.
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The Northern and Southern Districts of Texas have suffered from a
large increase in drug and immigration crimes. Jerry Buchmeyer, Chief
Judge of the Northern District of Texas, said late in 1997 that
[p]eople run out of desire and steam. It's one thing to keep going
when there's help right around the corner. But the corner keeps getting
longer. They're kind enough to give us more work by creating
additional federal crimes. It would be me to have some help to take care
of all this new business.
346
George Kazen, Buchmeyer's counterpart in the Southern District of Texas,
said his caseload is
like a tidal wave. As soon as I finish 25 cases per month, the next 25
are on top of me and then you've got the sentence reports you did two
months before. There's no stop, no break at all, year in and year out, here
they come. We've already got more than we can say grace over down
here. We have a docket. that can be tripled probably at the drop of
a hat
34 7
Both the Northern and Southern Districts had two long-standing vacancies
m 1997 One vacancy in each court was filled in March of 1998,348 but
these are large multi-member district courts,3 49 and they need additional
seat allocations to keep up with the increased case load. The Middle
District of Florida has one of the largest caseloads in the country, and the
backlog was so great that its judges conducted a continuous four-
month trial session in the summer of 1998 to reduce the backlog.350 The
346 Carney, supra note 142, at 2913-14.
" Sue Ann Pressley, Cases Pile Up as Judgeships Remain Vacant, WASH.
POST, May 15, 1997, at Al.
348 See United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Alphabetical List of
Judicial Nominees (visited Mar. 17, 1998) <http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/
105alpha.htin>
14' The Northern District of Texas, based in Dallas, has 12 seats, and the
Southern District, based in Houston, has 18 seats.
... See Jim Leusner, Wake Up Call for Lawyers on Federal Judge Shortage,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 19, 1998, at D3. Testifying on the problems of the
Middle District of Florida before the House Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, Chief Judge Elizabeth
Kovachevich stated that
[t]o try to help ourselves, we have decided to withdraw our forces from the
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Florida backlog was not directly related to the Senate's confirmation
gridlock because Florida judges have always been confirmed m a timely
fashion.
New judges also need to be assigned to the Southern District of
California, where the number of federal law enforcement agents has
doubled since 1994. There are more federal felony cases m San Diego than
m any other district, approximately 4000 per year.35' So many defendants
await trial m the district that hundreds have to be bussed in from 130 miles
away 312 Since 1978, the number of judges has remained constant at
eight." According to Alan Bersm, who was United States Attorney in San
Diego: "We've reached the limit. We have found that there is an irreducible
bottleneck at the point of courtrooms and active federal judges who can
hear the criminal cases that are being generated by the agencies and
brought by our office."3 ' Judith Keep, the Chief Judge in the Southern
District, agrees:
There's an awful lot of just crisis management that's constantly going
on. We're not able to do anything well. Even with the crimnmal cases,
you have to have such an assembly line to get them through. You cannot
give them the attention that they deserve. And you know that you're
making a lot of mistakes with-because of the speed.355
Alan Bersm attributes congressional failure to authorize new judgeships to
politics, noting:
Jacksonville and the Orlando Divisions and to redeploy and to attack the
caseload in Tampa and Fort Myers this summer by having the active U.S.
district judges abandon Orlando and Jacksonville for three months and
come to Tampa. This will put all eleven U.S. district judges in Tampa
courtrooms to tackle the backlog of civil cases in the Tampa and Fort Myers
divisions. We recognize that by doing so we will cause undue hardships to
the constituents of the Orlando and Jacksonville divisions. We are forced
to steal from Peter to pay Paul, and realize that this is merely a short-term
solution to a long-term problem.
Hearngs Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, 106th Cong.
5-6 (1997) (statement of Hon. Elizabeth Kovachevich), available in 1997 WL
626973.
35 See MornmngEdition: FederalJudge Shortage (Nat'l Public Radio broadcast,
Sept. 23, 1997).
352 See id.
... See id.
354Id.
355 Id.
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What is a political battle within the Beltway, and may make sense in the
logic of Washington politics, has real life consequences. Without judges,
we cannot bring these prosecutions. Without the prosecutions, we can't
support the agencies in their enforcement efforts and we end up with no
effective deterrence to the crime that exists here on the border. If we
don't have judges, that law ends up having no teeth, and we end up
chasing our tails to some degree.
35 6
To combat some oftheproblems associatedwith backlog and expanded
caseloads, the Judicial Conference in 1996 recommended that Congress
expand the size of the judiciary by creating fiffy-three new seats, equaling
seventeen court of appeals judgeships and thirty-six district court judge-
ships.35 7 As Chief Justice William Rehnquist stated in his speech on the
status of the judiciary at the end of 1996:
Another shortcoming in Congress' 1996 record on legislative matters
concerning the Federaljudiciary that will confront us again in 1997 is its
decision not to create additional Federaljudgeships. Despite an increasing
caseload and the fact that no new Article fIjudgeships have been created
since 1990, Congress declined the Judicial Conference's request to create
such positions. Circuit court judges continue to be especially squeezed
between time constraints and heavy dockets. Eventually, Congress will
have to reconcile this mismatch between Federal caseload and judicial
personnel. Either the former must be reduced or the latter increased if the
quality of justice admimstered by the Federal judiciary is to be main-
tamed.
358
The Chief Justice returned to this theme in his 1997 report, stating that
[s]ince December 1990, the last time Congress created any new judge-
ships, the number of cases filed in courts of appeals has grown by 21
percent and those filed in district courts have increased by 24 percent.
356 Id.
311 See Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, News Release, Judicial Con-
ference Seeks New Judgeships to Handle Growing Workloads at All Levels (Mar.
11, 1997).
311 William Rehnquist, 1996 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, at 4
(Dec. 31, 1996).
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In general, Congress has declined to eliminate the disparity between
resources and workload in the Federal judiciary by an expansion of the
number of judges.359
Finally, In a May 11, 1998, speech to the American Law Institute, he said,
"We need vacancies filled to deal with the cases arising under existing
laws, but if Congress enacts, and the President signs new laws allowing
more cases to be brought into the federal courts, just filling the vacancies
will not be enough. We will need additional judgeslps. 360 Legislation
which would lead to a modest expansion was reintroduced in 1997 It was
not formally considered, and the bill died at the end of the 105th
Congress.
361
3. Ninth Circuit Split
During the 104th and 105th Congresses, the issue of splitting the Ninth
Circuit again arose.362 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is the United
States's largest In terms of case filings, 363 population served, and geogra-
phy It includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and the territories of the Northern Mariana
Islands and Guam. For the past decade, conservative western members of
Congress have repeatedly introduced legislation which would split the
359Rehnquist, supra note 305, at 2-3.
0 William Rehnquist, May 11, 1998 Speech to the American Law Institute,
LEGAL TIMES, May 18, 1998, at 12.361 See Federal Judgeship Act of 1997, S. 678, 105th Cong. (1997).
362 In 1974, the Hruska Commission, chaired by Senator Roman Hruska (R-
Neb.), recommended that for efficiency purposes, both the Fifth Circuit (which
then included Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) and
the Ninth Circuit be split. The judges on the Fifth Circuit and the bar associations
from the affected states all enthusiastically agreed, and Congress split the Fifth
Circuit m 1981. At the same time, lawyers and judges in theNinth Circuit strongly
opposed splitting the court of appeals, and Congress chose not to take action at that
time. Law review articles discussing the history of the Ninth Circuit and arguing
for and against its split include Senator Conrad Bums, Dividing the Ninth Circuit
Court ofAppeals: A Proposition Long Overdue, 57 MONT. L. REV 245 (1996);
Carl Tobias, Why Congress Should Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 SMU L. REV
583 (1997); and Judge J. Clifford Wallace, The Ninth Circuit Should Not Be Split,
56 OHIO ST. L.J. 941 (1995).
363 In fiscal year 1997, 8692 appeals were filed. See 1997 FEDERAL COURT
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, supra note 344, at 20.
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Ninth Circuit, primarily by isolating Califorma with one or more additional
states and placing the remainder into a new conservative Twelfth Circuit.
364
Proponents of the split argue that because twenty-eight of twenty-nmne
Ninth Circuit cases accepted for review by the Supreme Court during its
1996-1997 term were reversed, the Ninth Circuit isjurisprudentially out of
step with the rest of the country.365
While claiming mimany cases to act purely on efficiency prnciples, the
major impetus behind these measures is to create a new court structure
because of distaste for particular rulings issued by members of the Ninth
Circuit. Split supporters acting at the behest of the timber, mineral and oil
extraction, grazing, and forestry industries, key m many of the western
states, believe that these constituencies have been stymied by environmen-
tal rulings and decisions impacting on Native American rights.31 Accord-
ing to Umversity of Washington law professor Stewart Jay, Senator Slade
31 See, e.g., S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997) (Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Reorganization Act of 1997); H.R. 2935, 104th Cong. (1996) (proposing split); S.
956, 104th Cong. (1995) (establishing commission on structural alternatives for
Courts ofAppeals); S. 853, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing split); H.R. 3654, 103d
Cong. (1993) (same); S. 1686, 102d Cong, (1991) (same); H.R. 4900, 101st Cong.
(1990) (same); S. 948, 101st Cong. (1989) (same).
365 See David G. Savage, Getting the High Court's Attention: Liberal-Leaning
9th Circuit is Often Reversed, A.B.A. J., Nov 1997, at 46.
3
1 See, e.g., Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286
(9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) (awarding tribal government sovereign
rights over tax decisions); Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd
sub nom. Benuettv. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997) (holding thatranchers andwater
irrigation districts could not employ citizen suit provisions of Endangered Species
Act to challenge government action); Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244
(9th Cir. 1994), rev'd in part, 117 S. Ct. 2098 (1997) (holding that state officials
were not immune from suit in boundary dispute concerning ownership of land
under a lake and between three rivers flowing through reservation lands); Seattle
Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 503 U.S. 429
(1992) (enjoining enforcement of appropriations statute that would have allowed
timber sales from old growth forests in Oregon and Washington because of the
presence of spotted owls protected by the Endangered Species Act); Oregon
Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 832 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490
U.S. 360 (1989) (enjoining construction of Elk Creek Dam in Oregon because
Army Corps ofEngmeers violated National Environmental Protection Act); David
C. Frederick, An OldArgument: Bids to Split the Ninth Circuit Are Nothing New,
nor Are the Sound Arguments Against a Split, RECORDER, Aug. 20, 1997, at 6;
Letter from Ninth Circuit Judge Charles E. Wiggins to Representative Harold
Rogers (Aug. 1, 1997) (copy on file with author).
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Gorton (R-Wash.), aperennial sponsor of legislation to split the circuit, "is
doing this because he thinks it will produce rulings in environmental and
land-use cases that are more favorable to his ideology" 367 Carolyn
Richardson, chief environmental lawyer for the California Farm Bureau, a
trade association, believes there is a California slant to the environmental
decisions: "the 9th Circuit is California, when you look at the decisions
coming out. I think that the other states have good cause to complain.1368
Speaking of the 1996 Alaskan Native American sovereignty decision,
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 69 Senator Ted
Stevens (R-Alaska) proclaimed, "[the] court has too much to do to even
learn about Alaska. I don't think any of those judges ever have been to
Alaska and yet we have them issuing an opinion like this which has so
much to do with our future.
'3 70
Senators favoring a split believe that if the California judges are
isolated, then the environmental decisions will be more favorable to
industrial interests, 371 but as Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozmski pro-
claims:
I'm no big friend of the environment-I'm pretty conservative. And I
haven't seen a lot of outrageous things happen. I've seen a bunch of laws
written m a mushy way getting applied by judges who have a view, but
who aren't doing anything terribly outrageous. If you want to change
what courts do, you're going to have to write better laws.37
2
As Governor Pete Wilson of California angrily noted, "the real issue
appears to be one of judicial gerrymandering, which seeks to cordon off
some judges in one circuit while keeping others m another because of
concerns, whether perceived or real, over particular judges' perspectives
or judicial philosophy "3rI
Senior Ninth Circuit Judge J. Clifford Wallace wrote to Senator Hatch:
367 Ostrom, supra note 26, at Al.
368 Morning Edition (Nat'l Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 27, 1997).
369 Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir.
1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
370 Neil A. Lewis, Western Senators Are Pushing to Break Up Circuit Court,
N.Y TIMES, Sept. 1, 1997, atA16.
371 See Fredenck, supra note 366, at 6.
31 Ostrom, supra note 26, at Al.
373 Editorial, Study the Split: Attack on 9th Circuit Is "Judicial Genymander-
ing, " SACRAMENTO BEE, July 18, 1997, at B6.
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Exactly sixty years ago this month, President Roosevelt acknowl-
edged the defeat of his plan to "pack" the Supreme Court m order to
reverse decisions he did not like. What killed the plan is that Roosevelt
lost the support of liberals who agreed with his legislative agenda but
were unwilling to alter court structures as a means to that end. Here, the
plan involves "unpacking" a court, but the lesson remains equally apt
altering court structures for ideological purposes is an inappropriate use
of Congress' power.
374
Todd True of the Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund claimed that
[i]n the past, proposals like this have been motivated by a desire to change
the outcome, particularly in natural resource and environmental cases.
To the extent this proposal has the same motivation, it's not just a bad
idea, it's flat-out dangerous. Court packing or restructuring by the
legislature to try to control the judiciary shouldn't be part of our govern-
ment system.375
In 1978, twenty-three Ninth Circuit judges handled 3100 cases.376 By
1995, twenty-eight judges handled 8600 cases.377 Two years later, because
of the Senate's reaction on confirming judicial nominees, there were ten
vacancies, and eighteen judges were handling almost 9000 cases and
overseeing an enormous backlog.3 7 According to Ninth Circuit Chief
Judge, Proctor Hug, Jr., because of the Senate's confirmation gridlock,
"We simply do not have enough active district and appellate judges to hear
and decide cases m a prompt and timely manner."379 The chiefjudge said,
"We've examined our procedures. We've looked at every other circuit,
looked at ways to handle more cases. We've sought measure to improve the
process without overdelegation of work to staff and law clerks.""38 In 1997,
374 Letter from Judge I. Clifford Wallace, Semor Judge of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee (July 18, 1997) (copy on file with author).
" Senate Panel Oks Breakup ofRegion 's Appeals Court, LAS VEGAS REV -J.,
July 16, 1997, at 6B.
376 See David J. Pasternak, TheJudiciary UnderAttack, 20 L.A. LAWYER, Sept
1997, at 11, 11.
37 See id.
371 See id.
37 9 Id.
3. Carney, supra note 142, at 2913.
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the chief judge was forced to cancel 100 circuit panels, affecting 600
cases.
381
During the past three years, interest by Republican senators from the
West m an immediate split was so intense that holds were placed on all
nominees to the Ninth Circuit. None were confirmed in 1996 and 1997 A
Senate colleague approached Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and said
"I am not going to let anybody go through until the mnth circuit splits
into two circuits."
I said "Why do you want it to split?"
He said "The reason I want it to split is I don't like the fact that
Califormajudges are making decisions that affect my state. 382
Senator Dianne Feinstem was
concerned about what appears to me to be a plan to force the splitting of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by crippling its ability to
do its work.
Ten of the twenty-eight judgeships on that court are now vacant-36
percent of the bench.
I believe that proponents of the nith circuit split wish to keep these
seats vacant as long as possible, so that the vacant judgeships can then be
transferred to the new twelfth circuit, and filled by judges who they hope
will be more in line with their own political philosophy.
Unfortunately, this plan is substantially inparmng the ability of the
ninth circuit to do its job, and impeding justice for the millions of
Americans who live within the ninth circuit
383
During the 104th Congress, the Senate Judiciary Committee held
hearings on a proposal to place California, along with Arizona, Hawaii,
Nevada, and the Pacific territories in the Ninth Circuit. The remaining
states would be placed in a new Twelfth Circuit. 84 Voted out of commit-
tee, the proposal died at the end of the Congress. In July of 1997, without
381 See Mike Doyle, UnfilledJudgeships Cause Case Crunch, FRESNO BEE, June
2, 1997, atB1.
382 143 CONG. REC. S2540 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997).
383 143 CONG. REC. S9165 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1997).
384 See S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The remaining states are Alaska,
Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington.
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any hearings and with limited discussion, a new proposal was added to the
Senate appropriations bill covering the Departments of Commerce, State,
and Justice, and the Judiciary"' that would have split the Ninth Circuit at
the beginning of the following fiscal year (October 1, 1997). California,
Nevada, and the two Pacific territories were to be included in a reconfig-
ured Ninth Circuit, and the remainder of the jurisdiction was to be placed
in a new Twelfth Circuit. 86 Almost all of the bar associations from the
affected states were opposed to this provision, as were most of the judges
on the Ninth Circuit. Although the split provision in the appropriations bill
was substantive legislation included with appropriations (which is
theoretically frowned upon), it passed the full Senate.
Senator Dianne Feinstem (D-Cal.) had proposed that the Senate pass
a substitute measure, previously approved by the House of Representatives
on June 3, 1997,87 which would have set up a commission to study all of
the circuit courts and make recommendations as to their structure
uniformly 3 18 Senator Femstem's alternative failed on a party line vote on
July 24, 1997 389 The appropriations process for the bill broke down
between House negotiators, who wanted a free-standing commission to be
included in the final passage of the appropriations measure (who were
joined by the Democratic members of the Senate), and Senate Appropria-
tions Chairman Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), who favored an immediate Ninth
Circuit split. Ultimately, Congress approved a compromise provision in the
last days of its 1997 session that established a five-person Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals which would
study "the structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals system,
with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit."39°
Chaired by retired Supreme Court Justice Byron White, the Commis-
sion included Senior Arizona District Judge William D. Browning, N. Lee
Cooper, past president of the American Bar Association, Sixth Circuit
Judge Gilbert S. Merritt, and Ninth Circuit Judge Pamela Ann Rymer. The
Commission held six public hearings in 1998 at which eighty-nine
witnesses testified, sixty-four at two hearings held in San Francisco and
Seattle. It received niety-two written statements from other interested
persons, and it produced a draft report and received seventy-six comments
35 See S. 1022, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
386 See 143 CONG. REC. S8084 (daily ed. July 24, 1997).
3
1
7 See 143 CONG. REc. H3223 (daily ed. June 3, 1997).
38 See H.R. 908, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997)
389 See 143 CONG. REC. S8061 (daily ed. July 24, 1997).
390 143 CONG. REC. S12339 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997).
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on that report.3 9' The Commission surveyed and received responses from
more than eighty percent of all active and senior circuit and district judges.
It also surveyed a national sample of more than 5600 lawyers who regularly
handle appeals in the federal courts and received responses from fifty-four
percent.392 69.7% of the judges on the Ninth Circuit and 67.6% of the
district judges within the Ninth Circuit "do not favor realignment of the
boundaries of the circuit."'393 The governors of Califorma, Nevada, Oregon,
and Washington, the United States Department of Justice, the American
Bar Association, and most state bar associations oppose a split, while some
of the senators from Alaska, Montana, and Washington, and some state
attorneys general within the Circuit support a split.394 Four members of the
United States Supreme Court-Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Stevens-also favor a split.395
While the Commission looked at the structure of all of the federal
courts, pursuant to its mandate it concentrated on the Ninth Circuit. Its
work was based on an important premise:
There is one principle that we regard as undebatable: It is wrong to
realign circuits (or not realign them), and to restructure courts (or leave
them alone) because of particular judicial decisions or particular judges.
This rule must be faithfully honored, for the independence ofthejudiciary
is of constitutional dimension and requires no less.
In conducting our analysis and developing our recommendations, we
have proceeded on the premise that the decisions about judicial structure
and circuit alignment should be based on objective and principled
considerations ofsound judicial admimstration. Moreover, such decisions
should be made with a long-range perspective and not be motivated by
short-range, temporary circumstances.
396
Having made this assertion, the Commission's concluding report was
divided into two parts, one that focused on how the Ninth Circuit functions
391 See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 3-4 (Dec. 18, 1998) [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT].
392 See id. at 4.
393 Id. at 38.
394 See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS, TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT 36 (Oct 1998).
395 See id.
396 FINAL REPORT, supra note 391, at 6.
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as an administrative unit and the other on how the Ninth Circuit works as
a court of appeals. The Commission concluded that administratively the
Ninth Circuit was functionmg well, that it been innovative in handling its
burgeoning caseload, and that "the administration of the Ninth Circuit is,
at the least, on a par with that of other circuits, and innovative in many
respects. We seeno goodreasonto split the circuit solely out of concern for
its size or admmistration. '3 97 In fact, the Commission thought that the
present configuration was advantageous in providing western and Pacific
Rim states with a single uniform body of federal law, unlike the Atlantic
coast/Gulf of Mexico comdor which is divided into six circuit courts.
The Commission was concerned about the high reversal rate by the
Supreme Court to which the Ninth Circuit was subjected, the immense
number of decisions made by Ninth Circuit judges, and the probability that
thejudges on that bench were unable to retain an understanding of all ofthe
cases decided by the court. In response to these problems, the Commission
recommended that the current borders of the Ninth Circuit should not be
redrawn but that it should be split into three internal divisions to "capitalize
on the benefits of smaller decisional units without sacrificing the benefits
of a large circuit." '398 The three divisions would include: a Northern
Division made up of Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington; a
Middle Division with the Northern and Eastern Districts of California,
Hawaii, Nevada, and the Pacific islands; and a Southern Division made up
of Arizona and the Central and Southern Districts of California.399
Each of the three divisions would be made up of at least seven judges,
a majority of whom would have to reside within that division, and the
remainder could be assigned permanently or for temporary tours of duty
The Commission believes that the combination of resident home judges
mixed with judges from outside the region and inclusion in the larger
circuit "heightens the regional character deemed a desirable feature of the
federal intermediate appellate system, without losing the benefits of
diversity inherent in a court drawn from a larger area.' °
The Commission believes that this divisional structure would promote
consistency and predictability
Over time, coherence and consistency suffer when judges are unable to
monitor the law of their entire decisional unit or correct misstatements of
397 Id. at ix.
399 Id. at47
399 See id. at 48.
400 Id. at 49.
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the court's decisional law. We believe that judges operating m the
smaller decisional units we propose-the regional divisions-will find it
easier to monitor the law in their respective divisions and that those
smaller decisional units will thus promote greater consistency.
401
Each division would have an added advantage for litigants because the
division would be "much more of a 'known bench,' fostering judicial
accountability and public confidence. Likewise, the circuit judges will
know better the district judges and lawyers within their jurisdiction." 2
Each division "would function as a semi-autonomous decisional
unit. Decisions made m one division would not bind any other division,
but they should be accorded substantial weight as the judges of the circuit
endeavorto keep circuit law consistent." °3 In orderto maintain consistency
andprevent legal conflict within the circuit, the Commissionrecommended
establishing a circuit-wide review panel, to be called the Circuit Division
for Conflict Correction. The Circuit Division would review cases where a
regional division has conducted an en banc review or where such a review
was sought and demed. This special panel would consist ofthirteenjudges,
including the Chief Judge of the circuit and four judges from each of the
three regional divisions, to be selected by lot.'
The Circuit Division would not have jurisdiction to review a decision by
a regional division on the ground that it is considered to be incorrect or
unsound; its only authority would be to resolve square interdivisional
conflicts. A regional division's decision that is claimed to be in error but
does not create a conflict between divisions would be subject to review
only by the regional division sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court.4°5
The current "mini en banc" provision used m the Ninth Circuit would be
abolished.4
The Commission summanzed its thoughts about the Ninth Circuit:
The divisional structure for the court of appeals that we recommend,
with a ready conflict-correction mechanism, is a practical alternative that
401 Id. at 47
4
02 Id.
403 Id. at43.
' See id.
4°- Id. at 45.
406 See id.
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is workable, will achieve the legitimate ends of those who favor splitting
the circuit and those who seek to preserve it, and affords the greatest
promise for flexibility m the future. It is not, of course, aperfect structure.
We can think of none that can be, with California-the single largest
contributor to caseload-a part of the circuit. Yet we are persuaded that it
is better to have the State of California subject to different divisions
within the same circuit than to split it between circuits.407
It is important to note that the Commission recognized that many of the
calls for division of the Ninth Circuit were politically motivated, and that
there were no controlling reasons to split the court. While there may be
some benefits in having regional influences reflected m a court of appeals,
these can be accommodatedwhile still safeguarding a single coherentbody
of law throughout the Ninth Circuit. Accordingly, the recommendations
appear to be a victory for those who advocate retention of the current
parameters of the court. However, unless the recommendations are
inplemented, we will not know how effective the internal Circuit Division
for Conflict Correction would be in maintaining consistency from one
division to another. The end result may be three balkanized divisions
having little to do with each other jurisprudentially, except that they are
administratively maintained within a single larger Ninth Circuit.
Unsurprisingly, there has been a mixed response to the Commission's
recommendations. Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Proctor Hug, Jr., who has led
the court's effort to remain united, is "pleased the commission said the
circuit should not be split" and delighted that the report notes that
"administration of the 9th Circuit is at least on a par with other circuits and
innovative in many respects,"41° but on behalf of the court, he finally said
that the proposal would undermine the Commission's desire to maintain a
single body of federal law in the western states. 4°9 Senator Frank
Murkowski (R-Alaska), who has favored a split, called the Commission's
recommendations "an ideal solution. It was good to see the commission
largely accept our arguments for the need for cases to be reviewed inside
each region. I believe this recommendation will bring about the
momentum needed to see this carried out by Congress.!"'"
4 07 Id. at57
408 David Savage, California and the West: Panel Urges Realignment of
Appeals Court, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at A3.
41 9th Circuit Chef Judge Objects to Divisions, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 8,
1998, at A3.
410 Paul Elias, Splitting Circuit Is Not 1st Choice, RECORDER, Oct. 8, 1998, at
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In contrast, split proponent and Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid
O'Scannlam said,
If we're going to go through all that trouble, why not split it? I think that
the people in Congress will see that there is some merit in restructuring
the circuit. Because now a really highly regarded committee, with four
judges and the former head of the ABA, is saying something must be
done.
411
Long-time Ninth Circuit split supporter Senator Conrad Bums (R-Mont.)
views the Commission's recommendations as "a floor, not a ceiling."412 A
spokesperson for California Governor Pete Wilson, who opposes splitting
the Ninth Circuit, said, "It seems to split the baby, having two divisions in
California. A disagreement between each division could be very confusing
and problematic.""'3
The Commission's work is sinply a recommendation, and the 106th
Congress has the opportunity to transform these recommendations into
legislation.414
IV CONCLUSION
Judicial independence is the ability of judges to be free from outside
pressures, other than legal constraints and precedents, so that they can
decide cases in an impartial manner. In the federal system, judicial
independence has been safeguarded by life tenure and salary protection.
Arguably, the current array of congressional challenges to the judiciary is
the greatest threat posed to judicial independence in more than sixty
years.415 The most direct contemporary attacks on the federal judiciary are
411 Id.
412 Savage, supra note 365, at A3.
413 Jordan Lite, Commission Says Western-States Circuit Should Be Re-
organized, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 8, 1998, at A3.
414 In 1998, while the Commission was fimctionmg, the Senate confirmed
judges to fill five of the ten vacancies on the Ninth Circuit. See Admimstrative
Office of U.S. Courts, Vacancies in the FederalJudiciary (visited Mar. 17, 1998)
<http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/judgevacancy.htm>; cf. ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1999). Two
additional seats, those of Betty Fletcher and David Thompson, became vacant
during 1998. See id.
41 Undoubtedly, President Roosevelt's court packing scheme of 1937
represents the most extreme and dangerous attack on thejudiciary in the twentieth
1998-99]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the proposals to end life tenure and to require judges to petition for
reappointment, because these proposals directly strip away their constitu-
tional protections. Equally extreme are the calls for impeachment ofjudges
because of dislike for individual decisions and the plans to "intimidate"
federal judges. While these are the most aggressive of the attacks on
judicial independence, in fact they have had little impact. No one on the
political right or left seriously believes that impeachment proceedings will
be initiated; even if the public thinks that life tenure is inherently undemo-
cratic, there is little likelihood that the Constitution will be amended to
bring about its demise.
Verbal attacks on judges such as those made during the 1996 presiden-
tial campaign and the convening of hearings to studyjudicial activism are
designed to challenge the judiciary, and these too can have an impact on
judicial independence. Because he suppressed a large amount of cocaine,
Southern District of New York Judge Harold Baer became a whipping boy
for Senator Dole, President Clinton, and various members of Congress.
Ultimately he revisited that suppression decision and changed his mind.
Third Circuit Judge Lee Sarokin was harshly criticized during that same
campaign, mostly for decisions made when he had served as a district court
judge. Judge Sarokin soon opted to retire from the bench instead of taking
senior status as planned. Who knows why Judge Baer changed his mind
and why Judge Sarokin actually retired? Judge Baer may have decided not
to suppress the cocaine because of legitimate legal principles that were not
evident when he initially made the decision, and Judge Sarokm may have
decided to retire because he wanted to spend more time with new grand-
children in California. In part, these decisions may also have resulted from
attacks on character, legal acumen, or honesty, and if so, these attacks on
judicial independence were successful.
As Second Circuit Judge John M. Walker, a former president of the
Federal Judges Association, suggests that there is a difference between
helpful criticism and harmful intimidation:
century and resulted in its most significant capitulation to external pressure.
Although FDR failed to win enactment of this legislation, he succeeded m Ins
overall goal: within months of the introduction of the plan, the Supreme Court
permanently changed its jurisprudential outlook and the most obstructionist
members of the Court soon resigned. This attack on the judiciary represented an
assault on judicial independence, and it caused the federal courts to alter their
behavior. See, e.g., LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK. THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR
AND THE SUPREME COURT (1967); HAROLD L. ICKES, THE INSIDE STRUGGLE: THE
SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES (1954); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE
SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF
ROOSEVELT (1995).
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I don't want to suggest that discussion, indeed forceful criticism of
particular decisions of particular courts is somehow inappropriate.
Vigorous critical debate is an nportant part of our culture and part of the
advancement of our ideas m our society. I and all otherjudges benefit
from thoughtful criticism of those taking issue with the reasoning or
unstated assumptions of our opinions. Indeed, the appellate process is
grounded on thoughtful criticism. Nor do I suggest that personal or
partisan criticism is somehow outside the tradition of our freedom of
expression. But when criticism reaches the level of intimidation-that is,
the attempt to affect the outcome of a particular case or future cases of
like kind before a particular judge-then I believe judicial independence
is imperiled.
Appropriate criticism would certainly include pointing out defective
reasoning, mis-application of the law to the facts, and a judge's clear
departure from the law to effect personal policy preferences independent
of the law. Criticism, I think, goes too far when it consists of
personalized attacks that are focused simply on the result of a judge's
decision without any consideration of its legal reasoning or of the facts of
the case, or attacks that call for a judge's resignation or removal from
office on the basis of rulings in a particular case. That's a fairly narrow
category of criticism. [E]nlightened, thoughtful criticism that is
comprehensive and well-reasoned and makes sincere points appealing to
intellect are almost always appropriate 416
While congressional hearings on so-called "judicial activism" have not
resulted m specific congressional action, equating the rendering of
reasoned judicial decisions with judicial misbehavior, as in one hearing
entitled JudicialMisconduct andDiscipline, contributes to rising hatred for
government generally, diminishes respect for the courts specifically, and
can serve to jeopardize judicial independence.
Congress, of course, has the constitutional authority to establish and
modify the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is completely appropriate
(although perhaps bad policy) for Congress to federalize specific crimes,
eliminate violations of the criminal code, and alter diversity jurisdiction
which limits caseload. Congress has also modified a relevant law or passed
a new one in response to specific findings of unconstitutionality by the
Supreme Court. However, when Congress passes legislation like the Illegal
416 ABA Heanngs of the Comm'n, supra note 16 (Dec. 13, 1996) (statement of
Judge John M. Walker).
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Immigration Reform and Imngrant Responsibility Act or considers the
DeLay Prison Amendment to H.R. 1252 to remove jurisdictions from the
courts and the right to create potential remedies from mdividual judges, this
can effectively curtail judicial independence, even though it may not be
unconstitutional. Legislators have long recognized the danger of court-
stripping legislation, and while much of tis legislation has been introduced
m previous years, almost none passed until the 104th Congress. These
recent laws have effectively dimimshed the power and influence of federal
judges in direct response to unwelcome court decisions.
The three branches of government are interdependent. Most people
would concede that deliberate congressional action to eliminate funding
from the federal courts would constitute an attack onjudicial independence.
Many of these same people would fall to recognize such an attack in the
failure to confirm judicial appointees or the elimination of federal
judgeships. They would similarly fail to see a problem with changing the
configuration of certain courts or in not approving legislation which adds
new federal judgeships. Collectively, these policies represent the inple-
mentation of "court-unpacking" plans, a modem congressional analog to
President Roosevelt's action of the past. If the judiciary is so overworked
that it cannot address the rising number of cases before it, it may have to
alter systems and procedures in response. If a general financial crisis
affected the entire government, then required sacrifices by the judicial
branch would not constitute an attack onjudicial independence. Currently,
however, the United States is facing little financial difficulty, and the
courts, in any event, constitute only a tiny fraction of the entire national
budget.
A portion of the confirmation gridlock, in the form of Republican
efforts to prohibit expansion of the judiciary, and plans to shrink part of it
are designed to deny President Clinton his right to appomtjudges. Much of
this effort represents an ultraconservative response to specific decisions,
because some members of Congress believe that fewer judges will
inevitably lead to less judicial activism. Senator Jeff Sessions made direct
reference to this in Merrick Garland's 1997 confirmation debate. Claiming
it was unnecessary to fill the eleventh seat on that court, Sessions observed
that "mischief sometimes gets started. I recall the old saying my mother
used to use: an idle mind is the devil's workshop. We need judges with full
caseloads, with plenty of work to do, important work to do. Fundamen-
tally, this is a question of efficiency and productivity ,,17 Representing an
attack on the courts, these plans have also placed the judiciary in an
417 143 CONG. REc. S2533-34 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997).
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increasingly vulnerable relationslp with Congress, such that pleas for
relief threaten judicial independence.
What is particularly incongruous about the recent series of attacks on
thejudiciary is that the courts have not made expansive policy While there
are certainly some errant decisions, these do not justify wholesale changes
m the structure, powers, and strength of the judiciary The theoretical
excesses of the Warren Court took place more than thirty years ago, and the
federal courts today are populated by Reagan-Bush conservatives, Clinton
moderates, and a few scattered liberals. Unlike the Great Depression, which
might have provided some rationale for attacking activist decisions of the
1930s, there is no contemporary national emergency which can justify an
assault on judicial independence. The United States is prosperous at home
and hegemomc abroad. Instead, legislators have placed judicial independ-
ence on the altar of political expediency solely to curry favor with the
electorate. Federal judges can look forward to similar treatment during the
remainder of the 106th Congress.

